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5 - Informal constraints

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Douglass C. North
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
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Summary

In all societies from the most primitive to the most advanced, people impose constraints upon themselves to give a structure to their relations with others. Under conditions of limited information and limited computational ability, constraints reduce the costs of human interaction as compared to a world of no institutions. However, it is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that societies devise than to describe and be precise about the informal ways by which human beings have structured human interaction. But although they defy, for the most part, neat specification and it is extremely difficult to develop unambiguous tests of their significance, they are important.

In the modern Western world, we think of life and the economy as being ordered by formal laws and property rights. Yet formal rules, in even the most developed economy, make up a small (although very important) part of the sum of constraints that shape choices; a moment's reflection should suggest to us the pervasiveness of informal constraints. In our daily interaction with others, whether within the family, in external social relations, or in business activities, the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are formal rules, but these are seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1990

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  • Informal constraints
  • Douglass C. North, Washington University, St Louis
  • Book: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678.007
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  • Informal constraints
  • Douglass C. North, Washington University, St Louis
  • Book: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Informal constraints
  • Douglass C. North, Washington University, St Louis
  • Book: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678.007
Available formats
×