INTRODUCTION: AUTOCRACY, LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT

A staple of the development policy literature is the idea that a better quality legal system will help generate economic growth, which in turn builds constituencies for democratic reforms. Yet the causal linkages between the judiciary and political liberalization have been difficult to demonstrate empirically. Legal reforms that are narrowly focused on better enforcement of property rights and contract law may be conducive to enhanced trade and investment, but we still have very little firm knowledge about those links and about their ultimate relationship with democracy (Carothers 2003). Our investigation of the political role of the courts during economic transition describes the different incentives for democracies and autocracies to strengthen the role of courts as a framework for investment and trade, fiscal discipline, and administrative centralization. We argue that this choice has different effects on political rents, corruption, and aggregate economic activity in democracies and autocracies. We ultimately conclude that there is little reason to believe that judicial reform will lead to political transition.

THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE COURTS ACCORDING TO REGIME EMPHASIS

A judicial system can be used as a tool to enhance the political survival of leaders within authoritarian regimes just as in democratic ones. Courts may help reduce costs of commercial transactions for private citizens in both contexts. However, the consequences of judicial independence for resource distribution will vary according to regime type.