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13 - Rationality and the unthinkable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

With respect to actions of whatever sort, circumstances are conceivable in which an action of just that sort would have greater utility than any available alternative. This means that if utilitarianism is correct, anything might at some point be morally imperative. There are people who make a similar point about atheism. If God does not exist, they say, anything goes. A person may do or be whatever he likes.

These observations concerning atheism and utilitarianism are not the same, but they are closely related. Each suggests that the doctrine to which it pertains makes it impossible to believe that there are absolute moral limits. Atheism is supposed to have the consequence that nothing is forbidden: If there is no God, everything is permitted. Utilitarianism is supposed to imply, correspondingly, that anything may be required. On the assumption that these characterizations of the two doctrines are correct, adherents of neither doctrine acknowledge any unconditional moral constraints. Utilitarians and atheists agree, in other words, that nothing can be ruled out in advance.

We are accustomed to taking it for granted that enlargements of our freedom enrich us. They do so, however, only up to a point. If the restrictions upon the choices that a person can make are loosened too far, he may become disoriented and uncertain about what and how to choose. Extensive proliferation of his options may weaken his grasp of his own identity.

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The Importance of What We Care About
Philosophical Essays
, pp. 177 - 190
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1988

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