The ill-starred American intervention in Southeast Asia at the height of the Cold War continues to fade into history as the generation that fought or lived through it departs from the scene. As a parable of the crimes and follies of “imperialism” American-style, though, it retains much of its emotional power in ongoing debates over American intervention in the Middle East and Southwest Asia today, and has to feature prominently in any account of the foreign policy of the United States after World War II. At first sight, however, the war in Vietnam seems a singularly unpromising candidate for a case study in neo-imperial proconsulship. Over the course of the two decades of American engagement in Southeast Asia (1954–75), many senior officials labored in a variety of locations on behalf of a number of U.S. government entities to counter communist advances there, but no single man on the spot ever enjoyed authority over the entire American effort. These included diplomats, military commanders of advisory and later combat units, and a variety of other officials operating out of not only Saigon (South Vietnam) but Vientiane (Laos), Bangkok (Thailand), and Honolulu (headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Command). At times these officials collaborated closely; at other times they operated virtually independently; not infrequently, they fought each other bitterly for control of policy on the ground. Furthermore, it would not be misleading to say that the Vietnam War was for all practical purposes waged directly from Washington – that is to say, that it was micromanaged to a degree that is probably unique in the annals of America's overseas conflicts. Unfortunately, the problems that prevented effective cooperation among different government agencies in the field were largely replicated at the center – and in fact were fatally aggravated by weak and divided leadership there.