After the World Economic Conference had collapsed, the question of exchange stabilization did not stay dead. Professor Sayers has explained that Governor Harrison of the New York Federal Reserve Bank pressed for some Anglo-American agreement in summer 1933 and then again in November. Unable to buy gold freely with dollars, the Exchange Equalisation Account operated chiefly in French francs, and from time to time it was able to peg the sterling-franc rate. Between the Bank of England and the Bank of France, understanding and cooperation steadily increased. But the French continued to press for some more formal arrangement, and after the United States had returned the dollar to gold American pressure was not unknown. Though it was interested in the management of sterling, and increasingly willing to envisage some sort of international cooperation in exchange management, the Treasury consistently resisted this pressure. The chancellor of the exchequer was if anything even more determined than his officials. The principal purpose of this chapter is to chronicle the Franco-American initiatives and Whitehall's responses.

Franco-American importunities

In the Treasury, the Bank, and the mind of the chancellor, the events of spring and summer 1933 had left a definite deposit of suspicion. As we have seen, Chamberlain was already inclined to distrust the Americans, and, in particular, the president. “Master Roosevelt,” as Chamberlain called him, would tack and change course in response to every political breeze.