This chapter looks at perhaps the most basic characteristic of the president's legislative agenda, the number of legislative proposals that the president submits to Congress, what Cameron and Park (2008) term legislative activism. The conventional wisdom holds that modern presidents, those from FDR onward, have been more active in the legislative policy-making process than their predecessors. Theories of the modern presidency often cite increased presidential involvement in the legislative process as a characteristic that distinguishes modern presidents from traditional ones (Greenstein, 1988; Pfiffner, 2008; Shaw, 1987; Wayne, 1978).

Thus, it is no surprise, as documented later in this chapter, that presidents are more legislatively active in the modern era than before. The legislative proposal database allows us to pinpoint the timing of the increase in presidential activism. That takeoff in legislative activism did not come during the FDR administration, but with Harry Truman after the end of the Second World War. As we shall see, this is consistent with the theory of congressional anticipations, which argues that presidents submit larger legislative agendas when they expect greater success with Congress. The creation of the legislative program and central clearance allowed the president to regulate the provision of bureaucratic expertise to Congress. Insofar as that expertise is useful to Congress in building legislation, control over this resource potentially strengthened the president's bargaining position with Congress. Thus, we should find the surge in legislative activism occurring in the late 1940s, rather than with Franklin Roosevelt's presidency, the more common view derived from the modern presidency perspective.