Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Propositions and Corollaries
- Tables
- Figures
- Sidebars
- Definitions
- Preface
- Overview of the Book
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods
- Part I The Logic of Collective Action
- Part II Collective Choice
- Part III Political Institutions and Quality Outcomes
- Part IV Social Justice, Choice, and Welfare
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Propositions and Corollaries
- Tables
- Figures
- Sidebars
- Definitions
- Preface
- Overview of the Book
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods
- Part I The Logic of Collective Action
- Part II Collective Choice
- Part III Political Institutions and Quality Outcomes
- Part IV Social Justice, Choice, and Welfare
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Summary
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- Information
- Principles of PoliticsA Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice, pp. 253 - 268Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012
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