Upon reaching the age of majority in the spring of 1902, Alfonso XIII ascended to the throne of Spain, after swearing to uphold the Constitution, a text that had been in force for twenty-five years. He was a new king for a new century. Here was an opportunity to adapt the political system of the Restoration to the new challenges and problems posed by society, to repair the cracks formed by the Desastre of 1898 before they threatened its existence – in short, to begin a programme of national ‘regeneration’, the word on everyone’s lips, repeated in the corridors of the Cortes and all the provincial community centres.

With the help of the Crown, the political elites aimed to lead a reform from above, a nationalising mobilisation that would broaden the social bases of the regime without putting its hegemony at risk, thus avoiding a revolution. The political history of Spain between 1902 and 1917 bears witness to this failure. The reasons for this are complex and diverse. The first reason was the attitude of Alfonso XIII himself, who from the outset insisted on intervening in political life and refused to renounce any of his prerogatives. The second was the crisis of the traditional parties, which were incapable of maintaining undisputed leaders and converting their roll-call of worthies into modern organisations. The internal division of liberals and conservatives, with factions, cronies and caciques at loggerheads over the distribution of power, undermined the stability of the governments and put a brake on Parliament’s legislative initiatives. The chance for the conservatives arrived with Antonio Maura, between 1904 and 1909; the Liberals’ effort, under José Canalejas, was frustrated by his assassination in 1912.