4 - The intrinsic value of the basic minimum
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
Summary
So far, I have offered a critical analysis of the most important non-welfarist approaches to the basic minimum. I have also argued that at least one welfarist approach (captured by WBM, or the view that the basic minimum is the maintenance of a valued project) can avoid the welfarist's dilemma. But even if we accept WBM (or, in response to the problem of preference for the worse, WBM2), much remains to be done in providing a full welfarist approach to the basic minimum. Though we may know what the minimum threshold is, a well-formed conception of the basic minimum must also account for its comparative moral importance. In other words, we must address a problem I hereby dub “the problem of weight”: we must understand the comparative moral weight of the basic minimum against non-minimum states.
To some, an inquiry into the moral importance of the basic minimum might seem quaint. After all, we're talking about a basic minimum: surely the most natural way to understand its significance is to insist that the promotion of the basic minimum is, in all cases, of paramount or overriding moral importance. Of course, givenBM3, this is not conceptually required: a basic minimum need only take weak moral priority. But surely the most natural view is that the basic minimum (whether welfarist or otherwise) should be the dominant moral concern. This proposal is reflected in the general motivation for a basic minimum offered by Stuart White (among others), and in Nussbaum's Guarantee.
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- The Basic MinimumA Welfarist Approach, pp. 109 - 146Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012
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