In previous chapters I have focused chiefly on decisions by competent individuals about the timing and manner of their own death (either, indirectly, by way of an advance directive, or, directly, when death is imminent). In this chapter I will be considering decisions about death and dying made on behalf of those who are not competent (either because they are no longer competent and have never issued an advance directive that sets out their considered wishes, or because they have never been, nor, as best we can judge, ever will be, competent). There is a risk inherent in proceeding straight from a discussion of voluntary medically assisted death to the topic of non-voluntary euthanasia, namely the risk of giving credence to the criticism that the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide would inevitably lead to non-voluntary euthanasia being practised. I have argued that that is not inevitable, so nothing hinges on the order in which the chapters appear. Moreover, I have contended that opponents of the legalisation of voluntary medically assisted death already embrace medical practices that, properly understood, amount to nonvoluntary euthanasia (for instance, the withholding and withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment from patients whom it is judged futile to continue to treat, but who have given no indication as to whether they wish to be kept alive for as long as medically possible).