The first two sections of this reply are devoted respectively to the criticisms of my views raised by Stephen Engstrom and Andrews Reath at a symposium on Kant's Theory of Freedom. The third section contains my response to the remarks of Marcia Baron at a second symposium. The fourth section deals with some general criticisms of my treatment of Kant's conception of freedom and its connection with transcendental idealism that have been raised by Karl Ameriks in a review article and by Paul Guyer in his review of my book. The reply as a whole is thus an attempt to clarify and defend some of the central claims of my book in light of the initial critical reaction.

Practical and transcendental freedom

Engstrom correctly points out that my primary concern in the first part of Kant's Theory of Freedom was to articulate a theory of freedom contained in the first Critique that is based on a general account of rational agency rather than on any specific features of moral agency. Central to this account is what I have termed Kant's “Incorporation Thesis,” that is, the view that inclinations or desires do not of themselves constitute an incentive or sufficient reason to act but do so only insofar as they are “taken up” or “incorporated” into a maxim. At the same time, however, I also distinguished between practical and transcendental freedom and claimed that the Incorporation Thesis required only the former.