Introduction

The argument set out in the foregoing chapters has been developed entirely for the case of simple majority rule. Might the problems posed by the predominance of expressive elements in voters' preferences be overcome, or moderated in a significant way, if the collective decision rule were more inclusive? There is, after all, a strong tradition in public choice theory – most clearly associated with Buchanan and Tullock – that the problems associated with majority rule disappear if unanimous decisions were required. Certainly, majoritarian cycling and the resultant indeterminacy of collective decision-making processes are not present under unanimity, because the requisite redistributions from minority to majority are no longer electorally relevant.

In fact, however, the voter's dilemma problem is also present under conditions of explicit consensus. That is, the revealed preference logic fails not only in large-number majoritarian settings, but also in large-number unanimity ones: The voter's dilemma, the “veil of insignificance,” is in this sense a necessary feature of all collective decision making, not just of majority rule.