INTRODUCTION

Senators strategically decide how to present their work to constituents in an effort to shift how they are evaluated by constituents. And senators have substantial discretion in deciding what to say to constituents. This creates the opportunity for deception – for senators to misleadingly convey their work to constituents. Most normative theorists would agree that deception is harmful to representation – it undermines the relationship between legislators and constituents necessary for effective representation (Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2009).

Deception comes in at least two forms, both of which, if present, could harm the quality of representation. The first form of deception is fabrication – creating a presentation of work that deviates from what they actually do in Washington. For example, legislators may speak out of both sides of their mouths – claiming credit for money secured for their state while also advocating for reform of the appropriations process. Or legislators may claim to advocate for policy on particular issues while doing little actual work to advance policy in those areas. A second form of deception is omission – failing to report stances or work performed in Washington. Legislators may be forced to cast difficult roll-call votes in Washington and fail to explain those votes to constituents. This is particularly true for marginal senators. For example, in the previous chapter I described how Lincoln Chafee faced pressure to support Bush's nominee for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).