The Six Day War

The Six Day war in 1967 altered the political landscape of Israel. The distinct possibility of an attack by Israel's Arab neighbours catalyzed the formation of a national coalition. For the first time, Menachem Begin, the veteran standard bearer of the Israeli Right, sat in government as Minister without Portfolio.

Unlike 1956, there had been no fatalistic expectation of a third round. Even so, a general anxiety had been increasing in the region. Egypt had concluded a defence pact with the regime in Damascus. There had also been an increasing number of military exchanges across the border with Syria – in April 1967, Israel shot down six Syrian MIG fighters. Both Israeli and Syrian settlements close to the border had been shelled.

The Soviet Union then seemingly exacerbated the prevailing tension by insisting that there had been a build-up of Israeli forces near the Syrian border with the intention of capturing Damascus. Nasser’s successful demand for the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force, separating the forces of Israel and Egypt, and his closing the Straits of Tiran to vessels flying the Israeli flag precipitated the crisis. Moreover, President Johnson refused to act on the pledge which the USA had given to Israel in February 1957 that ‘no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage’ in the Straits of Tiran. Despite President Kennedy’s provision of Hawk ground-to-air missiles to Israel in August 1962, the United States wanted a diplomatic solution. Indeed, Israeli military intelligence had not predicted a new war. There were no US arms for Israel.