This book was chiefly intended for English (and American) readers. Those points are emphasised which in the judgment of the author required emphasis for such readers. It may be worth while, therefore, in preparing a French translation, to indicate quite frankly and in a few words one or two of those aspects of the situation arising out of the Treaty of Versailles, which are of special significance for France.

The following chapters are designed to show, amongst other things, that our representatives at the Paris conference committed two grand errors against our interests. By demanding the impossible, they forsook the substance for the shadow and will in the event lose everything. By excessive concentration on political objects and on the attainment of an illusory security, they overlooked the economic unity of Europe—illusory because security is to be found least of all in the occupation of extended frontiers, and also because the political contrivances of the moment will be largely irrelevant to the problems of a later decade.

Let me say over again but more emphatically what is said in the following pages as to the bearing of these errors on the fortunes of France.

By the triumphantly victorious issue of the war, the political and moral position of France was no longer in question. But her financial and economic prospects were very bad. It was these latter, therefore, which prudent statesmanship should have sought to secure in the peace.