The December 2011 withdrawal of American troops from Iraq ended the nine-year war that cost the United States more than sixty-five hundred military, civilian employee, and contractor deaths; more than seventy-two thousand wounded; $1 trillion in short-term costs and perhaps another $2 billion or more in longer-term obligations in military benefits and health care expenses; America’s international credibility; and years of effort at reconstructing Iraq’s state and civil society. U.S. Coalition allies also incurred losses, including the United Kingdom’s 179 military deaths. For the Iraqis, the war resulted in more than a hundred thousand dead, countless thousands of civilians wounded, and millions of Iraqis displaced from their homes. At the time this is being written, the legitimacy of Iraq’s governing coalition remains tenuous. As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki attempts to consolidate his power by marginalizing his opposition, he ordered the arrest of Iraq’s Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi; an attempt was made to assassinate the Sunni minister of finance, Rafia al-Essawi; the governor of the Central Bank of Iraq, Sinan al-Shabibi, was suspended; and Muqtada al-Sadr has called for new elections. Street protests and demonstrations that occurred during the Arab Spring reflect the Iraqi people’s deep dissatisfaction with the provision of basic public services. More than a million Iraqis remain unemployed. Millions of other Iraqis fled their homeland, perhaps never to return. Corruption is endemic and undermines efforts at developing good governance and the rule of law. Regional and sectional issues threaten Iraq’s nationhood and contribute to the resurgence in sectarian violence. In the midst of this familiar list of woes that challenge an embryonic Iraq, why study the Iraqi budgetary process?