It seems to have become the general understanding today among lawyers that the privileges and responsibilities of the bar rest on delegation by the crown to the judges, at some remote time (perhaps in 1292), of the power to determine rights of audience; and on the further delegation by the judges to the inns of court, at some equally indeterminate period, of the process of training and selecting those who should exercise those rights. This is perhaps unexceptionable as a legal metaphor. As a matter of history, however, there never was an actual delegation of a power previously exercised by the crown. Delegation here means no more than it does when we say that the crown has delegated the administration of justice itself to the judges: with the duty of administering justice goes the responsibility of deciding who should appear as advocates, subject to any restraints imposed by law or custom.

Too much significance has been attached to the writ of 1292, whereby the king's Council ordered the justices of the Common Bench to control the number of attorneys following the court. Although the entry in the rolls of Parliament has the heading ‘De attornatis et apprenticiis’, the instrument itself does not mention apprentices and it now seems clear that it was directed at limiting the number of attorneys. There is no suggestion of delegation, let alone of any attempt to interfere with rights of audience.