Cyberspace communications infrastructure and logic rules are essential to the continued functioning of global commerce, diplomacy, and social networks of the twenty-first century. The previous chapters have demonstrated that strategic cyber A2/AD operations are possible and could deny states access to the benefits of cyberspace. Now that we know this, the question must be asked: What do we do with this information? States can try to protect themselves from strategic A2/AD operations in cyberspace, but can they also use it to deter or coerce others?

The ability to hold cyberspace infrastructure and communication nodes at risk is a significant factor in a conflict environment. Governments rely on cyberspace communications for command and control of military forces, economic stability, and societal well-being. Without access to cyberspace, the economy would immediately come to a halt, with millions of dollars lost per day of non-connectivity. Government, law enforcement, and security forces would have a difficult time functioning and protecting the population from domestic or foreign threats. Societal functioning would grind to a halt as people would need to develop alternate methods of conducting daily, routine activities.

Because of the serious impact of a strategic cyber A2/AD operation for society as a whole, it is likely that it would be applied leading up to or during a military conflict as one element of a larger campaign. At any threshold lower than armed conflict, strategic cyber A2/AD operations present the risk of potentially escalating the existing crisis to the level of armed conflict or broadening an existing armed conflict, as states could perceive the strategic cyber A2/AD action as a threat to their defences, economies, and societies.

Some scholars, such as Thomas Rid, discount the threat of cyber war, and others, such as Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness, assert that large-scale cyber conflicts are statistically unlikely to occur because they have not yet happened. Yet, these dismissals of the dangers of major cyber conflict are unsatisfying for several reasons. First, just because something has not happened yet is no reason to assume that it will not happen in the future. Based on the historical data, nuclear warfare was empirically unlikely until August 1945. Second, to prevent the occurrence of an action, it is best to plan against it, not ignore it or dismiss it as unlikely.