Stylistic differences between the traditions have been noticed (and parodied) from the very start. And while style is an intrinsically personal thing (Kripke has a different writing style from David Lewis, as do Derrida and Badiou, etc.), it is also difficult to dispute that there are some overlapping stylistic norms at play across these traditions. Of course, matters of style are obviously affected by the influences within each tradition; graduate programmes will inevitably end up socializing their students (usually via modelling rather than explicit directives) into particular ways of comporting themselves, both in written and oral communication. Analytic philosophers also generally self-identify as such (as do continental philosophers in Anglo-American countries), and certain overlapping tropes are also likely to flow from this self-identification, as well as an interest in demarcating such a philosophical style from other styles. It is hence perhaps not surprising that the history of “othering” of allegedly non-philosophical styles that was inaugurated by Russell continues to this day. The important question for us, however, is just what role these stylistic differences play in the divide. Are they symptomatic of underlying methodological or doctrinal commitments, or differences in their conception of the role of philosophy (perhaps creating perspectives versus limning reality), or are these stylistic differences the only real marker of the divide?

Those who argue that style is the main difference between the traditions tend to also have a deflationary view about the divide; indeed, they can point to stylistic variation in the common philosophical heritage (that between Aristotle and Plato, or between Spinoza and Berkeley, say) as evidence that stylistic difference need not indicate that philosophers fall within different traditions.