While I have had an interest in exploring the nature of moralism as a vice for some time, the main catalyst for writing this book was the moral furore over the exhibition of Australian artist Bill Henson discussed above. But at the time the driving force for me was not most prominently a concern to explore, as I do in Chapter 3, the possible significance of art to moral thought and reflection; on the contrary, what drove me was really my own moral response to these events, a response not most directly to Henson's images but to the way in which the girl in the off ending image along with her family were treated by many of those who objected most strongly to them. What struck me about many of those moral objections and judgements, as I shall explain below, was a certain lack of fellow feeling for the girl and her family. What the Henson case seemed to me to illustrate in a fairly striking way is how much more moral thought or reflection requires of us than simply making moral judgements, and how a failure to appreciate this results in moral judgement being nothing more than moralizing. Moralism, I have suggested, is a vice that involves a failure to recognize what moral thought or reflection requires (and does not require) of us in this broad sense. And this book is an attempt to more fully articulate this idea so as to better understand the proper nature of moral thought, reflection and judgement.