Political philosophy is often said to stand at an uneasy distance from everyday politics. On one side lie the often-abstract normative arguments of philosophers; on the other, the messy, power-saturated realities of political life; and in between, what seems to be a sizable gulf in aims, topics, and practices that limits their mutual relevance. Taking that gap as both a diagnosis and a provocation, this issue draws together a diverse group of political philosophers to explore why it persists, why it matters, and how it might be reduced. This introduction sets the stage for that discussion in three ways. First, it advances a principled argument for the inescapability of public political philosophising. Beyond familiar pragmatic pressures to demonstrate relevance or impact, it argues that political philosophy is intrinsically bound to public life, and that both philosophers and public actors have good principled reasons to engage with one another. Second, it offers a conceptual map of the contributions organised around three themes: the varied ways political philosophers have engaged with the public, the growing integration of public voices and empirical methods into philosophical reasoning, and the experimental and innovative practices through which public political philosophy is reshaping the boundaries of the discipline itself. Third, it reflects on our own experience guest editing the collection, highlighting how the somewhat serendipitous discovery of a hugely varied and inventive field of contemporary public political philosophising—far exceeding anything we had anticipated—pushed us to rethink some of our own assumptions and preconceptions.

This article reflects on the Socratic model for doing public political philosophy. It concentrates on the dialogue form and considers how this form might be adapted to a very different world than the one Socrates inhabited—one that is demographically diverse and huge, highly mediated, and today, intensely polarized. It suggests as well that philosophers are especially suited to facilitating critiques of current conjunctures and predicaments—their organizing terms, assumptions, and frameworks. They do this best through their skills of questioning.

The political economy of the left has emptied the space of critique. It has articulated an unusual combination: bureaucratic centralism aligned with the expansion of financialization. If, as Marx claimed, historical events appear first as tragedy, the contemporary institutional left—especially in Latin America—has staged a neoliberal play. This has fueled delusion, much captured by the far right. This situation has demanded engagement with the public intellectual role in the Latin American—particularly Brazilian—tradition, in which critical theories have been tied to social forms of resistance against political and economic power. When such powers are reorganized within left-wing programs and governments, engaged intellectuals must confront their field. In this article, we draw on Ruy Fausto’s reflection on the misdirections of the left in its processes of bureaucratization and institutionalization to assess the limits of reformism, the question of left unity, and the conciliatory project with the accumulation regime. From this dialog, we propose taking the critique of financialized capitalism seriously through the decentralization of socialist alternatives, capable of resisting both the homogenizing force of financialization and its top-down imposition by the institutionalist left.

This is a paper about three problems that public political philosophers are likely to encounter and how some underrecognized forms of public philosophy might help overcome them. After clarifying what I take public political philosophy to be, I present the three problems—the problem of academic overrepresentation, the problem of the critical intellectual, and the problem of novel values. These problems are especially acute for a particular form of public philosophy—namely, writing for a general audience. I describe four alternative models of public political philosophy—the organizing model, the participatory model, the policy model, and the bureaucratic model—and give examples of each. For each model, I describe some of its pros and cons, and in particular how it handles (or does not) the three problems. I conclude with some suggestions about the significance of the discussion for philosophical education.

In this article, I claim that moral sentimentalism is a good approach for political philosophers wanting to engage in public political philosophy. I propose live action roleplay (larp) as a method to maximise the potential of this. In the first section, I present the urgency for public political philosophy through Jonathan Floyd’s recent article. I claim that Floyd’s presentation of public political philosophy is complemented by thinking of certain topics in political discourse as wicked problems. I argue that moral sentimentalism is an excellent fit for public political philosophy because of its goal of eliciting empathy. I present methods in political philosophy that have appropriate immersive properties, but claim that larp takes this a step further. In the final section, I look at why this is and suggest larp as a method for moral sentimentalists to engage in public political philosophy research.

In this article, I argue that public political theorists need to adopt a different attitude and audience. If they are to help their fellow citizens learn collectively to engage critically with their future to take care of it, they must write and talk not only to their fellow theorists but also to their fellow citizens. To do this, they would need to focus on the opposite of the strictures of their specialised academic discipline that rewards internal debate, arcane language, and abstract theorising. They must provide a clear, persuasive understanding and critique of contemporary social, economic, and political narratives and structures of power. What matters is persuasion, not exclusive expertise; a change of attitude, not method; and a plurality of approaches. Perhaps most importantly, what they teach, write, and say must be comprehensively open to all, not beholden to corporate interests and canons, and they must act as “gadflies” in their society—public critics in battles over ideas, values, and power relations. While history is vital for this future-oriented craft, to bow down before predecessors is to miss the radical imaginative potential of thinking (and teaching) collectively in the present to provide for a better future: to change the world by changing oneself and thus one’s fellow travellers in improving how we live and love together. This would also make public political theory genuinely political.

Philosophy of education is a subfield of philosophy that is particularly ripe for engaging in public political philosophy. A closer look at scholars in this subfield who have taken such an approach to their work reveals important questions about and examples of how to engage in public political philosophy well. The questions and their answers offer helpful insights for others assuming this approach in the various fields of philosophy. This essay explores how such philosophers clarify the values and ideologies underlying debates about education and foster dialogs with the public about these concerns. It also describes the personal and professional benefits and risks of engaging in this work. Finally, it considers how public political philosophers of education help the public express dissent about educational policies and practices, while also fostering political hope for improved education.

This article advances a methodological framework for field-based political philosophy that integrates ethnographic inquiry with normative theorising on socioeconomic injustice. Empirically, it draws on qualitative research with individuals reliant on cash in an increasingly digitalised economy, a context in which infrastructural reforms disproportionately disadvantage socially marginalised groups. The approach is characterised by (i) epistemic recognition of lived experience as a source of normative insight, (ii) critical interrogation of social norms and problem representations associated with digitalisation, and (iii) a commitment to addressing epistemic injustice within philosophical practice itself. We argue that grounding normative theory in subordinated perspectives enhances both the conceptual adequacy of theories of justice and their public relevance. Finally, we reflect on the ethical challenges of research communication aimed at societal impact, emphasising risks of affect-driven “politics of pity” and the importance of maintaining analytical integrity in public engagement.

In 1886, a statue of Antinous, beloved of Roman Emperor Hadrian, was installed at University College London for reasons that remain unknown. Building on queer aesthetic theory, I argue that queer statues such as this can be used to transform the public spaces they adorn from sites of violence into venues for the experience of queer ecstasy. This argument builds on the iconoclastic logic of movements like Rhodes Must Fall, which insist that public statutes simultaneously do violence within our public spaces and reflect a violent politics that extends beyond them. Articulating the histories of the statues that adorn our public spaces offers the public political philosopher the opportunity to enliven these statues with an explicitly queer aesthetic capable of inspiring ecstasy among their audience. It also provides the opportunity to critique the politics responsible for eliding this queerness in the first place and making our public spaces so violent for minoritarian subjects. Exemplifying this work, I utilise Saidiya Hartman’s technique of critical fabulation to offer a narrative of Antinous distinct from the imperial rhetoric that traditionally surrounds his image, transforming his presence at University College London into something ecstatic and reclaiming the public space he adorns in the process.

The drive for greater public engagement and the turn to social science: each is an important and welcome movement in contemporary political philosophy. However, the relationship between these two boundary-crossing endeavors is not simple or obvious. I suggest that political philosophers have sometimes been too quick to assume that empirically-sensitivity and publicness go together; and I identify some ways in which these features can diverge and even compete. More positively, I go on to outline a modestly public role for political philosophy that is facilitated by in-depth engagement with diverse forms of social scientific evidence.