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The Japanese Privy Council*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
Extract
The growth of the democratic element in Japanese government has not been without effect on the Privy Council. In the early years of its history, the Council and the ministry were institutions serving the same classes and seeing eye to eye. This was true not only under the presidency of Ito, Oki, and Yamagata (1889-94), but also even during a considerable part of the period when party government was struggling for supremacy. In those days, political parties in the House of Representatives were balked by the bureaucrats, clansmen, and militarists entrenched in the administrative branch, while the seats in the Council were occupied by the great leaders of these controlling classes. But the doctrine of ministerial responsibility had begun to take root. In 1895, the Ito ministry abandoned the principle of executive independence of political parties and accepted an alliance with the Jiyuto, or Liberal party. In 1898, the Kenseito, or Constitutional party, under the leadership of Okuma and Itagaki, was given the opportunity of forming the first party cabinet in the history of Japan. Upon its fall, caused by internal dissension, the succeeding ministry under Yamagata (1898-1900) contained no party men, although the premier condescended to an alliance with the Kenseito. In 1900, Ito himself formed the Seiyukai, and brought the second party cabinet into office. But it was not until the first Kenseikai ministry, under Okuma and Kato (1914-16), and the fifth Seiyukai ministry under Hara (1918-21), that well-grounded ministerial parties controlled the lower house.
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- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1931
Footnotes
*
The first instalment of this article appeared in the August number of the Review. (Erratum: page 604, line 13, should read “1890,” not “1930.”)
References
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68 For the text of Articles VIII and LXX of the constitution, see footnote no. 18 supra.
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71 For a résumé of the press, see Japan Advertiser (Tokyo), April 19, 1927, p. 6: April 20, p. 7Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), April 28, 1927, pp. 468–469Google Scholar.
72 The Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs was set up under Premier General Terauchi during the World War. Membership included the privy councillors, the premier, the ministers of war and foreign affairs, and two party leaders–Hara (Seiyukai) and Inukai (Kokuminto). Its ostensible purpose was to formulate a consistent foreign policy for Japan; its real purpose was to minimize opposition to whatever policy the cabinet should pursue. It was abolished in 1923 during the Kato ministry. A saying ran to the effect that it was created by a general and abolished by an admiral. Compare Sasaki-Soichi, , “Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs,” Kokka Gakkai Zasshi (Aug., 1917), Vol. XXXI, no. 8, pp. 1137–1169Google Scholar; Yoshino-Sakuzo, , Gendai Kensei no Unyo, or “Contemporary Constitutional Government,” (Tokyo, 1930), pp. 224–229Google Scholar.
73 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, March 30 and 31, 1929, p. 6; April 1, p. 2Google Scholar; Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, April 2, 1929, p. 1Google Scholar.
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75 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 12, 1929, p. 1Google Scholar.
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77 Kwampo gogai, Jan. 24 and 29, 1929, pp. 52, 57Google Scholar.
78 Kwampo gogai, March 26, 1929, pp. 1026–39Google Scholar. Compare Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), April 4, 1929, p. 400Google Scholar.
79 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 1929, p. 2Google Scholar. Compare Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), June 20, 1929, p. 704Google Scholar.
80 Compare editorials in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 6 and 11, 1929, p. 7Google Scholar.
81 As usual, the press carried full accounts of the speeches and votes in the Council. Compare the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, June 27, 1929, p. 1Google Scholar; Osaka Mainichi, June 27, 1929, p. 1Google Scholar; Jiji Shimpo, April 27, 1929, p. 1Google Scholar; Japan Advertiser (Toyko), June 27, 1929, p. 1Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), July 4, 1929, pp. 14–15Google Scholar. The triumph of the Council was somewhat marred by a logical speech on the part of Count Uchida, a privy councillor and former minister of foreign affairs, who had been dispatched by the Tanaka cabinet as an ambassador to sign the pact in Paris in August, 1928, and who now pointed out the inconsistency of the declaration. The position of the cabinet also was rendered awkward when, after a vote of the Council, Count Uchida resigned as a councillor, as a means of indicating the responsibility of the cabinet for the diplomatic blunder. For the official statement issued by the Foreign Office regarding the ratification of the Kellogg Pact, see Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, June 28 and 29, 1929, p. 1Google Scholar.
82 The instructions were drafted by the Foreign Office, over which Baron Shidehara presided; they were submitted by Premier Hamaguchi to Admiral Kato-Kanji, chief of naval staff; they were unanimously approved by the cabinet on April 1, and on the same day were cabled to London. On the following day, Admiral Kato made his appeal to the Throne. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 2 and 3, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar; Jiji Shimpo, April 2 and 3, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), April 10, 1930, pp. 360–361Google Scholar. Compare a careful study of this controversy by Takeuchi, Sterling Tatsuji Dr., “Japan and the London Naval Treaty,” Institute of Oriental studies (1930), Vol. IV, pp. 37–47Google Scholar.
82 Kwampo gogai, May 7, 1930, pp. 79–84; May 8, pp. 88-91; May 12, pp. 126-130; May 14, pp. 179-183Google Scholar.
84 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 4, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar.
85 Compare editorials in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 6, 11, and 26, May 7, 1930, p. 7Google Scholar. For summaries of comments in the Japanese press, see Japan Advertiser (Tokyo), May 29Google Scholar; June 3, 14, and 24; July 23 and 27; Aug. 5, 6, and 10; Sept. 17 and 18; Oct. 1, 1930, p. 5. Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), May 8, 1930; Sept. 25, 1930, pp. 371–372, 470–471Google Scholar.
86 Under the ordinances issued by Yamagata in 1899, the ministers of war and navy are limited to generals and lieutenant-generals or admirals and vice-admirals. Genko Horei Shuran (1927), Vol. I, bk. iii, pp. 78, 88Google Scholar. The aim was to keep the army and navy under the control of the Choshu and Satsuma clans, and to preserve the military establishment against parliamentary interference. Compare the brilliant discussion of this subject by Yoshino in his Niju Seifu to Iaku Joso, or “Dual Government and the Supreme Command,” (Tokyo, 1922), pp. 7-12, 43–45Google Scholar. Dr. Yoshino, who served until 1924 as professor of political history on the faculty of the Imperial University of Tokyo, is the chief literary opponent of the military clique in Japan. For some years he was a member of the editorial staff of the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun.
87 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (evening ed.), July 23 and 24, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), July 31, 1930, p. 137Google Scholar.
88 The delay was caused partly by the demand of Baron Kuratomi for a copy of the report of the Supreme War Council to the Throne. The Government, which consistently claimed that this report was a document of the War Council and not a cabinet paper, refused to move for its submission to the Council. Another excuse for delay was a petty quarrel with the Foreign Office over some details of translation of the treaty, such as the omission of “1” in the spelling of the name of an Italian plenipotentiary, Admiral Alfredo. Compare the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 5, 6, and 7, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), Aug. 14, 1930, pp. 198–200Google Scholar.
89 The special committee, appointed on August 11, consisted of nine members: Count Ito-Miyoji, Viscount Kaneko-Kentaro, Baron Yamakawa-Kentaro, Baron Kubota-Yuzuru, Mr. Arai-Kentaro, Mr. Midzumachi-Kesaroku, General Kawai-Misao, Baron Den-Kenjiro, and Marquis Kuroda-Chosei. The committee appeared to be chosen chiefly from members of the Council opposed to the foreign policy of the cabinet. General surprise was occasioned by the omission of Viscount Ishii, a former minister of foreign affairs. Cf. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 12, 1930, p. 2Google Scholar.
90 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 17, 18, and 19, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar. Cf. Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), Aug. 21, 1930, p. 232Google Scholar.
91 The special committee held meetings on August 18, 23, 26, 28; September 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17. Full accounts of each meeting appeared in the press.
92 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 2 and 3, 1930, p. 7Google Scholar; Osaka, Mainichi Shimbun, Oct. 3, 1930, p. 5Google Scholar. Compare Japan Advertiser (Tokyo), Oct. 4, 1930, p. 7Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), Oct. 9 and 16, 1930, pp. 423, 558Google Scholar.
93 Cf. Jiji Shimpo (Tokyo), Aug. 9, 1929, p. 7Google Scholar.
94 For instance, the statement is made that it was Egi-Yoku, a leader of the Minseito, who first called the attention of Count Ito-Miyoji to the phrase “in the names of their respective peoples” in the Kellogg Peace Pact. Cf. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 19, 1929, p. 6Google Scholar.
95 The ages of the councillors are as follows: Kuratomi, 78; Hiranuma, 66; Ito, 74; Kuki, 79; Kaneko, 78; Kubota, 84; Tomii, 73; Ishiguro, 86; Yamakawa, 77; Kuroda, 64; Furuichi, 77; Matsumura, 80; Egi, 82; Sakurai, 72; Den, 53; Arai, 68; Kawai, 67; Ishiwara, 67; Kamada, 73; Suzuki, 66; Ishii, 65; Midzumachi, 68; Okada, 67; Fukuda, 66. Compare Japan Year Book (Tokyo, 1931)Google Scholar, Appendix A.
96 The militarists are Viscount Ishiguro (surgeon-general, retired in 1890), General Kawai-Misao (retired in 1927), Admiral Suzuki-Kantaro (retired in 1929), and General Fukuda-Masataro (retired in 1930). General Fukuda, who was appointed to the Council in 1930, was commander of the Tokyo garrison at the time of the earthquake in 1923 and was relieved of his command for laxity in regard to the massacre of Koreans and socialists, including the murder of Osugi-Sakae and his wife and nephew while in prison by Captain Amakasu. The bureaucrats include: Kuratomi, Hiranuma, Ito, Kaneko, Kuki, Kubota, Furuichi, Matsumuro, Egi, Den, Ishiwara, Midzumachi, Kamada, and Okada.
97 The seven councillors who have held cabinet posts are: Ito, Kaneko, Den, Egi, Arai, Ishii, and Okada.
98 The ex-presidents of universities are Kamada and Okada. The retired university professors are Tomii, Yamakawa, and Sakurai. Speaking strictly, Baron Yamakawa (emeritus professor of physics) should be included among the university ex-presidents, since he served as president of the Imperial University of Tokyo from 1913 to 1914, although during most of his academic career he was a physics teacher.
99 Dr. Ichiki-Kitokuro, a former university professor and a councillor from 1917 to 1925, may be considered as the one exception in recent years. Dr. Ichiki studied in Germany in 1890-93, and became professor of administrative law in the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1894. In 1900, he became a member of the House of Peers, in 1908 vice-minister of home affairs, and in 1912-13 served as chief of bureau of legislation. He was successively minister of education and of home affairs in the second cabinet of Okuma (1914-16). Since 1925, he has been minister of the imperial household.
100 In 1884, the Seido Torishirabe Kyoku, or Bureau for the Investigation of Constitutions, was set up under the Imperial Household Department with Prince Ito as chief. The technical work of the bureau was in the hands of three officials—one a classical scholar, one a student with a European education, and the third a bureaucrat—namely, Inouye-Ki, Kaneko-Kentaro, and Ito-Miyoji. Prince Ito's hand guided the whole process of constitution-drafting, but in particular, Ito-Miyoji was concerned with the Law of the Houses, Kaneko with the Election Law, and Inouye with the Commentaries. Ito-Hirobumi, , “History of the Establishment of the Imperial Constitution,” in Kaikoku Gojunenshi, or “Fifty Years of New Japan,” (Tokyo, 1907), Vol. I, pp. 129–130Google Scholar. In the English translation (London, 1909), see Vol. I, pp. 127-128. Compare article by Kaneko, in Taiyo, Mar. 8, 1909, pp. 127–128Google Scholar.
101 Compare Baba-Tsunego, , “Personalities of the Privy Council,” Kaizo (Oct., 1930), Vol. XII, no. 10, pp. 27–34Google Scholar; and his “Elder Statesmen and the Privy Council,” Taiyo (Nov., 1927), Vol. XXXIII, no. 13, p. 95Google Scholar.
102 Compare a symposium on reform of the Council in the Toikyo Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 13, 14, 15, and 16, 1930, p. 2Google Scholar.
103 Full accounts of the informal conferences were published in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (evening ed.), Oct. 9, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar; Oct. 11, p. 2; Oct. 16 and Oct. 30, 1930, p. 1; Jiji Shimpo (Tokyo), Oct. 9, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar; Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, Oct. 10, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar. Compare Japan Daily Advertiser (Tokyo), Oct. 16, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), Oct. 16 and 23, 1930, pp. 458, 485Google Scholar.
104 At the conference of October 8, Baron Tomii was appointed chairman. The following councillors appear to have been present: Tomii, Ishiguro, Furuichi, Okada, Ishii, Sakurai, Kamada, Kuroda, Arai, Matsumuro, Mizumachi, and Fukuda. The following day, the Secretary-general called at the residence of Count Ito-Miyoji in regard to Dr. Okada's proposal. It was reported that Count Ito entered vigorous objection, stating that the proposal was nothing less than an expression of want of confidence in the leaders of the Council, and that the Council, unlike the Imperial Diet, was not used to tearing up tradition. Cf. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 10, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar. At the unofficial meeting of October 10, attended by eight councillors, Ishiguro, Matsumuro, and Furuichi protested against the adoption of reforms at a time when the Council was held in ill repute. Okada and others replied that this fact made the reforms all the more opportune. After the conference of October 15, which adopted two of the proposals of Dr. Okada, Baron Tomii reported the views of the conference to the president and vice-president. A few days later, it was stated in the press that Baron Kuratomi would take no action, on the ground that no change in rules was needed, inasmuch as a distribution of the referred measures could be made to the councillors at any time that there was a request for the same, while there was no assurance that councillors not members of special committees would attend the sessions of the committee after the privilege was extended to them. Cf. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 22, 1930, p. 3Google Scholar.
105 It was reported in the press that after the plenary session and an audience with the Emperor on October 29, Kuratomi, Hiranuma, Kaneko, and the Secretary-General held a conference on Okada's proposals and came to the conclusion that, since all the steps taken had been informal, the president was not required to act other than to keep the question under advisement. Cf. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (evening ed.), Oct. 30, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar. Finally, after the plenary session of November 5, Dr. Okada left the Council office without raising the question of reform. Cf. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 6, 1930, p. 1Google Scholar.
106 “Reform of the Privy Council,” Chuo Koron, No. 473 (June, 1927), pp. 55–63Google Scholar. Dr. Nagai was formerly professor of politics in Waseda University. For several years, he has represented Ishikawa-ken in the House of Representatives. He belongs to the Minseito, and served as parliamentary counsellor to the Foreign Office in the Wakatsuki ministry (1926-27), and as parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs in the Hamaguchi ministry (1929-31).
107 Royama-Masamichi is professor of the science of administration on the faculty of law in the Imperial University of Tokyo.
108 Gendai Kensei Hyoron (Tokyo, 1930), pp. 126–128Google Scholar. This compilation contains his articles on “The Privy Council” appearing in the Kokka Gakkai Zasshi (1925), Vol. XXXIX, pp. 391-410, 752–769; (1927), Vol. XLI, pp. 1357-1390Google Scholar.
109 Kwampo gogai, March 8, 1927, pp. 69–70Google Scholar.
110 “Reform of the Privy Council,” Chuo Koron (June, 1927), No. 473, pp. 103–117Google Scholar. For an English translation, see Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe), June 2, 1927, pp. 596–597Google Scholar. Compare Baba-Tsunego, , “Personalities in the Privy Council,” Kaizo (Oct., 1930), Vol. XII, no. 10, p. 34Google Scholar; Sasaki-Soichi, , “Reform of the Privy Council,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 16, 1930, p. 2Google Scholar.
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112 For a manifesto of a group of the Minseito adopted at the party's headquarters in Tokyo on June 25, 1928, see Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 1928, p. 3Google Scholar.
113 Compare the statement of Katayama-Tetsu, one of the leaders of the Shakai Minshūto. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 13, 1930, p. 2Google Scholar.
114 Compare the following editorial from the Jiji Shimpo (Tokyo), Oct. 16, 1930, p. 3Google Scholar. “There is no room for a body like the Privy Council in a parliamentary system. As soon as party government was established, the Privy Council lost its reason for existence. If the Privy Council has continued with its powers unimpaired, it is because there has been no government strong enough to curb it. The Council ought to have been reformed, if not abolished, when it began to cause the downfall of cabinets. Should the Council continue to obstruct the Government as it did in the matter of the London Naval Treaty, it is safe to say that public opinion will soon force its abolition. There is only one way for the Council to save itself. That is to refrain from interfering in politics. If the privy councillors realize that the Council as now functioning is an institution incompatible with parliamentary government, all will be well. For the people will not destroy a harmless institution.”
115 Moriguchi-Shigeji, , Kensei no Genri to sono Unyo, or “Principles and Practice of Constitutional Government,” (Tokyo, 1929)Google Scholar. Dr. Moriguchi is professor of comparative constitutional law in the Imperial University of Kyoto.