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An Evolutionary Approach to Norms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1986

Robert Axelrod
Robert Axelrod*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Abstract

Norms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups, even when there are more than two people and no central authority. This paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality. The dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies. The results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable. One interesting possibility is the employment of metanorms, the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm. Many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms, including metanorms, dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership in groups, law, and reputation.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 80 , Issue 4 , December 1986 , pp. 1095 - 1111
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1986

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