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Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Shaun Nichols
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston
Todd Grantham
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston

Abstract

Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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