There has been a lot of interest lately in the possibility of downward causation, the idea that higher-level processes or events can cause lower-level ones. Downward causation, if it could be made sense of, is seen by some as a way to approach the philosophical problem of free will naturalistically, while others have heralded it as a promising way to explain aspects of the pathogenesis or treatment of psychiatric conditions. But the possibility of downward causation has been called into question because it is claimed to require causation across levels, and interlevel causation has been viewed as problematic. Reductionist accounts, for example, hold that entities or processes at higher levels can be reduced to entities or processes at lower levels, and that causal relations only “really” occur at the most fundamental level. On this basis, Kim’s (1998) causal exclusion argument holds that mental states do not enter causal relations and are merely epiphenomenal. Alternatively, the New Mechanist account holds that neuroscientific explanation is mechanistic explanation, and that the relationship between mechanisms at different levels is one of constitution (part/whole). Because constitution relations are not causal relations, interlevel causation does not exist: causation can only occur within a level (see, e.g., Bechtel & Craver, 2007; Craver, 2007). Several thinkers have suggested that if we can rid ourselves of levels, these problems and others would disappear (Eronen, 2013).

In dialogue with Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Shakespeare, this chapter articulates the difference between an “idol” of experience, which necessarily disappoints desire, and an “icon” of experience, which necessarily surprises; it sketches the parallels between two iconic modes of experience, Heidegger’s wonder for being and St. Francis’s thanksgiving for existence, and it argues that the latter constitutes a unique phenomenological reduction, which distinguishes aletheism from other forms of phenomenology as well as separates it from other sciences. “That desired and hidden other, which thankfully causes the world and me to be, is ‘God’.”

Human rights violations often form part of a pattern or practice of violations, rather than being purely isolated incidents. This context is not consistently taken into account by UNTBs during individual case consideration, however. This chapter explores several ways in which awareness of human rights violations’ embeddedness in wider contexts of violations should inform UNTB practice. In particular, the chapter considers the impact, or potential impact, of patterns and practices of violations on the manner in which UNTBs receive information, and the sorts of sources they recognize in their decisions; on UNTBs approaches to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the burden of proof; on case structuring; and on findings, recommendations and follow-up procedures. The chapter ends by observing that UNTBs are not only receivers but also key disseminators of information, and suggests ways in which their findings as to the patterns and practices of violations may be more effectively disseminated.

In this chapter, I develop and walk through a theory of the interaction between a legislator and an outsider proposing legislation to be introduced. This theory highlights the tradeoff that legislators face between introducing and securing the passage of a high-quality bill and obtaining a bill that is close to their ideal policy. I lay out the motivations and goals of legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups and use these to develop a theoretical framework that sets up expectations about the conditions under which interest groups and bureaucrats will be most successful at influencing legislative outcomes. This theory reveals testable implications about which types of legislators and legislatures should use more outsider input in crafting their legislative agenda.

The arts are deeply entwined with a sense of self. This chapter examines the many ways in which artistic engagement allows us to discover, express, and explore who we are. While previous chapters focused on how the arts enhance our thinking, knowing, or understanding, this chapter turns toward the role of the arts in shaping who we become — and, in some cases, how we reclaim parts of ourselves. The chapter begins by exploring the concept of self-identity, and its relationship to aesthetic taste and sensibility. From there, it considers how the arts can be a catalyst for transformation — both personal and community-based — and what these shifts reveal about the dynamic relationship between identity and artistic experience.

Chapter 1 introduces the concept of primary research literature as the foundation of scientific knowledge, detailing its role in documenting discoveries, enabling transparency, and fostering reproducibility. It explains the structure of primary literature, particularly the IMRaD format (Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion), which organizes research into a logical and accessible framework. This chapter emphasizes the importance of critical reading of primary literature (CRPL) in scientific education. It highlights common challenges, such as dense jargon, assumed background knowledge, and the nonlinear structure of research articles. It also addresses the gap in formal instruction for CRPL, leaving many students unprepared to analyze essential elements such as claims, evidence, and reasoning. This chapter outlines various reading strategies, including structured frameworks like CERIC and collaborative annotation methods, such as social collaborative annotation (SCA), to enhance CRPL skills. These approaches aim to help students engage deeply with research articles, overcome comprehension barriers, and contribute effectively to scientific discourse.

The role of constituents has thus far been missing in the book. What does the public think about legislators' reliance on outsiders for information? This chapter brings a survey and survey experiment to bear on these fundamental questions of representation. A survey assesses descriptive questions about where constituents think legislators get their legislation. To explore the causal effect of information provision, the chapter next presents a survey experiment. Does reading a story about the source of legislation alter survey participants' beliefs about the bill's sponsor, legislative legitimacy, or the policy? I find that interest-group authorship reduces perceived legitimacy and evaluations of best interest. The expertise cue does not improve evaluations. While legislators frequently turn to outsiders for bills, the constituents that are charged with representing question this involvement.

Carl Craver begins his chapter by noting that in psychiatry, mechanistic models attempt to understand the causal factors that produce, underlie, or maintain disorders. Knowledge of mechanisms, therefore, would support the goals of preventing, ameliorating, and even curing psychiatric disorders and thus represent the discipline’s highest aspirations for psychiatric explanation. Some thinkers, however, are concerned that under the banner of mechanism resides a static view of phenomenon that does not bear in mind that things constantly change. Another perceived problem with a mechanistic approach is a reductionism that dismisses higher-level causal structures in favor of using new technologies designed primarily to study the smallest things. This chapter argues that such concerns are not applicable to the new mechanists in the philosophy of science.

This chapter examines the principal philosophical debates surrounding the nature, function, and justification of pain in state-imposed punishment. It begins by analyzing the relationship between hard treatment and pain, including longstanding disputes over whether hard treatment must be intended to cause suffering and whether it must, in fact, be experienced as painful by those subjected to it. The chapter then considers the role of penal pain within expressivist and communicative theories and examines its justification within the dominant deontological and consequentialist frameworks. A central theme of the chapter is that, despite the prominence of pain in punishment, its precise character remains undertheorized. Few accounts engage directly with the kind of pain that punishment does – or ought to – inflict. The chapter argues that this conceptual opacity stems, in part, from penal theory’s tendency to abstract from concrete practices, treating punishment as a uniform response to crime rather than as a practice embedded in social and institutional realities. One of the most significant – and contentious – of these realities is prison.