In this chapter, the law scholar Jan von Hein analyses and evaluates the European Parliament’s proposal on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence against the background of the already existing European regulatory framework on private international law, in particular the Rome I and II Regulations. The draft regulation (DR) proposed by the European Parliament is noteworthy from a private international law perspective because it introduces new conflicts rules for AI. In this regard, the proposed regulation distinguishes between a rule delineating the spatial scope of its autonomous rules on strict liability for high-risk AI systems (Article 2 DR) on the one hand, and a rule on the law applicable to fault-based liability for low-risk systems (Article 9 DR) on the other hand. The latter rule refers to the domestic laws of the Member State in which the harm or damage occurred. In sum, compared with Rome II, the conflicts approach of the draft regulation would be a regrettable step backwards in many ways.

The law scholars Weixing Shen and Yun Liu focus on China’s efforts in the field of AI regulation and spell out recent legislative actions. While there is no unified AI law today in China, many provisions from Chinese data protection law are in part applicable to AI systems. The authors particularly analyse the rights and obligations from the Chinese Data Security Law, the Chinese Civil Code, the E-Commerce Law, and the Personal Information Protection Law and explain the relevance of these regulations with regard to responsible AI and algorithm governance. The authors introduce as well the Draft Regulation in Internet Information Service Based on Algorithm Recommendation Technology. This adopts many AI specific principles such as transparency, fairness, and reasonableness. Regarding the widely discussed field of facial recognition by AI systems, they introduce a Draft Regulation, and a judicial Opinion by the Supreme People’s Court of China. Finally, Weixing Shen and Yun Liu refer to the AI Act proposed by the European Commission, which could also inspire future Chinese regulatory approaches.

This chapter outlines three positions on the desirability of a marriage of the natural law and natural rights traditions: (i) that natural law and natural rights may be united without any recourse to revelation; (ii) that natural law and natural rights may be united but only by recourse to revelation; and (iii) that any form of union between natural law and natural rights should be avoided as contrary to the common good and the well-being of the City of God. It is argued that the third position is the preferred on the grounds that the natural rights tradition is difficult to translate into a non-individualistic, communitarian framework. Social bonds and civic ties revolve primarily around mediating institutions such as the family and cultural, educational, and sports associations, not around the machinery of the state and abstract concepts. Unlike Bills of Rights that enumerate rights attached to individuals, the alternative Common Law tradition presupposes that human persons live in communities, that human life is relational, and that conflicts arise for adjudication when a clash of claims occur that need to be resolved with reference to some higher common good.

Contemporary thought on human rights is rooted in significant part in the soil of natural law theory. Some natural law theorists embrace the idea of enforceable rights to a range of desirable socioeconomic outcomes. But natural law theory is best understood as grounding rights that foster these outcomes indirectly. Such rights, as I envision them, qualify as socioeconomic rights because they directly concern the socioeconomic sphere and because they further those aspects of flourishing which alternative schemes of socioeconomic rights are often intended to protect. There is, I suggest, a plausible natural law case to be made for indirectly promoting these dimensions of well-being by enforcing legal rights to bodily integrity, property, and labor, and so accepting robust limits on the use of force. In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for an exploration of that case by elaborating the variety of natural law theory in which I seek to ground my understanding of socioeconomic rights. I go on to discuss norms germane to the institutional context of socioeconomic life and to propose a set of fundamental socioeconomic rights and briefly consider the significance of these rights.

We set forth and defend a natural law account of the fundamental dignity of persons. The basis of fundamental dignity--and of the possession of fundamental rights--is being a person: a being with a rational nature. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, that is, their having a nature oriented towards enabling them to shape their lives by their deliberate (rational) and free choices. One’s dignity and status as a person derives from the kind of substantial entity one is, namely, a human being, and, as such a creature whose nature is a rational nature. Because personhood is based on the kind of being one is – a substantial entity whose nature is a rational nature – one cannot lose one’s fundamental personal dignity as long as one exists. Although not all persons need be human beings (if, say, there are angels or intelligent Martians, they too are persons), all persons have a rational nature. And so every human being, from his or her coming to be until he or she ceases to be, is a person, and as such a bearer of inherent dignity and fundamental rights.

The Catholic Church holds the concept of natural law in reference to a created order. While this concept has been put aside in philosophy and science the Church deems that creation implies an inherent relationship between all its components. The Social doctrine of the Church is built on the concept of natural law accessible to human intelligence. The teaching of Thomas Aquinas drawing from Aristotle remains the main source of Catholic understanding of natural law. Natural law and natural rights are not to be confused. Right refers to a natural order of things, which is the natural law apprehended by reason at a given moment. The source of human rights is entailed in a measure inscribed in the order created by God. So natural rights are determined on the basis of what constitutes a just relationship between persons in accordance with natural law. The attention given today to the ecosystem including the biosphere and human society altogether brings us back to the core of natural law. The ecosystem witnesses to an order which pre-exists to our attempts to use it arbitrarily. ’Integral ecology’ apprehends the human being in its interdependence with the created order of the universe.

In this chapter, the law scholar Christine Wendehorst analyses the different potential risks posed by AI as part of two main categories, safety risks and fundamental rights risks. Based on this, the author considers why AI challenges existing liability regimes. She spells out the main solutions put forward so far and evaluates them. This chapter highlights the fact that liability for fundamental rights risks is largely unchartered while being AI-specific. Such risks are now being addressed at the level of AI safety law, by way of prohibiting certain AI practices and by imposing strict legal requirements concerning data governance, transparency, and human oversight. Wendehorst nevertheless argues that a number of changes have to be made for the emerging AI safety regime to be used as a ‘backbone’ for the future AI liability regime if this is going to help address liability for fundamental rights risks. As a result, she suggests that further negotiations about the AI Act proposed by the European Commission should be closely aligned with the preparatory work on a future AI liability regime.

In this chapter, I argue for religious freedom as a first-class right, and I criticise the views of some distinguished scholars who react against traditional conceptions of religious freedom and deny the right to any special protection of religion by legal systems. I focus primarily on Ronald Dworkin and Brian Leiter’s views and arguments. I conclude that Dworkin’s approach to religion belittles the idea of God. Yet conviction about the existence of God and the holding of profound ethical and moral convictions are not so independent as Dworkin argues. Leiter’s approach belittles the idea of religion, which cannot be reduced to a matter of commands, a lack of evidence, and consolation. I argue why religion is more than a matter of conscience and a personal decision about ultimate concerns and questions. Religion cannot be reduced to moral conscience, let alone ethical independence in foundational matters. An increasingly globalised and pluralistic society demands a more comprehensive approach that fully protects all religions and creeds.

The origin of the modern liberal conception of human rights has been traced to the concept of natural rights that has its source in natural law thought, leading some to draw a connection between Thomistic natural law and human rights. However, the Thomistic understanding of natural law is embedded in a religious framework, raising the relevance and possible relation of religious traditions to the contemporary concept of human rights. This chapter explores this relation in the context of Hinduism, which espouses a version of natural law in the idea of Dharma, and gives primacy to duty rather than rights. Can the fundamental tenets, principles and concepts of Hinduism help to develop conceptual groundwork for human rights without subscribing to the Western liberal conception of rights? Exploring this question, the chapter argues for human moral obligations as the link between natural law and human rights. It concludes that human moral obligations serve the same purpose as human rights without being embroiled in controversies that vitiate the Western liberal conception of human rights.

In this chapter, the philosopher Thomas Metzinger lists five main problem domains related to AI systems. For each problem field, he proposes several measures which should be taken. Firstly, there should be worldwide safety standards concerning the research and development of AI. If not, Metzinger fears a ‘race to the bottom’ in safety standards. Additionally, a possible AI arms race must be prevented as early as possible. Thirdly, he stresses that any creation of artificial consciousness should be avoided, as it is highly problematic from an ethical point of view. He argues that synthetic phenomenology could lead to non-biological forms of suffering and might lead to a vast increase of suffering in the universe, as AI can be copied rapidly. While AI might improve different kinds of governance, there is the risk of unknown risks, the ‘unknown unknowns’. Accordingly, as a fourth problem domain, the author proposes allocating resources to research and prepare for unexpected and long-term risks. Finally, Metzinger highlights the need for a concrete code of ethical conduct for anyone researching AI.

The US retirement system is currently characterized by tremendous diversity of instruments, institutions, and intermediaries in pursuit of the same goal. While the goal – achieving financial security in retirement – is widely accepted by policymakers and participants, for individuals in the United States, the nature of the “investment” experience in the retirement context varies considerably based on the identity, savviness, and size of the intermediaries, as well as the particular legal regime to which such intermediaries are subject.

Resolution of the conundrum of how to protect retail investors while supporting their access to the capital markets is one of the most intractable problems in modern financial regulation.1 Regulation must grapple with multiple and longstanding market failures2 as well as with the distinct, exacerbating behavioral challenges of retail market investment.3 Further, while significant welfare losses can follow from sub-optimal levels of market participation,4 regulatory transaction costs can be high and protection can quickly become obstruction.5