The Brazilian report describes the wide range of sanctions available to the Brazilian Competition Authority. It presents the public debate between two commissioners about the appropriate method of calculating fines proportionate to the wrongdoing. The authors suggest that Brazil can improve the level of effectiveness of the antitrust policy beyond raising fines. It would be important to incorporate in the antitrust law the specific sanction of a director disqualification order, to create double damages, establish the offense’s duration as a statutory basis for the fine calculation, and create exemptions for leniency beneficiaries to double damages. They also recommend establishing the economic group’s gross turnover as the statutory basis for the fine calculation (instead of the imprecise turnover in the relevant market). Finally, they advocate raising to four to eight years (currently two to five years) the criminal imprisonment penalty for collusion and conspiracy, and including in the criminal law the revocation of the corporate license for trade as an ancillary penalty to be applied by the criminal courts.

Sweden joined the European Economic Area in January 1994, and became a member of the European Union the following year. With the advent of EU membership, it introduced a major shift in the direction of its competition law and policy. A wave of product market liberalisation was supplemented by a new Competition Act and a new Competition Authority, superseding a model that had been applied for almost forty years. Where enforcement action earlier had relied mainly on information, influence and negotiation, the new competition regime was based on clear rules prohibiting certain conduct, and vigorous intervention against any infringements of the prohibitions.

The chapter aims to answer the question in its title from a practical aspect, the perspective of a Hungarian criminal lawyer. First, it dsicusses the theoretical background and reasonableness of the criminalisation of anticompetitive conducts, including some thoughts about the type of sanctions that might make the threat of criminal liability a real deterrent. It goes on to summarise the main features of various criminal regimes with their own unique approaches to criminalisation. For this, it not only focuses on the regimes’ theoretical concepts, but also on their actual implementation and results, covering the difficulties and discrepancies deriving from their everyday practice. Based on this analysis, some general conclusions are drawn – both on the national and European Union level – regarding anticompetitive conducts’ criminalisation, and suggestions made as to how to improve the criminal regimes already introduced. Based on these findings, the study tries to answer its basic question, whether at the present stage of the (Hungarian) criminalisation of anti-competitive conducts, the ‘cartel crime’ could be deemed a somewhat theoretical danger, a so-called paper tiger, and whether even the present stage of criminalisation could be deemed satisfactory, and the present threat of criminal liability and sanctions already to have a real deterrent effect.

In the US, consent judgments, decrees, or orders entered into between merging parties and government are a longstanding tradition. There are three key components to such consensus-based remedies. First, the remedies are not truly a consensus. The second notion is one of transparency: the remedies proposed in such settlements are made public. The nature of the theories of harm the remedies seek to mitigate are public as well. The third notion is typically a question of the overall merits of the remedy. Whether or not a merger remedy is in the public interest is a broad question. This chapter details the common provisions of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s settlements, alongside the EU Commission’s settlements. It looks for common weaknesses between the methods of settlement deployed, and the harms to competition that might arise from such systems. It concludes that competition policy is increasingly regulatory and non-adjudicatory. To the extent that consent settlements are important and prominent, it would make sense to have stakeholders have some significant say in the settlement. Lack of meaningful judicial review assures that any concerns are ignored. The authors critically note that lack of transparency assures that any concerns not listed in the proposed settlement are not properly addressed.

The chapter analyzes the complex system of labour law sanctions against unlawful violations of employee obligations, consisting of statutory laws, collective agreements, agreements of the parties and unilateral sources issued by the employer. The chapter looks at various forms of liability of the employee, and the responsibilities of the employer are discussed in detail. The employer may use disciplinary measures extending from warning and disciplinary sanctions to termination of employment. However, the employer and the employee may be liable for third-party damages and fines by public authorities, which must be paid in accordance with national rules. The chapter discusses opportunities and weaknesses of labour law in the particular context of cartels and antitrust rules. The author concludes that as regards sanctions against rogue employees for cartel actions, the employer has several choices depending on the strength of the sanction and its legal nature. Labour law focuses primarily on the protection of employees in these fields, but the employer is also entitled to proper protection against unlawful activities of rogue employees in case of cartel actions.

The chapter discusses the structure of public enforcement in the US antitrust system, with particular emphasis on the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement of laws governing marketplace competition, and a focus on civil sanctions under the Sherman Act, FTC Act, and parallel state law in the United States. It then argues that the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement is inextricable from the supporting remedial structure, including criminal enforcement and meaningful private enforcement. The chapter explains the theory of civil fines in law enforcement and reasons for a jurisdiction’s choosing one or the other form of sanctions. It then explains the structure of remedies for antitrust violations in the US system, highlighting the three forms of public enforcement and the backstop of private enforcement. It then turns to recent developments in civil remedies, including punitive fines as well as damages and related civil monetary relief. It criticizes the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Abbvie Inc. and interrogates the current Supreme Court case involving AMG Capital, inquiring whether AMG Capital might influence the interpretation of the FTC Act as it applies to competition law enforcement as well as consumer protection enforcement.

The chapter discusses canon law provisions relating to just punishment of financial–economic infringements by members of the Catholic Church. The aim of penalties in the Church differs from that in civil society: in the Church, punishments are applied to lead the offender through repentance to salvation; in civil society to reintegrate them into the society. The Church does not have power to enforce punishments, which means that a punishment can be applied only to those who accept the power of the Church by their own will. In canonical delicts the offender is bound by his conscience; in civil delicts by the coercive power of the state. Penalties can be used only as last resort. All possibilities are to be exhausted before a real punishment is applied. The principle of gradualism is one of the most important in the salvation of souls. The reverend emphasizes that being lost in pure legalism in the interpretation of the texts would cause the real meaning of canon law to be lost, since all penalties have the purpose that all offices, dignities, ministries, duties should be fulfilled by persons who are suitable.