The chapter aims to answer the question in its title from a practical aspect, the perspective of a Hungarian criminal lawyer. First, it dsicusses the theoretical background and reasonableness of the criminalisation of anticompetitive conducts, including some thoughts about the type of sanctions that might make the threat of criminal liability a real deterrent. It goes on to summarise the main features of various criminal regimes with their own unique approaches to criminalisation. For this, it not only focuses on the regimes’ theoretical concepts, but also on their actual implementation and results, covering the difficulties and discrepancies deriving from their everyday practice. Based on this analysis, some general conclusions are drawn – both on the national and European Union level – regarding anticompetitive conducts’ criminalisation, and suggestions made as to how to improve the criminal regimes already introduced. Based on these findings, the study tries to answer its basic question, whether at the present stage of the (Hungarian) criminalisation of anti-competitive conducts, the ‘cartel crime’ could be deemed a somewhat theoretical danger, a so-called paper tiger, and whether even the present stage of criminalisation could be deemed satisfactory, and the present threat of criminal liability and sanctions already to have a real deterrent effect.

In the US, consent judgments, decrees, or orders entered into between merging parties and government are a longstanding tradition. There are three key components to such consensus-based remedies. First, the remedies are not truly a consensus. The second notion is one of transparency: the remedies proposed in such settlements are made public. The nature of the theories of harm the remedies seek to mitigate are public as well. The third notion is typically a question of the overall merits of the remedy. Whether or not a merger remedy is in the public interest is a broad question. This chapter details the common provisions of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s settlements, alongside the EU Commission’s settlements. It looks for common weaknesses between the methods of settlement deployed, and the harms to competition that might arise from such systems. It concludes that competition policy is increasingly regulatory and non-adjudicatory. To the extent that consent settlements are important and prominent, it would make sense to have stakeholders have some significant say in the settlement. Lack of meaningful judicial review assures that any concerns are ignored. The authors critically note that lack of transparency assures that any concerns not listed in the proposed settlement are not properly addressed.

The chapter analyzes the complex system of labour law sanctions against unlawful violations of employee obligations, consisting of statutory laws, collective agreements, agreements of the parties and unilateral sources issued by the employer. The chapter looks at various forms of liability of the employee, and the responsibilities of the employer are discussed in detail. The employer may use disciplinary measures extending from warning and disciplinary sanctions to termination of employment. However, the employer and the employee may be liable for third-party damages and fines by public authorities, which must be paid in accordance with national rules. The chapter discusses opportunities and weaknesses of labour law in the particular context of cartels and antitrust rules. The author concludes that as regards sanctions against rogue employees for cartel actions, the employer has several choices depending on the strength of the sanction and its legal nature. Labour law focuses primarily on the protection of employees in these fields, but the employer is also entitled to proper protection against unlawful activities of rogue employees in case of cartel actions.

The chapter discusses the structure of public enforcement in the US antitrust system, with particular emphasis on the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement of laws governing marketplace competition, and a focus on civil sanctions under the Sherman Act, FTC Act, and parallel state law in the United States. It then argues that the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement is inextricable from the supporting remedial structure, including criminal enforcement and meaningful private enforcement. The chapter explains the theory of civil fines in law enforcement and reasons for a jurisdiction’s choosing one or the other form of sanctions. It then explains the structure of remedies for antitrust violations in the US system, highlighting the three forms of public enforcement and the backstop of private enforcement. It then turns to recent developments in civil remedies, including punitive fines as well as damages and related civil monetary relief. It criticizes the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Abbvie Inc. and interrogates the current Supreme Court case involving AMG Capital, inquiring whether AMG Capital might influence the interpretation of the FTC Act as it applies to competition law enforcement as well as consumer protection enforcement.

The chapter discusses canon law provisions relating to just punishment of financial–economic infringements by members of the Catholic Church. The aim of penalties in the Church differs from that in civil society: in the Church, punishments are applied to lead the offender through repentance to salvation; in civil society to reintegrate them into the society. The Church does not have power to enforce punishments, which means that a punishment can be applied only to those who accept the power of the Church by their own will. In canonical delicts the offender is bound by his conscience; in civil delicts by the coercive power of the state. Penalties can be used only as last resort. All possibilities are to be exhausted before a real punishment is applied. The principle of gradualism is one of the most important in the salvation of souls. The reverend emphasizes that being lost in pure legalism in the interpretation of the texts would cause the real meaning of canon law to be lost, since all penalties have the purpose that all offices, dignities, ministries, duties should be fulfilled by persons who are suitable.

This chapter examines the competition sanctions regime in Kenya. Competition sanctions and enforcement tools adopted by the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) have evolved, in what has been a historical shift. During its earlier years of operation, CAK required undertakings found to have engaged in restrictive trade practices to undertake advocacy initiatives, or cease and desist from future conduct. However, in the recent past CAK has continually imposed punitive administrative fines, increasing them steadily. In most cases, undertakings have preferred to enter into a settlement agreement with CAK. At the time of writing , no cartel case had been prosecuted in Kenya and no administrative fines had been imposed on an individual. To enhance detection of cartel conduct, CAK has adopted novel enforcement tools such as the informant reward scheme and the leniency program whose effectiveness is yet to be evaluated. The biggest challenge facing the Kenyan competition sanctioning regime is a low level of competition culture and a lack of public awareness, making CAK over-reliant on its own investigations and market inquiries in detecting cartel conduct. By taking stock of the Kenyan competition regime, this chapter provides understanding of the appropriate sanctions and remedies adopted by young and emerging competition agencies in developing countries.

Over recent years, Italy has seen a general increase of antitrust sanctions.1 In 2019, the total amount of sanctions imposed was EUR 693.93 million, the second-highest total ever reached in this jurisdiction.2

Turkish competition law provides a dual enforcement structure that consists of public and private enforcement. Although the legislator has attached considerable weight to private enforcement by enabling the claimants to sue for threefold damages, it is fair to say that the Act on the Protection of Competition mainly relies on public enforcement. The Act empowers the Turkish Competition Authority to enforce the law and sets out various sanctions, including structural remedies, which equip the Authority with broad powers in combating anticompetitive behavior. The prime sanction is administrative monetary fines which are based on the turnover of the infringing undertaking and can be set at a maximum level of 10 percent of the turnover of the infringing undertaking. The Act also authorizes the Authority to implement monetary fines to managers and employees in cases where they have considerable influence in the formation of infringement. Anticompetitive behavior is a misdemeanor; however, in bid-rigging, it can also give rise to a crime and trigger harsh criminal sanctions. It is generally accepted that the Act provides severe penalties for infringements; however, in practice, the sanctions have been applied somewhat inconsistently, basically due to the fact that enforcement policy lacks coherent policy goals.