Chapter 11 explores how German criminal procedure, in the same way as German substantive criminal law, builds on a main body of legislation that was drafted in the nineteenth century. While the German Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended numerous times – also with the intention to address digital transformation and the shift to an information society – the obtaining of digital evidence (in particular from service providers), its analysis and its transformation into evidence introduced in a criminal trial remain areas with many challenges, uncertainties of legal interpretation and need of legislative reform. This chapter aims to provide an overview of core themes of digital evidence in criminal justice and the cooperation of service providers in criminal matters in Germany – in particular those that seem of most relevance to an international audience.

Chapter 18 considers how, in general, Russian law does not provide a definition of digital (or electronic) evidence or any particular rules in that respect. However, various laws in the spheres of telecommunications, information technologies and personal data list specific categories of natural and legal persons, empowered to work with data in a digital form, including content data. Russian legal provisions are not always precise, and an important role in their interpretation belongs to both courts and executive bodies (e.g. the Roskomnadzor). Information dissemination managers and many other categories of personal data processors are obliged to use Russian information systems or databases to store data and cooperate with LEAs that are involved in criminal investigation and operative-search activities. Threats to data subjects’ rights especially increase during the latter, because it is almost impossible to find out that certain pieces of data have been transferred to LEAs. Other problems are grounded in the 24-hour access of specific bodies to certain information systems and the low efficiency of judicial orders as a mechanism of human rights protection.

Chapter 8 discusses the recent development within the Council of Europe – the Second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention – which provides the legal framework that legitimises unilateral cross-border access to digital evidence in criminal matters. While the Second Additional Protocol is innovative in terms of its law enforcement mechanisms vis-à-vis digital evidence, it is incomplete regarding its protective safeguards against the risks of abuse, as well as the extent to which it addresses rudimentary issues such as jurisdiction, data protection provisions, etc. This chapter pushes the idea that these non-negotiables should be addressed and the loose ends tied up.

Chapter 4 describes modern encryption technologies in not-too-technical terms, from the building blocks of encryption primitives to more advanced technologies, within the debate of potential lawful access to encrypted digital evidence. It demonstrates that, in our modern world, there is no single kind of encryption and that a nuanced understanding of the technology needs to be kept in mind. It also presents several advanced encryption technologies that present additional security capabilities (beyond message encryption). After arguing against the deliberate creation of ‘back-doors’, it presents recent preliminary proposals of technological solutions to this issue.

Chapter 14 discusses the Polish law on the basis of which electronic evidence is collected. These provisions are not always consistent with each other and do not contain a definition of electronic evidence. The chapter presents the problem of adapting the regulations of the Polish Telecommunications Act to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the field of legal requirements for collecting electronic evidence, and assesses the mechanism for controlling the acquisition of telecommunications data by the police. It looks at difficulties in providing electronic evidence to law enforcement authorities (LEAs) by very small service providers that do not possess appropriate organisational and financial resources, and the problem of limited remedies being available for persons whose data was collected by an LEA in violation of the law. It expresses doubt as to the manner of implementing the European Investigation Order in the Code of Criminal Procedure in Poland in terms of guaranteeing the defendant’s right to defence.

Chapter 19 provides an overview of Turkish law on the collection of digital evidence stored in and outside Turkey. It explains that while cybercrime offence definitions under Turkish law are generally in line with the Cybercrime Convention, Turkey has largely not transposed the criminal procedure and international cooperation sections of the Convention into its domestic law. It delves into the legal framework for collection of digital evidence in Turkey, including investigative measures, mandatory or voluntary cooperation of internet service providers, and administrative search and seizure methods. It analyses the judicial cooperation between Turkish LEAs and their foreign counterparts, and notes the challenges Turkish authorities face in obtaining e-evidence stored in foreign jurisdictions through mutual legal assistance requests. Noting efforts to overcome such challenges, in part through expanding the powers of the Information and Communication Technologies Authority, the chapter calls for a reform of Turkish criminal procedure and international cooperation law with the relevance of Turkey’s human rights obligations and e-evidence in mind.

Chapter 3 explores how EU data protection law relates to public–private direct cooperation on digital evidence in criminal investigations. It asks if a neat prima facie separation of the GDPR and the LED matches the realities of private-to-public data transfers for criminal investigations, and if that legal framework is harmonious enough to warrant description as an EU data protection acquis. It distinguishes scenarios of formal (and informal) direct cooperation, viewed through the conceptual prism of data controllership. It applies that frame to the European Commission’s 2018 ‘e-Evidence package’, along with co-legislators’ competing visions, before looking at the final 2023 compromise text from a data protection perspective. It discusses how far CJEU case law illuminates theoretical blind spots and if the ongoing strengthening of enforcement powers is likely to herald not only greater legal certainty on the supply of digital evidence but also meaningful, workable data subject rights. Last, it reflects on the future place of EU data protection standards within the Council of Europe’s own new direct cooperation mechanism – the Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention.

To begin a tour of research on implicit bias, the construct must be defined conceptually and operationally, and Section 1 does just that. As we shall see, the accumulated literature has been characterized by definitional divergences that merit investigation and resolution.

A primary goal of prejudice and stereotyping research is to reduce intergroup disparities arising from various forms of bias. For the last thirty years, much, perhaps most, of this research has focused on implicit bias as the crucial construct of interest. There has been, however, considerable confusion and debate about what this construct is, how to measure it, whether it predicts behavior, how much it contributes to intergroup disparities, and what would signify successful intervention against it. We argue that this confusion arises in part because much work in this area has focused narrowly on the automatic processes of implicit bias without sufficient attention to other relevant psychological constructs and processes, such as people’s values, goals, knowledge, and self-regulation (Devine, 1989). We believe that basic research on implicit bias itself is important and can contribute to reducing intergroup disparities, but those potential contributions diminish if and when the research disregards controlled processes and the personal dilemma faced by sincerely nonprejudiced people who express bias unintentionally. We advocate a renewed focus on this personal dilemma as an important avenue for progress.

In this section, we reassess the value of explicit prejudice measures. P.J. Henry starts this discussion by reviewing critiques of implicit prejudice measures and points to the overwhelming evidence of the power of explicit measures to predict important outcomes. To date, implicit measures have not yet been shown to be similarly capable. Henry explains how the “implicit revolution” was founded on the claim that explicit measures are useless, yet this is clearly not so.

Researchers in cognitive psychology have proposed that there are two distinct cognitive systems or dual processes underlying reasoning: automatic (implicit) processing and effortful (explicit) processing. Multiple measures have since been developed to capture implicit attitudes. However, do these new measures truly capture implicit attitudes? And can these implicit measures be used interchangeably? To answer this question, we investigated the differences between two of the most popular implicit attitudes measures used in the study of political behavior, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP). We examined data from an original survey experiment investigating gender attitudes and a nationally representative survey that measured racial attitudes. We found that it is important to consider implicit measures alongside explicit measures, as they are not redundant measures. However, when implicit attitudes are measured with the IAT, our inferences are more consistent with predictions of dual process accounts. Moreover, the IAT picks up out-group bias in a way that the AMP does not. The two studies point to the presence of significant differences between different types of implicit measures, and a need to reconsider how implicit attitudes are measured.

The concept of unconscious bias is firmly entrenched in American society, yet evidence has accumulated in recent years questioning widely accepted claims about the phenomenon, including assertions that it can be measured reliably, influences behavior and is susceptible to intervention. We adopt a two-pronged approach to investigating the state of affairs: First, assessing claims made about unconscious bias in the public sphere; and second, conducting a national public opinion survey – the first of its kind, to the extent we can ascertain – designed to measure public understanding of unconscious bias. Results show that broad majorities of Americans think unconscious biases are prevalent, influence behavior and can be mitigated through training. Confidence in its accurate measurement is lower. The public sees unconscious biases as more prevalent than biases that are consciously held, and as worthy of mitigation efforts by businesses and government. Our chapter assesses these attitudes and understandings and compares them with the state of the science on unconscious bias.

In this chapter we identify scientific gaps research to date regarding the ability of IAT scores to explain real world racial gaps. We use the term “IAT scores” rather than “implicit bias” because, as we show: (1) Implicit bias has no consensual scientific definition; (2) A definition offered by Greenwald (2017) is shown to be logically incoherent and empirically unjustified; (3) Exactly what the IAT measures remains unclear. Nonetheless, meta-analyses have shown that IAT scores predict discrimination to a modest extent. Alternative explanations for gaps are briefly reviewed, highlighting that IAT scores offer only one of many possible such explanations. We then present a series of heuristic models that assume that IAT scores can only explain what is left over, after accounting for other explanations of gaps. This review concludes that IAT scores probably explain a modest portion of those gaps. Even if the IAT captures implicit biases, and those implicit biases were completely eliminated, the extent to which racial gaps would be reduced is minimal. We conclude by arguing that, despite its limitations, the IAT should not be abandoned, but that, even after twenty years, much more research is needed to fully understand what the IAT measures and explains.