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12003 results in Cambridge Handbooks

Page 566 of 601

  • Chapter 9 - Explanation

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 155-170

  • Summary

    Our sensory and motor capacities depend on more than just the workings of the brain and spinal cord; they also depend on the workings of other parts of the body, such as the sensory organs, the musculoskeletal system, and relevant parts of the peripheral nervous system (e.g., sensory and motor nerves). It seems natural to think of cognition as an interaction effect: the result, at least in part, of causal processes that span the boundary separating the individual organism from the natural, social, and cultural environment. One thing to say that cognitive activity involves systematic causal interaction with things outside the head, and it is quite another to say that those things instantiate cognitive properties or undergo cognitive processes. Bridging this conceptual gap remains a major challenge for defenders of the extended mind. Situated cognition is a many-splendored enterprise.

  • Chapter 25 - Cognition for Culture

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 467-479

  • Summary

    In the classical theory, the terms problem and task are interchangeable. Allen Newell and Herbert Simon introduced the expression task environment to designate an abstract structure that corresponds to a problem. It is called an environment because subjects who improve task performance are assumed to be adapting their behavior to some sort of environmental constraints, the fundamental structure of the problem. Task environments are differentiated from problem spaces, the representation subjects are assumed to mentally construct when they understand a task correctly. Puzzle and game cognition seems to fit the formal, knowledge-lean approach. The ideas of task environment and problem space have a formal elegance that is seductive. The four areas in which adherents of situated cognition ought to be offering theories are: hints, affordances, thinking with things, and self-cueing. Evidently, self-cueing helps beat the data driven nature of cognition.

  • Chapter 8 - Dynamics, Control, and Cognition

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 134-154

  • Summary

    This chapter discusses the importance of dynamics to understanding cognition. The author turns to the issue of how dynamics have been integrated into various theories of cognition. The author describes strengths and weaknesses of three main contenders in cognitive science, in relation to their incorporation of time into their methods of model construction. The neural engineering framework (NEF) is a general theory of neurobiological systems. Neural dynamics are characterized by considering neural representations as control theoretic state variables. Thus, the dynamics of neurobiological systems can be analyzed using control theory. The model employs biologically realistic neurons to learn the relevant structural transformations appropriate for a given context, and it generalizes such transformations to novel contents with the same syntactic structure. The intent of the NEF is to provide a suggestion as to how we might take seriously many of the important insights generated from cognitive science.

Page 566 of 601