For a growing portion of our society, and especially younger generations, life increasingly revolves around intellectual creativity, entrepreneurship, and the digital domain. General Motors and other manufacturing companies are no longer the largest and most significant economic enterprises. Digital Age startups, such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix, provide the social and commerce platforms of daily life. They dominate the business news. Tesla is revitalizing the American automobile industry and revolutionizing automobile transportation. The balance sheets of these companies are not based on tangible resources but rather intangibles – intellectual property rights, information, and human capital. As President Obama emphasized in his final State of the Union Address,1 technological innovation provides the greatest hope for addressing the most pressing human challenges – climate change, public health, food and fresh water supply, and world peace. Social interaction occurs more and more in cyberspace, a seemingly infinite, borderless “place.” And a growing proportion of the most salient “property” rights issues that concern netizens and the U.S. judiciary relate to information resources and digital technology.

Throughout most of the twentieth century an exceedingly narrow interpretation and application of the utilitarian rationale for intellectual property protection dominated much of Western intellectual property (IP) law and policy.1 This was especially evident in the United States, wherein an economic incentive/commodification approach to IP social utility pervaded IP jurisprudence and scholarly discourse. In essence, that limited perception of the utilitarian economic incentive approach to stimulating IP endeavor, including among other things, the production of patentable inventions and copyrightable expressive works, was premised on the belief that IP endeavor is most effectively promoted by providing individuals with nearly absolute property rights in their IP output and the accompanying prospect of monetary rewards for their intellectual labors. Concomitantly, the commercial marketplace would not only determine the “rules of engagement” for IP production and dissemination, but also incentivize and determine the quality and quantity of IP output. Such an approach would result, by design, in IP innovators and creators devoting their energies to producing the kind of IP products that the public was willing to pay for, with little incentive to engage in “nonessential” IP activity unlikely to bring adequate economic returns.

China has become an active treaty-maker by entering into a large number of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral treaties. More recently, China has been actively engaged in some high-profile negotiations with the EU, the United States and ASEAN, with the aim of expanding its economic network. However, China’s treaty behaviours have come under scrutiny. This chapter aims to conceptualize China’s treaty behaviours through some case studies, including the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, China’s signing of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention of State Immunity and International Legal Order. These case studies indicate China’s paradox in treaty-making. While it attempts to legalize its political will through treaty-making, its enforcement of these treaties may be subject to a politicalized endeavour.

The rule of law (ROL) is invoked by multinational institutions, Western governments and in China as a political expectation of what legitimate governance looks like. Chinese leaders regularly make claims that are translated into commitments to uphold the ROL, and they generalize this rhetoric to the international level. Constrained by top-down conceptions, China’s idea of an international ROL becomes a hypothetical yet coherent and attractive possibility. Western legal scholars and political scientists are significantly more diverse and sceptical; most do not speak about an international rule of law, for a variety of reasons. This does not mean that there is no role for international law, but it does mean that for many Western scholars and practitioners, domestic conversations about an ROL ideal do not travel to the international level. Ideals can be useful even if they remain elusive. Yet the very different Western and Chinese understandings of the ROL ideal and its international implications may limit China’s international efforts to build international support for the vision that Chinese leaders are intentionally and assiduously creating.

In New York City, the 7 train rumbles above ground across the borough of Queens, before heading into an underground tunnel to cross the East River into Manhattan. Some 1.5 million people ride the 7 train every weekday. On November 18, 2013, as they looked out the window shortly before being enveloped by the tunnel’s darkness, they saw a dilapidated factory complex covered everywhere with vibrant graffiti.

This chapter addresses the benefits both to society and to prison inmates3 of equitable access, inclusion, and empowerment afforded by intellectual property (IP) protection extended to people in detention who constitute one of the most marginalized populations in the modern history of the United States.

As an essential player of global climate change governance, China has been proactive in climate change policymaking and has improved its climate governance through progressive policy measures and institution building both domestically and internationally. This shows China’s transformation from a norm-follower to a positive participant and further normative contributor to global climate change governance. Particularly, China has steadily exerted its influence on global climate change governance by adopting two governance approaches – a top-down governance approach and a multi-stakeholder engagement approach – in union. With Chinese corporations and financial institutions’ evolving participation in green investment and agenda-setting in global climate governance, China’s mixed governance approach can further improve its climate governance regime from a state-led climate governance system to a co-governance system. Through a more flexible framework with the involvement of different actors, China and other leading partners can create a broader foundation for policy cooperation to accelerate the reduction of carbon emissions and raise climate ambitions collectively.

The law of the sea is developed from centuries of national practices; China’s practice has also played a role in that process. International law was introduced into China in the late Qing dynasty. After the Opium War in 1840, the Qing dynasty government had to learn and accept international law, including the law of the sea, as created by the Western countries in order to negotiate and communicate with them. From 1840 until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, there were some practices in applying the law of the sea in China focussing on territorial sovereignty and fisheries interests. In the 1970s, the Chinese delegation participated fully in UNCLOS III, ushering in a new era in the practice of the law of the sea. China has made important contributions to the formulation of UNCLOS. It has actively implemented the law of the sea through domestic practices including legislation, law enforcement and judiciary, as well as bilateral consultations and cooperation on law of the sea issues with its maritime neighbours. China is committed to upholding the maritime order with the United Nations at its core and based on international law.

China’s engagement with international criminal law almost dates back to the creation of the body of law when the Tokyo tribunal was first established; China has followed closely the continuous evolution of international criminal law in various contemporary institutional contexts. Since China has involved itself in the making and development of international criminal law, it no longer views the body of law as subject to the same criticism as some of its aspects dating back to the nineteenth century, but it is not willing to take a step beyond its stance of positive engagement and commit fully to the binding force of international criminal law. This chapter aims to understand the evolving relationship of China with international criminal law, from the substantive issues that have influenced the nature of that relationship to date to the factors relating to China’s interactions with this body of law in the years to come. The chapter seeks to explore how China’s dual identities as both a developing country and a rising great power, which represent different kinds of state interests and preferences, give rise to competing concerns in its relationship with international criminal law.

On January 11, 2017, The Slants™ released “The Band Who Must Not Be Named,” describing it as a “special EP that commemorates the band’s defining moment: appearing at the Supreme Court of the United States.”2 This release preceded by one week the oral argument in their facial First Amendment3 challenge to a provision in the Lanham Act that had permitted the government to reject or cancel federal registration of disparaging trademarks.4 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) had upheld the denial of the band’s application to register the band’s name as its trademark on the federal register, deciding that the mark was racially disparaging.5 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit initially affirmed but later vacated the denial of registration, through an en banc decision.6

Libraries in the United States promote social justice by preserving and providing the public with free, equitable access to information. Libraries can provide this free access only because of exceptions and limitations in the U.S. Copyright Act such as the first sale doctrine, the fair use right, and the safe harbors for providers of online services. As a result of these exceptions and limitations, Americans at every social-economic level of our society enjoy access to the knowledge contained in millions of copyrighted works, and they use that knowledge to improve their daily lives and to enhance their participation in and contributions to civil society. This chapter explores the importance of these exceptions and limitations, particularly in the modern remote information society, to the pursuit of the precepts of equitable access, inclusion, and empowerment in the fulfillment of libraries’ social justice mission.

The relationship between China and international intellectual property (IP) law is full of challenges. Western countries, in particular the United States and those in the EU, have continually accused China of not respecting international IP law. China, however, argues that it has done its best to comply and has achieved great success within a short period of time. This chapter tries to answer the question of whether China is a respected player of international IP law and a responsible stakeholder of the international IP system, or a challenger to it. The chapter argues that although the relationship between China and the international IP system is not always smooth, China has justified that IP has its own normative values and thus should be protected, taken part in negotiation of IP treaties, implemented its IP obligations in good faith and accepted judicial settlement of international IP disputes. China learns from the system, supports the system and contributes to the system. China is changing from a follower of international IP law to a key player that contributes to the international IP legal system, for which she deserves to be respected.

For the past forty years China has been developing its network of international investment agreements. While initially China followed the template set by contracting partner countries, it has increasingly adopted its own approach towards investment protection in treaty negotiations, in an attempt to translate its rapid economic growth into greater political and negotiating power. This aspiration is also visible in China’s domestic policy initiatives concerning inward investment, in particular its enactment of the Foreign Investment Law and its implementation of related measures, including exemptions from tax liability for certain reinvestments. China’s continued shaping of investment treaties in accordance with its own bespoke needs has the potential to influence the future development of international investment law worldwide. This chapter first summarizes the history of China’s investment treaty practice and its domestic policies concerning inward investment. It then looks at issues that have arisen in investment treaty arbitrations involving China (as a respondent) or its nationals (as claimants). Finally, it analyzes China’s proposals for international investment law reform.

Statements tying geography to destiny reflect a deterministic idea of politics arising from early theories of geopolitics. “Geography is destiny” captures the idea that certain geographical regions have strategic, economic, and political advantages. The epigraph also extends beyond states to the truism that not all individuals and communities have the same opportunity to have access to resources,1 to contribute to the global economy of innovation,2 and to benefit from the global cumulative wealth. In some areas, it is more self-evident that the benefit-sharing systems are “a kind of lottery where the luckiest individuals and populations participate and win a portion of the benefits and others, also in great need but without similar resources, are left out of the process completely.”3

This chapter examines China’s asymmetrical engagement with different areas of international adjudication at a time of rising Chinese assertiveness and influence in the shaping of international law. It first explores the relatively minor, yet still remarkable softening of China’s traditional strategic detachment from international adjudicative systems concerning general public international law, international criminal law and international human rights law. These areas exemplify China’s lowest point of engagement with the international adjudicative system. It then focusses on China’s deepening engagement with other international adjudicative systems – in the areas of international trade law and international commercial and investment law – and how the prevention and dispute settlement system of the Belt and Road Initiative is taking shape. It looks at China’s exploratory accommodation of international settlement mechanisms in the law of the sea and newer areas, before examining an array of concomitant cultural, historical, political and contemporary strategic factors weighing both for and against China moving beyond its current ‘comfort zone’ regarding international adjudication.

Inventors have always approached the United States Patent Office hoping for financial reward.1 As Abraham Lincoln, himself a patentee, explained, the United States patent system is designed to add the “fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”2 Starting with the Patent Act of 1790, Congress offered “fuel” in the form of an opportunity to put dollars in one’s pocket by commercializing exclusive rights to an invention.3 While many inventor-patentees, including Lincoln, failed to earn anything from their patents, the legislative intention was to keep the fires of genius burning in the American population in order to generate what the United States Supreme Court has called “a positive effect on society.”4