This research analyzes the drivers of voluntary transparency in nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Particularly, we assess the influence of key internal and external resource providers—paid staff and business partners—on the extent to which NPOs make accessible relevant information about themselves for public scrutiny on a voluntary basis. First, we conceptualize transparency as one of the critical dimensions of accountability and explain how it has become a key issue for NPOs. Second, we discuss professionalization and business–nonprofit partnerships as business-oriented strategies directly connected to the main challenges (and controversies) NPOs face. Third, following institutional theory as core theoretical framework, we propose a set of hypotheses linking those strategies to transparency. Their influence will be measured through an empirical research based on a survey to a representative sample of 325 NPOs. Regression analysis and probit models will be used to test the hypotheses. The results confirm the positive effects of both professionalization and partnerships, although each strategy influences different dimensions of transparency.

Since 2003, the European Commission has produced analytical documents (called Impact Assessments, IAs) to appraise its policy proposals. This appraisal process is the cornerstone of the regulatory reform policy of the European Union. Previous research has been concerned with the quality of the IAs in terms of evidence-based policy, usages of economic analysis and other standards of smart regulation. Instead, we move to a different perspective. We draw on the narrative policy framework to explore IAs as a text and discursive instrument. Conceptually, insights from discursive institutionalism are used to explore narratives as tools of coordination within complex organizations such as the European Commission, and as communicative tools through which policy-makers seek to enhance the plausibility, acceptability and, ultimately, legitimacy for their policy proposals. Empirically, we consider a sample of IAs that differ by originating DGs, legal instrument, and level of saliency. The findings show that both in coordinating and communicating policy, the European bureaucracy projects a certain definition of its identity via the narratives it deploys. The Commission may use IAs to produce evidence-based policy, but it also an active narrator. It engages with IAs to provide a presentation of self, to establish EU norms and values, and to create consensus around policy proposals by using causal plots, doomsday scenarios, and narrative dramatization.

Non-profit organisations are under increasing pressure to demonstrate their social impact. This paper examines the experience and behaviour of non-profit organisations in the UK in relation to a demand for social impact evaluations. External resource providers request organisations to present evidence on how resources are used and what organisations have achieved. While most organisations are willing to comply and accept this control, they can also resist through using their discretion in deciding what to measure, how to measure and what to report. Non-profit organisations can proactively and voluntarily use social impact measurement for learning and promotional purposes, and as a way of exerting control over their environment. The analysis develops the concept of strategic decoupling to explain the differences observed between what organisations are asked to do, what they plan to do and what they are doing in practice.

Scholars have long been interested in what influences philanthropic behavior. However, little is known about the effects of length of residency on charitable gifts to local and non-local organizations. Using 2010 survey data from 470 older individuals, we examine whether donors’ geographic relocations influence philanthropic behavior and whether these moves are a bigger challenge for some types of nonprofits than others. We find variations in giving to specific types of nonprofits based on residency duration. The giving patterns we uncover add depth to our understanding of philanthropic behavior and inform nonprofit managers seeking to better understand older adults’ giving to local and non-local religious, human services, arts, and education nonprofits.

In January 2018, two different large-scale simulation games on the European Union’s decision-making process took place in Brussels. This study aims to bring systematic empirical evidence from both EuroSim and SUNY Model EU, two active learning experiences that gather around 300 international participants. The intention is to scrutinize whether specific student attributes generate differential effects on the learning outcomes. These involve cognitive outcomes and affective outcomes. The first type refers to participant’s level of knowledge and understanding about the EU policy-making dynamics. The second type reflects on participants’ overall interest and motivation upon the EU. The data were obtained through a post-game survey method based on stratified sampling. The results point at affective outcomes as the most salient learning outcomes of the simulations. In relation to participants’ features, the data reveal country of origin and gender as good performance-enhancers for students of non-EU origin and for the female cohort. All in all, in order to increase the usefulness of large-scale simulations, more attention needs to be given to participant selection and role attribution, as well as post-simulation debriefing or focus groups.

Support for a common currency and the European Monetary Union signifies that European citizens are willing to transfer power from the nation‐state to the European Union (EU). Given the symbolic importance of national currencies, this willingness to give up sovereignty over currency has important implications for the further integration and development of the European Union. Drawing on a multi‐level governance perspective and past research into public support for European integration, we examine how economic factors such as the value of the national currency and individual factors such as diffuse support for the EU and education condition support for the euro. We hypothesize that citizens will be less likely to support a common currency when they lack diffuse support for the EU, when their own national currency is strong or when their country's domestic agenda is squeezed by austerity measures. Using pooled Euro Barometer data from 1992 to 2000, we find support for these hypotheses indicating that citizens take into account domestic economic performance when evaluating EU institutions, but we also find that individual attitudes toward the EU play a role in support for the euro.

Currently, social enterprise represents a clear commitment of the European Union (EU) to generate socially responsible economy. Sheltered Workshops are a manifestation of this phenomenon. Their study raises interest because they are able to create value by combining a social purpose with a commercial activity. Thus, we intend to analyze the relationship between the social impact and the economic returns of these entities. In Spain, results show a strong interaction between social value (proxy for social impact) and economic value (proxy for economic returns), which allows us to state that it is possible to develop socially responsible and financially viable activities. In addition, the estimation using instrumental variables reveals that economic value is the result of the social strategy that takes precedence in managing Sheltered Workshops.

This article addresses the problem of unclear usage of “coercion” and “repression” in literature concerning protest and repression in democratic and nondemocratic states. It questions the bases and conclusions of domestic democratic peace theory and discusses its consequences. The article proposes expanding definitions of coercion and repression in terms of timing, agency, and perceptiveness. Using vocabulary of poststructuralist discourse theory and the “logics” approach to analyzing social phenomena, it introduces the notion of hegemonic coercion and repression and describes their functioning. It argues that contemporary liberal democracies are not free from coercion and repression, but that the hegemony embodied in the state is able to sustain itself by means of hegemonic coercion with little use of direct violence. Consequently, the absence of state violence is not a criterion of a mature democracy, but can also be a characteristic of a totalitarian regime where ideological deviations are strictly and preemptively controlled.

The succession of economic and financial crises, the migration crisis, and, of course, Brexit have raised many questions about the future of the European Union. Such crises present challenges for teaching and learning European Studies. This article discusses the question how to maintain a relevant study programme while taking into account ever-changing societal developments. Based on a survey conducted among students of a Bachelor in European Studies, and a subsequent focus group discussion, we look at programme relevance and programme capacity to deal with societal change in the context of a problem-based learning environment. Our study reveals that problem-based learning, when applied consistently and correctly, is a good educational approach to ensure that a study programme is relevant and capable of capturing societal change. At the same time, students seem to prefer a more guided version of problem-based learning, which presents challenges concerning its possible contribution to teaching and learning in times of crises. While we discuss the situation in one specific BA programme, we will do so in light of general challenges in the fields of European Studies, International Relations, and Politics.

This article develops the reward‐punishment issue model of voting using a newly collated aggregate measure of issue competence in Britain between 1971 and 1997, revealing systematic differences between governing and opposition parties in the way citizens' evaluations of party competence are related to vote intention. Using monthly Gallup ‘best party to handle the most important problem’ and vote intention data, time series Granger‐causation tests give support to a classic issue reward‐punishment model for incumbents. However, for opposition parties this reward‐punishment model does not hold: macro‐issue competence evaluations are Granger‐caused by changes in vote choice or governing party competence. An explanation is offered based upon the differentiating role of policy performance and informational asymmetries, and the implications are considered for comparative studies of voting, public opinion and for political party competition.

Over the past years, the economic crisis has significantly challenged the ways through which social movements have conceptualised and interacted with European Union institutions and policies. Although valuable research on the Europeanisation of movements has already been conducted, finding moderate numbers of Europeanised protests and actors, more recent studies on the subject have been limited to austerity measures and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has been investigated more from a trade unions’ or an international relations perspective. In this article, the TTIP is used as a very promising case study to analyse social movements’ Europeanisation – that is, their capacity to mobilise referring to European issues, targets and identities. Furthermore, the TTIP is a crucial test case because it concerns a policy area (foreign trade) which falls under the exclusive competence of the EU. In addition, political opportunities for civil society actors are ‘closed’ in that negotiations are kept ‘secret’ and discussed mainly within the European Council, and it is difficult to mobilise a large public on such a technical issue. So why and how has this movement become ‘Europeanised’? This comparative study tests the Europeanisation hypothesis with a protest event analysis on anti‐TTIP mobilisation in six European countries (Italy, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Austria) at the EU level in the period 2014–2016 (for a total of 784 events) and uses semi‐structured interviews in Brussels with key representatives of the movement and policy makers. The findings show that there is strong adaptation of social movements to multilevel governance – with the growing presence of not only purely European actors, but also European targets, mobilisations and transnational movement networks – with a ‘differential Europeanisation’. Not only do the paths of Europeanisation vary from country to country (and type of actor), but they are also influenced by the interplay between the political opportunities at the EU and domestic levels.

This article examines the links between legitimacy, politicisation and the rise of political dissensus in the context of the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). In particular, it assesses democratic, technocratic and procedural legitimacy against the vertical, inter-level relations between EU institutions and national authorities in the elaboration of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs), with a particular focus on the case of Italy. The article shows that the implementation of the RRF tends to centralise powers in national executives and their technical-administrative structures to the detriment of national legislatures. This gives rise to a “legitimacy disequilibrium” in the implementation of the RRF characterised by a strong technocratic and a weak democratic legitimacy. Challenging the coordinative Europeanisation literature, the article thus argues that the implementation of the RRF is potentially subject to dynamics of politicisation. As a matter of fact, the observed legitimacy disequilibrium resulting from the implementation of the RRF is open to politicisation from party actors in the member states, thus assuming salience in national public debates. Finally, the article illustrates how the politicisation of NRRPs can become a factor in the wider process of political dissensus in the EU, involving contestation by different types of actors (EU institutions, member state governments and national parties), operating at different levels (EU and national), and with different aims.