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The existing social pact literature claims that governing parties offer social pact proposals because they anticipate they will receive an electoral benefit from social pact agreements. Yet the available data on social pacts inform us that in a substantial minority of cases social pact proposals fail to become social pact agreements. In an effort to better determine the political calculations made by governments before they propose a social pact, this article examines the effect of implementing reform legislation unilaterally, social pact proposals, social pact proposal failures and social pact agreements on the vote share of government parties in 15 Western European countries between 1981 and 2006. It is found that social pact proposals do not have any electoral consequences for governing parties, unilateral legislation and social pact proposal failures reduce the vote share of governing parties, and social pact agreements provide an electoral benefit to parties in minority governments only. These findings suggest that governing parties propose social pacts in a good faith effort to complete a social pact agreement; and that such an agreement is not a way for these parties to gain votes, but to avoid the electoral punishment associated with enacting unpopular reforms unilaterally.
This paper argues that the operating environment of humanitarian assistance is best conceived as an interorganizational social network or regime and that the problem of power and authority in such situations must be re-founded or reconceived accordingly. This contention is developed to contribute to an important ongoing dialogue among analysts concerning how humanitarian aid may most effectively be delivered in the context of a realistic appraisal of the structural and operating conditions in which it is offered. The paper first outlines the primary elements of the organizational environment in which humanitarian efforts must proceed, next suggests a way of thinking about how one might conceive of those conditions that builds on recent work, and then sketches the elements of a strategic contingency approach to the humanitarian assistance coordination dilemma. This analytical frame leads one to rethink assumptions concerning how best to conceptualize both the environment and the behavior of humanitarian organizations engaged in providing assistance in emergency situations and to suggest that theory building for this domain of study should now turn to a network-based and strategically contingent perspective for its foundation.
Studies on populist parties – or ‘supply‐side populism’ more generally – are numerous. Nevertheless, the connection with demand‐side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the electorate, requires more scholarly attention. This article examines in more detail the conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of populist attitudes amongst citizens. It asks two core questions: (1) are populist party supporters characterised by stronger populist attitudes than other party supporters, and (2) to what extent do populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? The analysis uses fixed effect models and relies on a cross‐sectional research design that uses unique survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. The results are threefold. First, in line with single‐country studies, populist attitudes are prominent among supporters of left‐ and right‐wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support in addition to left‐wing socioeconomic issue positions for left‐wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti‐immigration issue positions for right‐wing populist parties. Third, populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous with their own policy‐related preferences.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) that deliver services on behalf of public authorities operate under increased competitive and standardization pressures. Given this background, many CSOs experience a need to justify why public authorities should continue to fund them. In this article, we underpin and develop a new understanding of added value, proposing it to be the perceived social value of services or programs provided by a CSO that differs positively from the perceived social value of services or programs provided by other organizations and can be identified as functional, altruistic, emotional, or social. We elaborate on these four forms of added value and discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this understanding.
How can the internal governance of civil society organizations be conceptualized more adequately by accounting for the dual and simultaneous requirements of controlling and coaching in board behavior? Empirically, we seem to agree that effective governance of a civil society organization is crucial to its sustained viability. Conceptually, however, we observe a lack of consensus on how to best understand CSO governance. By critically juxtaposing two major theoretical lenses to conceptualize governance, namely, agency and stewardship theory, we identify a number of challenges when dealing with board–management relations that deserve our attention. While agency theory privileges controlling behavior, stewardship theory emphasizes the coaching behavior of boards. The purpose of this article is to offer a concept of governance that is informed by a paradox perspective advancing a subtler, more adequate conceptualization of board governance that accounts for these often conflicting demands on CSO governance. Drawing on illustrations from a longitudinal interpretive case study, we exemplify our propositions empirically. The article concludes with discussing the implications of our argument for CSO governance research and practice.
This article provides the contextual background to the symposium on Populist Discourses and Political Communication in Southern Europe. It explains the symposium’s objectives and introduces the rationale of its articles on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Within this context, the editors also highlight the specific conditions for the emergence of typical forms of Southern European populism, as well as its distinctive features, focusing on the challenges populism poses to politics and media research. The implications of the phenomenon for the future of the European project are also addressed.
The study of new political parties causes important problems both on the theoretical and empirical level. First, only little empirical evidence is available for recently formed parties, and secondly, the study of the emergence of new political parties has attracted little attention from political scientists. This fact apparently stems from the essentially static characteristics of major political theories, such as the study of party systems and electoral behaviour. Hence in contradiction to predominant political theory, the present article proposes a dynamic model in order to study the emergence of the Swiss Ecological Party.
This paper deals with the politics of redistribution in local government. Traditionally, it has been assumed that redistributive policies are crucial in electoral competition and party politics, both in national and local political systems. From this perspective, differences in local competition and party systems are essential to an explanation of local redistributive efforts. Peterson (1981), however, claims that redistributive policies are excluded from the local agenda because they impair local economic prosperity. These policies are therefore not conceived as instruments in the vote-maximizing strategies of local political parties. In this paper, hypotheses on the impact of party competition and party politics on local redistribution are formulated and tested on data for 342 Dutch municipalities. The results show that, contrary to what would be expected from Peterson's perspective, municipal redistributive efforts were related to electoral competitiveness and the party system. The proposed model, however, proved to be unsatisfactory in accurately predicting the direction of the effects of these explanatory variables. These results suggest that, rather than abandoning the study of local redistribution as a non-issue in subnational politics, an effort should be made to develop a better theoretical understanding of the ways in which competition and party politics shape these policies.
Within the last few years something akin to a paradigm-shift has been underway in the French-language political science literature dealing with contemporary France. Previously this literature had overwhelmingly focused on the distinctiveness and specificity of France's institutional arrangements under the Fifth Republic. It had therefore been concerned with elaborating particularist concepts and typologies to characterise both her political regime and also the political forces operating within, and shaped by, that institutional framework. In contrast, a growing body of recent writing is informed by a shared conviction that the contemporary period is indeed witnessing la fin de lexception française. Such works are therefore concerned with locating and identifying the sources of change through which French democracy is now, in the view of these authors, coming to be more closely aligned on the forms and processes characteristic of the practice of liberal democracy elsewhere.
The ballot structure of German Bundestag elections allows two votes: one for a constituency candidate and the second for a party list. About one-fifth of the voters usually split their ticket. Several hypotheses are derived about incentives for ticket splitting and tested with survey data from a 1998 pre-election poll. We argue that an explanation of split tickets in the German system has to take into account both party rankings and coalition preferences. One of the most important incentives is a preference or top ranking of a minor party like the FDP or Greens, if it is combined with a preference for a coalition with either the CDU/CSU or SPD. Contrary to this finding, the hypothesis of threshold insurance voting of CDU/CSU or SPD supporters choosing the party list of their prospective minor coalition partner is rejected for the 1998 election.
This article illustrates the development of government–nonprofit collaboration in the Netherlands. It first gives an overview of the scope and structure of the nonprofit sector and voluntary work and then explains the crucial steps in the evolution of the partnership arrangement between the public sector and nonprofit institutions. The article describes the past significance of so-called pillarization on the development of the nonprofit sector and its collaboration with the state. In accommodating a broad diversity of nonprofit organizations with different religious and social backgrounds, the Netherlands created an elaborate mechanism for government–nonprofit collaboration in which nonprofit organizations fulfill functions in service delivery and policy formation. However, the sector is now fundamentally fragmented and has little shared identity left today. Paradoxically, its past success also makes it less likely that the Dutch nonprofit sector will be regarded as a solution to current social problems.
This paper examines some of the key challenges critical terrorism studies will have to face. Starting from the premise that a critical turn must both challenge traditional approaches to ‘terrorism’ and provide an umbrella under which traditional and critical perspectives from ‘terrorism studies’ and cognate fields can converge, the article reflects on the tensions this will introduce, ranging from how to define the boundaries of a critical field and whether to adopt the term ‘terrorism’ as a field delineator, to the need for policy-relevance and the tensions this introduces between striving to influence policy and avoiding co-optation. The paper ends with a reflection on the challenge of being sensitive to cultural and contextual differences while remaining true to one's emancipatory agenda.
In the first half of the essay we summarise the main contributions in the essays in this issue by Coleman, Colomer, and Taagepera, and identify key commonalities in their suggestions for making political science more ‘scientific’. We argue that most of their concerns are well taken, but that the remedies they propose may not be applicable in all domains within political science. In particular, it is largely in the area of voting and elections, where clearly demarcated input and output variables can be identified, that their suggestions seem the most applicable. In the second half of the essay we trace the rise and fall, over the past 100 years, of movements in the US to make political science more scientific. We conclude by identifying similarities between these essays and the recent EITM movement in US political science.