Mr. Hope is a 40-year-old man who has resided at a long-term care facility for the past 10 years. The resident was originally admitted to the nursing home for his inability to care for himself secondary to advanced AIDS and complications from progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy (PML). When he initially arrived at the nursing home, Mr. Hope was able to smile and appeared to respond to some of the staff’s requests. Now, he responds by wincing when told that procedures are being performed and especially when he is told that he has to go back to the hospital. He is extremely contracted, with his arms wedded to his chest in a crossed fashion, as though he is protecting himself from blows. Mr. Hope’s family consists of a partner, his parents, and one sibling. Numerous conversations have been had with the family, and according to the facility staff, “they persist in continuing aggressive measures with the hope that the patient will wake up and walk out of the facility.” What had been frequent visits to the local hospital ER have increased substantially in the last few months, for what appear to be new infections and pneumonia. During most visits he ultimately spends a few days in the hospital to resolve his acute issues. On his most recent return to the long-term care facility, the medical staff approached the family about Mr. Hope’s code status. The family continues to insist on a full code status and that he be provided every opportunity to “live.” The staff is very concerned about Mr. Hope and his welfare. Many of the nursing staff have grown attached to him over the years, and watching him deteriorate has been distressing. They see part of their role as being his advocate and supporting him in ways that his own family has not. They express very strong reservations about performing CPR on Mr. Hope because they think it will be ineffective and they will have to break his upper extremities in order to gain access to his chest for resuscitation. The staff has contacted the ethics consultation service with the request that Mr. Hope needs protection and that his own family is not making the best decisions for him.

The Criminal Code of Canada prohibits persons from aiding or abetting suicide and consenting to have death inflicted on them. Together, these provisions have prohibited physicians from assisting patients to die. On February 6, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada declared void these provisions insofar as they “prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.” This declaration of invalidity was scheduled to take effect one year (later extended by six months) after the ruling, to give the government time to put legislation in place. We trace the history of this decision, discuss how it has forever changed the debate on physician-assisted dying, and identify the issues that must be resolved to write the legislation. Of special importance here are the topics of access, safeguards, and conscientious objection.

Mr. Hope’s family’s expectations and his staff’s concerns raise important issues about surrogate decisionmaking, communication regarding prognosis, and staff angst. Unfortunately, Mr. Hope himself is unable to reliably understand and communicate his preferences, especially for complex medical decisions, so the ethics consultant is left to negotiate the disagreement between his family and his healthcare providers, who presumably both believe they are acting in his best interest.

An ethics consult was scheduled for the following day. Prior to the consult, Mr. Hope subsequently decompensated and was transferred to the local hospital. The ethics consultation service continued with the ethics consult to discuss the ethical concerns of the medical staff but in particular to create an open forum for the staff to process their moral distress over the care of this patient and to come to an agreed-on plan on how they would proceed should the resident code. The patient never returned to the long-term care setting. While in the emergency room, the patient took a turn for the worse and appeared to require intubation. The emergency room attending physician contacted the patient’s family and discussed the imminent likelihood of the patient’s demise and the potential harm caused to the patient by resuscitation and intubation, and the family agreed to switch to comfort measures, allowing the patient to pass peacefully. The family stated to the ER physician that they needed to feel as though they had done everything they could to keep their loved one alive and did not want any responsibility for his death. The staff at the long-term care setting still remember Mr. Hope in their daily work and talk about him often.

In 2014, the Japanese government amended the laws concerning regenerative medicine. This reform aimed to contribute to the appropriate promotion of regenerative medicine and new drug discovery for intractable diseases using stem cells. It also helped restrict stem cell tourism, that is, provision of stem cell therapy of unclear efficacy and safety to tourists from abroad, and its relaxed regulations may even lead to the resolution of the drug lag problem. Stem cell medicine is positioned as a part of a national growth strategy that requires cooperation among the industry, government, healthcare field, and academia. It can be characterized as a “mesoscopic strategy,” in that it aims to achieve high-level technological developments that would allow results from human-induced pluripotent stem cell and traditional stem cell research to contribute to regenerative medicine and drug development for intractable diseases, while attempting to strike a balance with commercialization and improved access of citizens to cutting-edge medical care.

This article examines ethical issues debated in Iceland concerning population genetic research, specifically methods of collecting biosamples and ways to return clinically relevant results to participants. Also discussed are scientific research in the health sector, a bill on surrogacy, and a policy on consent for organ donation.

In 2003 Turkey introduced the Health Transition Program to develop easily accessible, high-quality, and effective healthcare services for the population. This program, like other health reforms, has three primary goals: to improve health status, to enhance financial protection, and to ensure patients’ satisfaction. Although there is considerable literature on the anticipated positive results of such health reforms, little evidence exists on their current effectiveness. One of the main initiatives of this health reform is a performance-based supplementary payment system, an additional payment healthcare professionals receive each month in addition to their regular salaries. This system may cause some ethical problems. Physicians have an ethical duty to provide high-quality care to each patient; however, pay-for-performance and other programs that create strong incentives for high-quality care set up a potential conflict between this duty and the competing interest of complying with a performance measure.

In its simplest interpretation, this is a case about goals of care and appropriate code status. At the outset, we must confess that we found this case to be extremely interesting—not for the novelty of the issues or its ethical complexity but because it is truly a case of the ordinary. Too often when teaching or discussing clinical ethics cases, we are distracted by the exotic and the unusual and ignore the mundane cases that every practicing clinical ethicist must be able to competently manage.1,2,3

Dignity is one of the most controversial and yet commonly used terms in debates regarding end-of-life issues. The term “dignity” can take various meanings. For example, it can be used to denote the respect owed to an individual person, or to signify the intrinsic value of humankind as a whole. These two different understandings of dignity inevitably lead to different approaches to end-of-life decisionmaking.

This article explores the meaning of the term “dignity” in two European countries, England and France. Our analysis compares public debates and legislation on end-of-life-related issues in these two countries. We argue that in England dignity is most commonly understood as respect for individual autonomy, whereas in France dignity usually signifies respect for humanity as a whole. We demonstrate that the difference in the conceptualization of the term leads to different ethical, and hence legal and practical, approaches to end-of-life issues and vulnerable patients. Our particular focus is on (1) withdrawing/withholding life-sustaining treatment, (2) respect for patient preferences, and (3) assistance in dying.

Given the difference in the understanding of dignity, and the underlying philosophical approaches, it appears that there is still a long way to go before we can establish common guidelines on end-of-life decisions across Europe and beyond. However, clarifying the use of the term “dignity” in different discussions around Europe could hopefully facilitate this endeavor.

Pharmaceutical representatives use detailing, gift giving, and the donation of free samples as a means to gain access to and influence over physicians. In biomedical ethics, there has been an ongoing debate as to whether these practices constitute an unethical conflict of interest (COI) on the part of the physician. Underlying this debate are the following antecedent questions: (1) what counts as a conflict of interest, (2) when are such conflicts unethical, and (3) how should the ethical physician respond to conflicts? This article distinguishes between two perspectives that have been developed on these issues: a reliable performance model (PM) and a trustworthiness model (TM). PM advocates argue that a conflict of interest can only be established by demonstrating that a particular influence is undermining the reliability of the physician’s judgment, and this requires empirical evidence of negative patient outcomes. TM advocates, on the other hand, argue that because of the fiduciary nature of the patient-physician relationship, physicians have an obligation to develop and be worthy of patient trust. A COI, on this view, is a condition that undermines the warrant for patients to judge a physician as trustworthy. Although there is much that is right in the PM, it is argued that the TM does a better job of responsibly addressing the unique vulnerabilities of the patient. The TM is then applied to the practices of detailing, gift giving, and sample donation. It is concluded that these practices constitute an unethical conflict of interest.

The Dutch Euthanasia Act seems to be set in stone. Since it took effect in 2002, it has not seen any significant amendments. Recent developments, however, indicate that a major component of the act—the review procedure—is due for revision. The review practice of the regional euthanasia review committees—responsible for applying and interpreting the law—now also extends to instances of euthanasia and assisted suicide for special categories of patients: psychiatric patients, patients with early-stage dementia, and patients whose suffering is derived from a combination of medical and existential causes. In this article, it is argued that a reconsideration of the review practice for these new cases is necessary primarily because review committees lack the legitimacy needed for the development of policies with such a large impact on society.

Surgical advances have allowed for the development of split liver transplantation, providing two recipients with the opportunity to potentially benefit from one donated liver by splitting the liver into two usable parts. Although current data suggest that the splitting of livers provides overall benefit to the liver-recipient population, relatively low numbers of livers are actually split in the United Kingdom. This article addresses the question of whether ethical concerns are posing an unnecessary barrier to further increasing the number of life-saving transplantations. Recognizing that an important aspect of exploring these concerns is gaining insight into how transplant staff and patients regard splitting livers, the article presents the findings of a qualitative study examining the views of senior transplant staff and liver transplant patients in the UK and uses these to inform a commentary on the ethical issues relating to split liver transplantation.

Assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) are intertwined and coevolving. These technologies are increasingly used to fulfill socially and culturally framed requests, for example, “family balancing,” or to enable postmenopausal women or homosexual couples to have genetically linked children. The areas of ART and RGT are replete with ethical issues, because different social practices and legal regulations, as well as economic inequalities within and among countries, create vulnerable groups and, therefore, the potential for exploitation. This article provides an overview of the ART and RGT landscape in Pakistan and analyzes the available online content addressing Pakistani citizens and international clients. We explored the topic in view of socioeconomic challenges in Pakistan, particularly deeply rooted poverty, lack of education, gender discrimination, and absence of regulation. As online information given by ART and RGT providers is readily available and could easily raise false hopes, make use of discriminatory statements with regard to women, and promote gender selection to meet sociocultural expectations, it should be subjected to quality control.

In 2011, Frank Van Den Bleeken became the first detainee to request euthanasia under Belgium’s Euthanasia Act of 2002. This article investigates whether it would be lawful and morally permissible for a doctor to accede to this request. Though Van Den Bleeken has not been held accountable for the crimes he committed, he has been detained in an ordinary prison, without appropriate psychiatric care, for more than 30 years. It is first established that Van Den Bleeken’s euthanasia request plausibly meets the relevant conditions of the Euthanasia Act and that, consequently, a doctor could lawfully fulfill it. Next, it is argued that autonomy-based reasons for euthanizing him outweigh complicity-based reasons against doing so, and that, therefore, it is also morally permissible for a doctor to carry out the euthanasia request.