In December 2001, over 150 citizens of Russia, Israel, the U.S., Ukraine and some other countries gathered in Moscow in their capacity as former activists of the non-official Jewish movement in the USSR to celebrate the 25th anniversary of an event that had never taken place—an unofficial Moscow Symposium on Jewish Culture. The symposium, which had been forbidden by the KGB, acquired an important, but symbolic, meaning (as vivid evidence of the suppression of Jewish culture in the USSR) for the very fact of its non-performance. Celebrating this (non-)event 25 years later, members of the Jewish movement who had been active for some time in the period from the late 1960s to the late 1980s talked about their struggle against the Soviet regime, emphasizing the victory they had gained together with other dissenting groups. They called for the “political support of Israel, the United States, and Russia in their fight against international terrorism,” spoke on behalf of repeal of the Jackson–Vannick amendment, voted for the establishment of a transnational association of Russian (or Russian-speaking or former Soviet) Jews, and even discussed the “historical mission of Russian Jewry.” The issue of Jewish culture was virtually omitted from the discussion.

In view of the vast scope of my topic I have to restrict myself to the most basic aspects and most recent developments in the subject area. Actually, as far as Soviet Belorussia is concerned there has not been much going on in this area. With sufficient cadres of historians to have produced the 12-volume “Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia” (Minsk, 1969–1975) and a 5-volume “History of the Belorussian SSR” (the first three volumes appeared in 1972–1973), the topic of terminology and periodization has nonetheless been relegated to silence along with the problem of the general state of historiography. For example among the 4,500 entries in the “Bibliography of Belorussia's History: The Period of Feudalism and Capitalism” (Minsk, 1969, 437 p.) one discovers only nine articles on historiography written in the post-Stalin period, the most recent of which is dated 1965. Of the two articles reviewing the state of historical scholarship on the occasion of the fortieth and fiftieth anniversaries of Soviet Belorussia neither discusses or mentions discussions on the subject of historiography, let alone terminology and periodization. This strange abhorrence by Belorussian Soviet historians of their own metier still persists, as we learn from two reviewers of the third volume of the new 5-volume “History of the Belorussian SSR”: “We must note that in this volume as well as in the previous ones the historiographic part is essentially lacking.” Nevertheless, some individual historians and authors demonstrate their keen awareness of the importance of the matter. This was perhaps most perceptibly expressed in 1968 by a Grodno Professor Jazep Jucho (Yazep Yukho). Explaining the origin and history of one of the basic terms of Belorussia's past and present, the name Bielaruś, Jucho observes: “confusion in terminology leads to a distortion of the whole historical process of the development of the Belorussian people.”

This article analyzes the discourse of historical legitimacy in the duchy of Schleswig and in the Slovenian-speaking regions of Carniola, Styria, and especially Carinthia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The question as to who had arrived in the area first was never far from the surface, because in an era of national romanticism, duration of stay seemed to allot special claims to possession. Rather than challenging this rationale, all sides tended to focus their efforts on enhancing their local genealogy. Yet the national conflicts of the period were not about political and linguistic history, but about contemporary interests and identities. In both Jutland and the southeastern Alps, national movements tended to focus on select moments in time that corresponded most closely to their modern-day political aspirations. The comparative analysis of two otherwise fairly divergent European regions reveals the pragmatic similarities of historical nation-building.

An academic gathering – be it a symposium, a conference, or a round-table – to examine the work of a fellow scholar is invariably timely. At the very least it presupposes a consensus on the basic significance of the subject being addressed and a collective decision to address it. As a launch of a new book (in Ukraine a phenomenon known as prezentatsiia), it provides the welcome opportunity to discuss a new contribution and with that to fill in and redraw our map of the field. If more than one work or project is involved, it provides a still greater opportunity, and indeed poses a scholarly obligation, to see the larger picture and to engage in stocktaking and rethinking. By contextualizing, problematizing, and where need be, deconstructing, we recalibrate our understanding and thus revive the field and our commitment to it. Clearly, the process of laudatio, of paying homage to achievements spanning a whole career, also contributes to this.

Western experts claim that the end of the Warsaw Pact and the artificial stability it provided, together with what are routinely called “traditional ethnic animosities,” are the causes of continual and inevitable clashes between states in East Central Europe. This area, a triangle formed by the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, covers the Western border area of the former Soviet Union, and all of Poland, ex-Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, ex-Czechoslovakia and the eastern territories of Germany. This issue of Nationalities Papers is dedicated to the Hungarian ethnic minorities of East Central Europe, in part to examine the validity of the “traditional ethnic animosity” thesis. Spread among seven states, roughly three and a half to four million souls, they constitute the largest diaspora in Europe, and, in relative terms, are more numerous in states around Hungary than the ethnic Russians outside of the Russian Federation on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

This article is the fifth and final in a Nationalities Papers series providing an overview of the development of Romani political group representation and administration, from the arrival of Roma to Europe up to 1971, the landmark year of modern transnational Romani politics. The article concentrates on the period between the Second World War and 1970 and the emergence of the following phenomena which distinguish this period from those covered in the previous articles: some limited Romani participation in non-Romani mainstream political or administrative structures, an international Romani evangelical movement, reconciliation between Romani political representation and the Catholic Church, national institutions created by various governments to aid the administration of policies on Roma and rapid growth of non-governmental organizations addressing Romani issues.

Michael Rywkin: Perestroika in Central Asia

I will cover only a few points. It is obvious that, as far as the nationalities are concerned, perestroika has affected them in different ways. It is very hard to say that there is a uniform situation as far as perestroika's impact is concerned. We know well what is going on with the national fronts in the Baltic; we also know about the Caucasian situation's being complicated by difficulties not only between the local nationalities and the Muscovites, but also among the local nationalities themselves, and minorities within minorities. We have still a different situation in Belorussia, and yet another in Central Asia. Some of the events in Central Asia are directly connected with republics, while other trends already started beforehand.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines nation as “a distinct race or people, characterized by common descent, language or history, usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory.” Nationalism in turn may be defined as a sense of identity as a people, and the efforts resulting to foster this and to obtain recognition as a distinct population, bound by common historical, cultural, linguistic, political, religious or other ties in the eyes of the larger society.

While in the broadest sense the term “nation” may apply to a non-politically autonomous ethnic group consisting of only a few hundred individuals (cf. the West African or Native American use of the word as an equivalent to “tribe”), it is most often used synonymously with the notion of an actual country, the existence of an independent geographical homeland being an integral part of its interpretation. However, as the dictionary definition indicates, this is usually, and therefore by implication not invariably, a defining criterion. There have been nations of people lacking a homeland (or a homeland allowing them access or control) throughout history. The pre-1948 Jewish population, for example, or the Palestinians in the present day. Bloody wars have been fought because of the existence of nations of people lacking their own autonomous territory.

It is into this latter category that the Romani nation fits and, though the efforts to secure a geographical homeland were central to the nationalist movement, especially during the 1930s and 1940s, the price paid for not having one has been heavy.

In the article, the author uses a sociocultural approach to analyze debates in the US press that accompanied “Russian celebrations” in 1813. During the War of 1812, the Federalist opposition to President Madison's administration organized several celebrations of Russia's victories over Napoleon, who was a de facto ally of the USA in its war against England. As a result, harsh debates arose about the relative merits of the Russian nation. Madison's supporters described Russia in extremely critical terms, while the critics of the administration mostly spoke positively of the distant country. For both sides, the Russian victories were just a pretext for formulating their own political views, but by using an image of “the Other,” they elaborated and affirmed two major characterizations of Russia: in one view, it was a barbaric and uncivilized country; in the other, a guarantor of liberty and a rapidly developing and freedom-loving nation. The main difference was summarized in a pamphlet publication of correspondence between Robert Harper and Robert Walsh. The article affirms that the level of civilization in Russia was not just used as an argument in domestic polemics, but was determined according to the demands of that polemic.

The republics that make up the South Caucasus today gained brief independence after the fall of the Tsarist Empire, before the integration of the region into Bolshevik Russia. This period, even though short, gives interesting historical background to understand the present. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to study the South Caucasian republics from 1918 to 1921 at the regional and international levels, paying particular attention to the historical continuities with the contemporary era (since 1991). The results of the study show three main parallels between the early twentieth century (1918–1921) and the present. First, the region is still internally divided (e.g. the unresolved conflicts). Second, externally, it is torn between sometimes opposing powers (e.g. Russia and the Western powers). Finally, third, the partnerships with international or regional powers still remain asymmetrical; consequently, the need to cooperate with Russia exceeds the aspirations of the Western powers toward the South Caucasus. Based on archival research, this study contributes to the historiography of the region and gives a framework for understanding the South Caucasus in contemporary international relations.