The relationship between the Jewish nation and the governing systems of Central and Eastern Europe has long fascinated, and bedeviled, contemporary observers and modern scholars alike. Numerous problems continually seem to defy convincing resolution. Among them are such key questions as these: Which factors can be used to define the Jews — i.e., linguistic, religious, ethnic lineage, custom and tradition — or a combination of these? Can the Jews become trusted loyal citizens of a secular state wherein they form a distinct ethno-religious minority? How can the government and/or its supporting majority determine at what point the Jews cease to be productive, contributing members of society, and become instead a harmful burden to the state and its people? Nowhere, it seems, has this collection of thorny issues, conveniently known as the “Jewish Question,” enjoyed such widespread attention and concerted concern from both official and general sources as in the lands ruled by the Russian tsars and, after 1917, by the Soviet commissars.

In an essay published in September 1962, poet Pavle Stefanovic announced that in the next census he would identify himself as a Yugoslav rather than a Serb. Writing down “Serb” on official forms, Stefanovic said, had always made the sweat break out on his forehead, plunging him into “the nightmarish vision of an individual identity imposed upon me rather than chosen by my own will, one which fills me with polar opposites: pride and shame … a feeling of innocence and of culpability.” Mixed with his pride in parts of his Serbian heritage, he explained, was horror at the atrocities committed in the name of Serbdom by the Chetniks, the Serbian monarchist forces of the Second World War. Stefanovic emphasized that he was not rejecting Serbian identity because he thought the Serbian past was worse than others. Rather, he wished to throw off the symbolic weight attached to all national pasts. By declaring himself a Yugoslav, he thought, he could show that he considered nationality merely “a sort of historic-genetic address, a fact about one's origin,” and not a primary or sacred identity. In his eyes, choosing the Yugoslav identity meant asserting his own free will against the unchosen national collective, expressing his commitment to internationalism, and separating the future from a nightmare-ridden past.

Intra-state regional differences are a central topic in the study of European and Eurasian politics. In Ukraine, regional differences have proven to be powerful predictors of mass attitudes and political behavior. But what does the “regional factor” in Ukrainian politics represent? Is it simply the result of compositional effects, or are the regional differences more than just a sum of other demographic factors correlated with geographic divisions? When analyzing regional divisions as an explanatory variable, what are the implications of employing different regional frameworks? In this article, we demonstrate how geographic divisions in the country hold up even when others factors—such as ethnicity and language use—are controlled for. As part of this inquiry, we compare the results of three competing regional frameworks for Ukraine: one with two regions, one with four regions and one with eight regions. While the eight-region framework is uncommon in studies of Ukraine, the decision to examine eight regions is supported by historical, economic and demographic arguments, as well as by the results of the statistical analyses presented in this article. Scholars who have focused on fewer regions in Ukraine may have underestimated the effects of regional differences and missed interesting stories about intra-state variation in Ukrainian attitudes and voting behavior. The results of this study carry important implications not only for the study of Ukraine but also for those interested in intra-state regional divisions across Europe and Eurasia.

At the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, Russia annexed the eastern half of Moldavia, the territory between the Dnestr and Prut Rivers, which it called “Bessarabia.” One historian argues that this was an effort to circumvent the Tilsit agreement with Napoleon in which Russia had agreed to vacate both Romanian principalities. Since Tilsit “did not mention ‘Bessarabia’ the Russian troops could remain there.”

Over the last decade or so there has been renewed interest in the Greek civil war, with a number of important publications shifting the focus of research from the high plane of international relations and Cold War polemics to a critical history of the period, allowing unheard voices and perspectives to be heard and revealed. The volume edited by Mark Mazower, for example, places the experiences of the 1940s in the longue durée of Greek nation-state formation as well as in the wider context of war and post-war violence and resistance—the social character of which is emphasized. Yet the importance of the Greek civil war in the emergence of the Cold War cannot be underestimated as Gerolymatos makes clear. This paper, therefore, aims to demonstrate how the refugees from Greece who arrived in Poland constitute an important part of Cold War history and to show how their experience in Poland can shed light upon both the wider international context and the dynamics of nationality policy in Poland itself. I contend that the arrival of Greek refugees weakened the Polish state's drive to national homogeneity.

With 20,251 square kilometers, Slovenia has a little less than two million inhabitants. In the last thirty-five years, national productivity has risen on average by 5.2% annually (though it stagnated in the eighties and diminished fast in 1990 and 1991), and per inhabitant, rose 0.7% annually. At approximately 6,000 dollars, per capita productivity is twice as high as the Yugoslav average and eight times higher than per capita productivity in less developed Kosovo. With a 47% economically active population, 9% agricultural population, more than 99% literacy, 30% expenditure on food, and 0.28 vehicles and 0.32 telephones per inhabitant, Slovenia ranks among the rich Eastern European countries.