Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to welcome you to the Nationality and Siberian Studies Program's first annual conference on “The Soviet Nationalities and Gorbachev.” With so distinguished a collection of experts, I am certain that our discussion will prove to be both a stimulating intellectual experience and a permanent addition to the debate on Soviet nationality policy.

This paper examines the debates that surrounded the renovation of the royal castle in Krakow during the last decade before World War I. When the Galician crownland took over the castle in 1905, it bore little resemblance to a royal seat, having been used as military barracks since 1846. The debate that followed focused on what should be preserved, what demolished, and what recreated. In this discourse the “meaning” of a historical monument was examined and different interpretations within the circles of architects, preservationists, and artists were propagated. The debate conducted during the meeting of the Central Commission for Research and Conservation of Historic Buildings revealed that the division was not along national lines, but rather among different philosophies of preservation of built heritage. The point made by the paper is that the discourse conducted 100 years ago allows us today to draw conclusions about the role of historical buildings in a national(istic) worldview and examine its inherent contradictions. That is because, I argue, the past as such matters little in the national(istic) understanding, despite its ostentatious interest in history. What matters is the usefulness of historic symbols in the present.

Western studies of Russian or Soviet Central Asia originated in England, spearheaded by Anglo-Russian rivalry in the area in the second part of the nineteenth century. British research was dominant until after World War II, covering the field from classical academic study (Royal Central Asian Society) to current affairs (Col. Wheeler's Central Asian Research Center).

This contribution looks into nationalization and education in European borderlands in the early post-World War II period. Belonging to Belgium and Poland, respectively, in the interwar years, the Eupen–St. Vith–Malmedy and the East-Upper Silesia regions came under German rule during World War II. Returned to the Belgian and Polish nation-states once the war was over, the regions experienced a pronounced upheaval in the population profile as a result of population transfers and reorientations in education curricula. The aim of these measures was to guarantee the national reliability of borderland inhabitants, with a special role being designated for teachers, who were perceived as crucial in the raising of children as national citizens imbued with certain core values. This contribution compares the methods employed by the authorities in selecting educational personnel for their borderlands, the nationalizing role teachers were to play and the way teachers gave meaning to their professional practices.

The history of each nation has some key periods that have drawn the attention of generations of researchers. Historians consider the Great Revolution of France, the rise of Hitler in Germany, and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia to be among the most important events, hence the events most worth studying, of these countries. Different interpretations of these events, which determined the fates of people for decades and even for centuries, cause heated debates among scholars.

This article explores the tensions inherent in how Kyrgyzstan's nationhood and statehood have been imagined and practised via an analysis of local reactions to the findings of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission's (KIC) investigation into the 2010 Osh violence and in particular the threat narrative that developed in opposition to the investigation. In the wake of the clashes that erupted in Osh in June 2010, a recurrent theme was calls from the international community for an independent investigation. Within Kyrgyzstan, however, some politicians argued that investigations violated the republic's sovereignty. Despite local reluctance, a number of investigations did subsequently take place. Yet the reports of the respective investigations did little to quell controversy, with the KIC report being strongly criticized and declared a threat to national security. The strength of feeling demonstrated by this reaction was indicative of long-standing and unresolved tensions in Kyrgyzstan between international and local imaginings of nationhood and statehood. The article concludes by arguing that nationhood and statehood need to be reimagined to focus on reestablishing state-society relations by both local and international actors in order for Kyrgyzstan to begin repairing the already fragile sociopolitical relationships that were grievously damaged by the violence and the subsequent investigations.

In the case of Croatia, sport has proved to be a highly politicized form of national expression, functioning as a salient social field in which its “national habitus codes” are most intensively articulated, debated, and contested. An incident emblematizing this argument occurred on 19 November 2013, when the Croatian national football team secured their qualification for the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil. In front of the 25,000 people at Zagreb's Maksimir stadium, the national team player, Josip Simunić, grabbed the microphone and “greeted” all four stands with a loud chanting of Za dom (For the home(land)), to which the stands thunderously responded spremni (ready), the official salute of the Independent State of Croatia, a fascist WWII quisling-state. This paper argues that the issue extends beyond politically radicalized football hooligans and has to be understood from the standpoint of “social memory.” By focusing on football, the article scrutinizes debates in the Croatian public sphere dealing with the salute Za dom – spremni. Providing an insight into its complex and multi-layered nature, this paper illustrates that Croatian football has to be understood as a field in which social memory is prominently constructed, heatedly articulated, and powerfully disseminated.

The purpose of this article is to clarify the relationship between forms of political legitimacy employed by communist regimes in East and Central Europe and subsequent models of revolutionary change in 1989. The conceptual basis of the analysis lies in Max Weber's theoretical framework of legitimacy. The four cases selected for comparison are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The attempts of de-Stalinization and reformation of these party-state regimes through the introduction of paternalistic and also more goal-oriented measures could not prevent their disintegration in the 1980s and their subsequent collapse in 1989. But, I argue, it was the withdrawal of ideological support by elites that ultimately brought communism to an end. The differences in revolutionary scenarios and transitions to democracy in the four cases indicate the importance of a shift in both rulers and masses towards interest in dialogue and compromise. Hungary and Poland represent the clearest scenarios in which communist parties acted as agents of regime change in a rational-legal direction. The Bulgarian case stands as an intermediary case between these two and Romania. Finally, Romania represents an extreme case of violent revolution and the overthrow of a traditionalist and sultanistic regime and illustrates the difficulties following a complete collapse of political authority.

Investigating the Muslim population of Ottoman Europe is the stuff of a demographer's nightmare. There is no lack of material to study; thousands of estimates of Balkan population were made throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Unfortunately, almost all of them were nonsense, the prejudiced guesses of nationalistic advocates or estimates made by travellers who felt a journey through a land provided enough information for accurate estimates of population numbers.