During the summer and fall of 1941, as they took part in Operation Barbarossa—the invasion of the Soviet Union—Wehrmacht personnel paused to reopen churches that had been shuttered by the communist regime. These events, which drew enormous crowds, brought together conquerors and conquered in a surprising display of shared faith before being halted by a directive from the Führer. This article addresses the question of why they took place at all, given the genocidal nature of the campaign in which they were embedded, as well as what they can tell us about the role of religion in the Wehrmacht, its relationship to Nazi ideology, and the nature of the military occupation. The reopening ceremonies, it is argued, were the spontaneous outcome of a number of interrelated factors, including Nazi rhetoric, the pent-up yearnings of Soviet Christians, and above all the vision of the invasion as a religious crusade against an atheist power adopted by many chaplains and soldiers. Although often overlooked, religion remained a powerful force in the Wehrmacht, one that could serve both to undermine and justify Nazi goals. Further, the reopenings demonstrate the army's capacity for flexibility in its dealings with the population, particularly during the war's opening months.

Mill's On Liberty is centrally concerned with avoiding social tyranny. But Mill's Principle of Liberty defines interfering, in the context of social pressure, as intentionally punishing and it seems to allow speech and actions that critics have thought would conflict with liberty in self-regarding matters. To critics, Mill draws distinctions among social influences where no genuine difference is to be found and he permits more social pressure than can be accepted by someone who values liberty highly. In this article, I explain where and why Mill draws the line he does between permitted and forbidden influences and show the line is coherent and tracks a genuine difference. I also show that although the Principle leaves residual social pressure, Mill has resources besides the Principle that can prevent social influences that threaten individuality while retaining beneficial social influences.

Criminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances, they overtly communicate, such as with banners or signs. This article explains the competition dynamics behind public criminal communication and provides theory and evidence of the conditions under which it emerges. Relying on a new dataset of approximately 1,800 banners publicly deployed by Mexican criminal groups from 2007 to 2010, the study identifies the conditions behind such messaging. The findings suggest that criminal groups “go public” in the presence of interorganizational contestation, violence from authorities, antagonism toward the local media, local demand for drugs, and local drug production. Some of these factors are associated only with communication toward particular audiences: rivals, the state, or the public. An interesting finding is that the correlates of criminal propaganda are sometimes distinct from those of criminal violence, suggesting that these phenomena are explained by separate dynamics.

This article examines change and continuity in the United States' recent foreign policy toward Cuba. In the context of the posthegemonic regionalism of the Pink Tide and regional disputes over Cuba's position in the interamerican system, the Obama administration's rapprochement was driven to protect the institutional power and consensual features of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. The Trump administration reversed aspects of Obama's normalization policy, adopting a more coercive approach to Cuba and to Latin America more broadly. Against the emerging scholarly proposition that the international relations of the Americas have crossed a posthegemonic threshold, this analysis utilizes a neo-Gramscian approach to argue that the oscillations in U.S. Cuba policy represent strategic shifts in a broader process of hegemonic reconstitution. The article thus situates U.S. policy toward Cuba in regional structures, institutions, and dynamics.

Can popular organizations engage with the state in a lasting collaborative interaction that benefits their interests without being politically co-opted or captured? This article addresses this question by analyzing the interaction between cartonero organizations and the PRO administrations in Buenos Aires City between 2002 and 2018. It shows how cartoneros managed to prompt a change in the PRO’s policies on recyclable waste collection. The article’s main arguments are that popular organizations’ opportunity to gain formal access to the state without losing their autonomy is related to the strategic orientations of both the popular organization and the ruling party, and that such a possibility increases when the popular organization is not part of the incumbent party coalition. The “troubled collaboration” between cartoneros and the PRO was possible due both to the cartoneros’ combination of contentious and institutionalized actions and to an important change in the PRO’s strategic orientation toward cartoneros.

Neopatrimonial exercise of power, combining ruler appropriation of resources with ruler discretionality in the use of state power, remains present to varying degrees in contemporary Latin America. Building on an extensive literature, this article provides a delimited conceptualization and measurement of neopatrimonialism for 18 countries in the region and examines the effects of neopatrimonial legacies on poverty with cross-national quantitative analysis. The study finds that higher levels of neopatrimonialism have a significant, substantive impact on poverty levels, controlling for other relevant demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors. It confirms the importance of a cumulative record of democracy for poverty alleviation, while the analysis indicates that neopatrimonialism limits the effects of the political left in power on poverty reduction.

This article proposes a new approach to employing Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in the philosophy of religion. Rather than finding a latent theology in Merleau-Ponty – as some interpreters do – this article argues that Merleau-Ponty's later ontology can provide the basis for a philosophical anthropology which can help us understand why human beings are drawn to religion and how this is expressed in affective and ritual practice. This ontology can help us to understand the notion of freedom as it applies to affective, embodied, and ritual religious practices and begins to sketch out how freedom might be understood in light of embodiment.

It is sometimes claimed that faith is a virtue. To what extent faith is a virtue depends on what faith is. One construal of faith, which has been popular in both recent and historical work on faith, is that faith is a matter of taking oneself to have been spoken to by God and of trusting this purported divine testimony. In this article, I argue that when faith is understood in this way, for faith to be virtuous then it must be accompanied by intellectual humility. I defend this view by showing how someone ought to respond to purported divine testimony if her faith is to be intellectually humble, and how, if it fails in this respect, it will instead be accompanied by the vices of either servility or arrogance.