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With the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, what will be the impact of resurgent nationalism on international and regional military conflict? This was the central question addressed by Jack Snyder, a specialist on international relations. He outlined the trends that give cause for optimism and those trends that should generate concern regarding peace and stability.
This article argues that the formation of a mass sense of Russian national identity was a recent, contingent event that first began to take shape under Stalin. Surveying the new literature on Russian nationalism, it contends that elite expressions of “Russianness” and bureaucratic proclamations of “official nationality” or russification should not be conflated with the advent of a truly mass sense of grassroots identity. Borrowing from an array of theorists, it argues that such a sense of identity only becomes possible after the establishment of necessary social institutions – universal schooling, a modern army, etc. Inasmuch as these institutions come into being only after the formation of the Soviet Union, this article focuses on how a mass sense of Russian national identity began to form under a rapid and unpredictable series of ideological shifts that occurred during the Stalinist 1930s and 1940s. This article's major contribution is its description of this development as not only contingent, but accidental. Drawing a clear line between russocentric propaganda and full-blown Russian nationalism, it argues that the ideological initiatives that precipitated mass identity formation in the USSR were populist rather than nationalist. In this sense, Stalinism has much more in common with Perónism than it does with truly national regimes.
The Slovene national movement of the late nineteenth century was based primarily on the myth of an eternal linguistic community, an essentialist position within historiography. The national development itself best fits into patterns described by Hroch and Gellner. Although most objective conditions for national constitution were met by 1929, it is not clear if subjective ones had been met by that time. World War II revitalized the nation-constitution process, particularly by warring Communist- and Catholic-supported political and military factions, both claiming to fight for a Slovene identity, while Communists also claimed to be fighting for a “Greater” (Megali) Slovenia. With the war's end, and Slovenia becoming a Yugoslav republic and expanding geographically, there was no doubt of a Slovene national identity, as understood by Connor, among the general population. However, important developments followed in nation-constitution after 1945, particularly upon gaining independence in 1991. The process need not be considered completed. Slovenes may be considered leaning towards a cultural type nation, with a cultural nucleus in an essentialist understanding of the Slovene language.
The relationship between Marxism and nationalism has been tumultuous. While theoretically attempting to reject nationalism as a transient product of capitalism, Marxism has in practice oftentimes exploited its appeal and utilized its extensive institutional repertoire. To a large extent, the difficult dialogue between the two ideological constellations can be traced back to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels who neglected to leave a definitive statement on the nationality question. The article traces the evolution of Marxism's conceptualization of the nationality question – a slow shift from an outright rejection of nationalism to an acceptance of its progressive features, complexity, varieties and influences. It re-evaluates Marx and Engels’ views on the nationality question, from its outright denial to limited acceptance and application. After identifying factors that shaped their perception of the nationality question, the study offers an analysis of the evolution of these attitudes from the 1840s to the 1860s. The objective is to show how Marx and Engels’ theoretical dogmatism was tainted by their desire for activism. Their views were not inflexible but rather evolved in response to changing circumstances in the mid 19th century.