Introduction: The Evolution of European Security Governance

Security governance can be defined as the coordinated management of issues by multiple and separate authorities. As applied to Europe, its most obvious formal characteristic is the development of dense patterns of multilateralism and institutionalization. This feature does not negate the continuing relevance of the state-as-actor but it clearly suggests that this actor is, to an important degree, subordinated to institutional imperatives and processes of cooperation, as well as subject to a normative discourse on the appropriate principles of order. Governance of this type was not absent in Europe during the Cold War, however, since the late 1980s it has both ‘widened’ and ‘ deepened’. Security governance has come to acquire a pan-continental (rather than a bipolar) quality that involves overlapping interactions among a range of state, institutional and private actors in multiple security-relevant issue areas. At both analytical and policy levels the conceptualization and operationalization of security governance can be disputed; however, what seems eminently clear is that European order is now as much about institutions and norms as it is statecentric concerts, balances of power, and the conduct and settlement of war.

The development of Europe's security governance has occurred against a backdrop of policy-driven controversies concerning the appropriate roles and hierarchy of security institutions. For two to three crucial years after 1989 this came in the guise of the so-called ‘ architecture’ debate concerning the relative merits of NATO, the then Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and the post-Maastricht European Union (EU).

Introduction: The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Russia

The election of Vladimir Putin as Russian President in March 2000 presented the European Union (EU) with a window of opportunity to develop its relations with the ‘ New Russia’. Whereas the Yeltsin regime had pursued a policy of benign neglect towards the EU throughout the 1990s and had focussed its attention more on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US relations, Putin had quickly recognized the potential that Russia’ s relations with the EU presented in supporting the domestic priority of economic modernization. Yet when the Commission report on relations with Russia was published in February 2004 and acknowledged that motivations for cooperation between the EU and Russia existed in a wide range of areas, it was noted that relations had come under ‘ increasing strain’ on sensitive issues. The response, it was argued, was for the Commission and the member states to ‘ concert their positions and speak with one voice’ in order to project a coherent and consistent policy line in negotiations with the Russian government. The report highlighted two interconnected sets of concerns; the first being the institutional shortcomings of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in general terms and the second specifically focused on the emerging ‘ two-level game’ influencing the internal dynamics of EU policymaking on Russia.

The first of these two concerns relates to the incremental fashion in which EU foreign policymaking has developed since the end of the Cold War and the RUSSIA AND EUROPE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY establishment of the CFSP in 1992.

Introduction

As at many times in its history, Russia has approached a certain turning point, when it has to decide once again about its true identity and actual role in the world. The era of stability during President Putin's first term and the reforms initiated during that period have created the prerequisites for rethinking the future development of the country. Russia is hesitating between modernization and accelerated qualitative growth and the desire to maintain the long-awaited stability and ensure gradual evolution, which is more appropriate for the public and the bureaucratic staff.

Domestic Policy Developments Affecting Russia's External Course

The President seems to support the first model and is prepared to sacrifice his unprecedented rating (around 60 per cent of approval even during the wave of protests in early 2005) to ensure his place in Russian history. As a prudent politician, he is attempting to make compromises in line with reality, but as a lame-duck President, who has to leave in 2008, he recognizes the limited period of time left for substantial achievements. Therefore, the launch of most of the reforms in Russia has been planned for between 2005 and early 2007, in other words, the period when the President can at last convert his incredible popular support into deeds – with the aim of enhancing Russia's ‘competitiveness’ and ensuring its modernization.

Obviously, to perform this noble mission, including the doubling of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) proclaimed in 2003, there is a need for deep restructuring of the Russian economy and social system.

Introduction

Nowhere else is the impact of the Eastern enlargement on the European Union (EU)' s foreign and security policy felt as strongly as in relations with Russia and the other Eastern neighbours of the Union. On the eve of enlargement, it was the Atlanticism of the incoming member states that caused most concern among many old EU countries. However, the fear that the new member states would act as ‘ Trojan horses of the US and put a brake on the development of the European foreign, security and defence policy seems to have been unfounded. The same cannot be said about another major concern of the old member states: they were right to assume that the new Eastern members were going to complicate relations between the EU and Russia by bringing the burden of history and their own problems in relations with the Eastern neighbour to the Union’ s table. The new member states on their behalf were hoping that EU membership would have a positive impact on their relations with Russia. They had also been expecting the EU to move towards a more unified and consistent Russia policy. Yet neither Russia nor the EU have lived up to their expectations: during the first one-and-a-half years of EU membership, (the time covered by this chapter), their relations with Russia developed in a negative rather than positive direction, and the EU still lacks a coherent policy towards Russia that would help to address the concerns of its Eastern members.

Introduction

As its title implies, this book is concerned with the nature of Russia's relationship with Europe. In that context, the NATO-Russia dimension poses a specific consideration in that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is much larger than European NATO. Consequently, there is a temptation to disaggregate NATO in order to focus upon its ‘European-ness’ in terms of its interaction with Moscow. The temptation should be resisted, however. It may in theory be possible to disaggregate NATO by separating out its North American and European components, but no meaningful discussion of Europe's security relationship with Russia is possible if it fails to acknowledge the primacy of the US in guiding, if not determining, the existence and persistence of NATO. One may write of the Alliance without specific reference to, say, the views of some of its smaller European members: indeed, in a sense, one may even discuss historical NATO views or positions without reference to France, given its history of autonomy from the military structures. However, any understanding of post-Cold War NATO, including the relationship with the Russian Federation, must contend with the views of Washington and the consequences thereof for its European allies, as will be discussed below. To that extent, nothing much has altered since the Cold War and the US remains, as Richard Holbrooke described it a decade ago, a European power. NATO-Russia interaction as examined here will reflect that fact.

We propose that the applied sociologist is well described as a craftsman in much the sense that C Wright Mills had in mind in his famous description of the model social scientist in general in The Sociological Imagination (1959). Fair enough, most would say, go ahead and add that to the long list of what the applied sociologist is and isn't, should and should not be. But our claim is more presumptuous – we assert that the applied sociologist is probably nothing more than a particular and peculiar figure of craftsman. To evaluate this claim we must first understand what is meant and what is implied by this characterization. Once established, the craftsman heuristic may then provide a standard for identifying roles and activities for applied sociologists that are consistent and authentic.

The Craftsman as Pragmatist

We know that Mills made a study of the pragmatists in his Ph.D. dissertation and therefore, while The Sociological Imagination does not mention Pierce, James, or even Dewey by name, we suspect that Mills had in mind a pragmatist version of craftsmanship. However, we must explain what we mean by this and, in the spirit of the American School, why it matters. It is reassuring to point out that Horowitz, in his introduction to Mills' Sociology and Pragmatism (1964) documents a strong and ongoing influence of Mills' interest in Dewey in particular on his thought and writing throughout his career.

Introduction

Russia's relations with Europe depend on more than the diplomatic and the foreign policy positions adopted by contemporary governments. Over the longer term, Russia's relations with Europe depend on two factors: the development of Russia's socio-economic system and political regime, and the way that the development of Russian society and polity relate to the changes that are being wrought in Europe by processes of integration within the European Union (EU). The relationship between these two factors and how they impact on European-Russian relations is both complex and indeterminate; quite simply, relations could go in a variety of directions.

The complexity of the relationship between Russia's development and Europe's is understandable; many other factors and forces, not least domestic pressures in Russia and European states and the continued evolution of the post-Cold War global order and the wider ‘Western’ interaction with Russia mediate the influence of each on the other.

The indeterminate nature of relations is harder to understand. Developments in Russia and in Europe would seem to be leading to a steady improvement of relations between the two and to the creation of conditions that should guarantee continued incremental improvement. Despite setbacks to further integration (such as delays to the adoption of an EU Constitution) or disagreements over how to deal with extra-European foreign policy issues (such as the Iraq war), Europe as the EU is arguably developing as a civilian superpower, different from state actors in the international system because of its commitment to peace, democracy, human rights and foreign relations based on responsibility rather than self-interest.

In the summer of 1996 I arrived in Germany for further studies. Before I left my homeland, Cameroon, my secondary school teachers, family, friends and acquaintances were very sure I would take up a course in natural science, most probably either in Information Technology (IT) or engineering. Personally, even I wished to study natural science until about 1992 – when an usual phenomenon – changed my mind. Round about this time a political ‘wind of change’ blew across Africa, which came to affect the political life of the people of Cameroon also. Such political upheaval also ushered in social changes which, in turn, paved the way for a series of questions that called for immediate answers – from the ‘governance’. As a result of this change, the people of Cameroon were introduced to democracy, which meant, the citizens got the opportunity to choose their leaders (party or parties) and therefore, could do away with the prevailing system of governance, which failed to satisfy the people. All this while, I remained a keen observant of the situation. My direct social environment (my family and peers) influenced me to be preoccupied with what was going around me. Problems arose in my family when my father indulged in the age-old custom of polygamy on the pretext of respecting tradition. Similarly an alarming rate of ‘juvenile delinquency’, such as unwanted or teenage pregnancies, abortion and even death, became a common phenomenon among my peers.

Applied sociology differs from basic sociology as it is explicitly and consciously focused on providing information and insights relevant to particular pragmatic social concerns and is designed to assist in addressing a perceived social problem or organizational shortcoming. In other words, applied sociology attempts to translate research into practical action, while basic sociological research in its purest form seeks to advance knowledge for the sake of acquiring knowledge itself. Posed in these terms, it appears that applied research and basic research are stark dichotomies. The former is typically viewed as making use of the developments of the latter in a derivative way (in this regard, the role of applied sociologists is similar to that of engineers or doctors), while it is in the realm of basic research that substantive theoretical, methodological and empirical advances are made (Bulmer, 1992). However, in real world sociology the two are often far more interconnected than the above-mentioned portrayal might suggest, with applied research at times advancing sociological understanding in significant ways and basic research frequently being directly applied to specific social concerns (Lazarsfeld and Reitz, 1975).

While applied and basic researchers share a common sociological tradition, both theoretically as well as methodologically, there is a structural or contextual difference that serves to distinguish them. Applied sociologists work for clients who are responsible for defining the social issues or problems in question and setting the parameters of research agendas.

There have been few times before when there was such a thirst for knowledge and guidance about Russia. In the year when Russia charied the G8 and the oil price rocketed Russia back to super-power status there were still riddles to be solved about Russia and where it is going.

The shutting off of pipelines to the Ukraine started off 2006 which was to become a remarkable year. In one move, the Russian government claiming it was motivated only by normal market economics, the rest of Western Europe woke up to the issue of energy security. Whether this was another law of unintended consequences or part of some Machiavellian plan has still to be resolved, but it has certainly put Russia back in the headlines.

For even the expert Russia watchers there is a need for help in navigating the currents alive in Russian politics today. That is why this collection of essays is so important. Here a number of perceptive people have turned their minds to describing what is going on – and – more importantly, have combined to give us some conclusions.

A multifaceted approach has always been necessary in understanding this great country and its neighbours. Kremlin watching was once a profession all of its own. Nowadays democratic Russia has still many facets which need explanation and interpretation. It is a fact that in today's complicated world to be ignorant of Russia is to be without a key ingredient in understanding what is happening to our lives.

Introduction

One of the main trends shaping the character of the contemporary international relations system is the increasing role of sub-national territorial units (regions). Nation states tend to take into account the opinions of their territorial units when elaborating their national external relations policy while from the other side their decisions are evaluated from the perspective of their consequences for regional development.

Direct involvement of the sub-national territorial actors in the realm of international relations represents one of the distinctive features of the so-called ‘new regionalism.’ This is especially true for federative political systems that involve at least two meaningful levels of government and each level has its own institutionally designed policymaking responsibilities. Any discussion of the policymaking process must consider the degree to which the country's authority is centralized. Such discussions about the distribution of political authority usually focus on a single constitutional feature: does a country have a unitary or a federal political system?

Nowadays the desire of the regions to increase their autonomy in the international arena represents a constituent element of more general processes of intrastate regionalization and federalization. In turn, these very processes stimulate further activation of the regions when they try to influence the agenda in the external relations sphere. It is important to stress that the degree and character of the regions' involvement in the national decision-making process in the field of external relations represent a significant feature of a national model of federalism; the very character of centre-regional relations in a state determines the degree of possible involvement of the regions in shaping external relations at the national level.

This research is an exploratory study that addresses the relationship between altruism, empathy and forgiveness. We hypothesize that respondents who score high on measures of altruism, spirituality/ religiosity, empathy, social responsibility, moral identity and selfesteem are more likely to be forgiving and helpful in nature. A second hypothesis is that respondents who score high on those same measures and who have been hurt or offended in some serious way will be more likely to forgive those who have harmed them. We have reasoned that respondents who receive high scores and who have been hurt or offended would be more altruistic and empathetic towards the harmdoers; this was confirmed by our data.

To test these assumptions, we gathered responses from 435 people, including moral exemplars, members of clergy, college students and the general population. Some of the data was obtained by interviewing a sample of respondents, while other respondents completed a selfadministered questionnaire. All of the respondents completed a forgiveness scale. We began this research by interviewing a sample of moral exemplars to explore their motivations for showing compassion and acts of kindness.

My interest over the years has moved from the study of smaller social units to that of larger ones, from greater concern with conceptualization to an emphasis on the social relevance of social science and from a fair segregation of the role of the sociologist and the active citizen to a greater effort to articulate the two. In doing so, I believe my work reflects trends which affect social sciences in general and sociology in particular. I shall focus first on these trends and then briefly discuss a contribution I might have made to their extension.

Numerous sociological article begins with a definition of a new concept (or relationship) and a discussion of methods to be employed to measure it. Such a definition is frequently followed by presentation of some data relevant to the new concept and familiar sociological variables related to it as for instance, ‘the distribution of elephantiasis by age and sex in the cities with a population of over one hundred thousand’. Most sociologists, the author included, feel that such combination of theory and methods forms the very foundation on which sociology as a science ought to be built. In fact, it is being constructed on such a foundation. But many of us also feel that something is lacking.

What is lacking most is social analysis, the systematic exploration of social issues, i.e., concern with the methodological questions of sociological analysis of the great issues of our age, which tend to involve the study of macroscopic units.

The social, political and economic effects of globalization are manifesting themselves in modern society in innumerable ways. A central impetus behind this process is the development and proliferation of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) – large conglomerates that foster increased economic interconnectedness. Multinational corporations, or firms that produce, distribute and market in more than one country, such as Microsoft, wield assets and profits far larger than the Gross Domestic Products (GDP's) of most countries in the world. Moreover, such MNCs are able to influence the politico-economic developments through the goods and services they produce and the wealth at their disposal (O'Neil, 2004). This fact allows MNCs' increasing ability to operate above the laws of their home countries, largely beyond the sight of both the government and the general public. In that regard, Chirayath, Eslinger & DeZolt (2002) assert, ‘…changes in the global economy, toward increased oligopolization, lend themselves to additional opportunities for corporate deviance’. Since all of the implications of corporate deviance as it relates to globalization go beyond the size and scope of this paper, the focus will be limited to the theoretical frameworks which attempt to explain corporate deviance with the use of contemporary cases of corporate deviance and their general outcomes.

Chirayath, et.al (2002) emphasizes that ‘Corporate decisions are made as an extension of private interests for the accumulation and mobility of capital required for increased productivity’.

It is a good sign that the discipline of sociology is held in high esteem, both in its academic and applied form. While some claim sociology as ‘a gauche newcomer’, they also recognize its contribution. The non-sociologists, on the other hand, at times ‘mock at those who pursue it professionally’ (Bruce, 1999). Developmental policies to eradicate social problems mostly depend on sociological insights. Its theory and knowledge are based on the construction of the real society. Bruce (1999) obser ves: ‘Sociology recognizes the socially constructed nature of reality; it identifies the hidden cause of action; it describes the unanticipated consequences of action’. If the sociologists deal with such issues, the attempt would be totally non-professional. The amateur view of sociological explanation is rhetorical and concerned with the world, but professional sociology serves the true purpose of the real world. If it is the discourse of the real world, then it has a humanistic perspective. Peter Berger (1963) says convincingly that sociology as a form of social consciousness includes scepticism about the official claims or common sense interpretation of human behaviour. Some argue that sociology emphasizes in-depth knowledge about society and social life. The wisdom of the ages thus signs the development of sociological theory and thinking. When this theoretical wisdom merges with empiricism the study of sociology undergoes a transformation. The debate of rhetoric vs reality, theory vs application, knowledge-sociology vs practising sociology gradually comes to the fore. Mill's (1961) Sociological Imagination gives a new impetus to the theoreticians and practitioners.