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The voice-over for a Jain Studios video entitled The Making of a Chief Minister addresses potential political clients interested in marketing themselves with confident lines such as: ‘If your target is victory, then your medium is VOW!’ Equally, in my conversations with J K Jain and other employees of Jain Studios, the BJP's victories in Parliamentary and Assembly Elections were frequently attributed to the power of the Studios’ facilities, in terms of both production and distribution.
These brief examples indicate the hopes and desires shared among several BJP representatives that political transformation could be successfully enhanced with the help of new media technologies, and that the videos produced by Jain Studios could have a strong impact on the audiences. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was in this way that the party sought to exploit new media technologies that had thus far been restricted through state monopolization. In the prologue to his work, The Rise of Network Society, Manuel Castells speaks of a similar interaction of technology, politics and society in the context of identity constitution and focuses on the question of the actual impact of media on social change.
A Hindu who fights for his country and dies is as much a Hindu martyr in the religious sense as one who fights for his temples. … For the Hindus every inch of their land is divine. … Every inch of our land is sacred and so are the rivers and the mountains. … To fight for the motherland is therefore the same as fighting for the vedas [sacred texts] or for the temples. … In that way the Hindus can never be really secular in the Western sense. … There is no such thing as a secular Hindu … that is why Hindus do not differentiate between religious martyrs and secular martyrs. … There can be no Gods without the land, and there can be no land without the Gods. … Therefore, those who are fighting for a temple at Ayodhya are as much political Hindus as those who are laying down their lives for Kashmir. … To me the struggle for Ayodhya is not a religious struggle. It is as political a struggle as the struggle in Kashmir.
Our specialness lies in the fact that we have been a nation for eternity, and although enemies have come and gone, they have not been able to touch our culture and nation, we have remained India and Indian … Walking on the path of truth is the pride of our country. We cast aside untruth. This is our pride … It is for the sake of our truth that our heroes have been martyred.
The introductory scene of the video God Manifests Himself (hereafter, also referred to as GMH), produced in early 1990 by Jain Studios, opens with a speech by J K Jain, who appears on screen against the backdrop of a white temple and blue skies. The temple is a model of the proposed Ram temple due to be ‘rebuilt’ at the disputed site of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in order, according to spokespeople of the Hindu Right, to honour Lord Ram's birth and reinstall national integrity and justice to the Hindu majority. The site is particularly well known to us because of the mosque's demolition by supporters of the Hindutva movement on December 6, 1992, and because of the riots between Hindus and Muslims that swept across the subcontinent in the subsequent months. In the video, J K Jain addresses the viewers like this:
In the work of God, in the work of building the nation and reconstructing the social fabric, Jain Studios and all our workers keep doing this work—may your co-operation and blessings be with us. This is our prayer to Lord Ram. Jai Shri Ram (Victory to Lord Ram)!
There then follows a montage of different calendar prints of Lord Ram, one of the main gods of the Hindu pantheon, referred to as the beholder of supreme authority.
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.
(Walter Benjamin, Theses on History)
This chapter explores Hindutva spokespeople's attempts to exploit the video media in the context of nation building with respect to the notion of history. The key argument is that Jain Studios’ videos were used to create consensus in the viewers that India's history had to be rewritten by re-making it. The new media technology was one tool through which Hindutva spokespeople strove to persuade audiences to get personally involved in what was referred to as an unavoidable ‘turning point in history’, and another step to Hindu people's self-empowerment. The idea behind this was that those who hold the past control the future.
We (the BJP) have tried to marry technology with tradition, and to send a very strong message to all those in India and abroad who used to think and propagate this falsehood, that if the BJP comes to power, being an obscurantist party, it would take India back to the eighteenth century. And we are trying to tell the people that being the first party to go on the Internet-and to go on the Internet in the manner that we have done it, we have proved that we alone have the perspective for the 21st century; to make India a strong information power, that India can harness this technology, it can communicate confidently through this new medium.
This statement by one of the BJP's media experts is representative of the ‘New BJP’, ‘the party with a difference’, as the political wing of Hindutva promoted itself from the late 1990s onwards. To some extent, in projecting a new national confidence, Kulkarni's comment is reflective of the international recognition that India has gained in recent years on the basis of her software expertise, thereby changing the dominant image of India as an economically backward country into that of an equal player “in the new world order”. Information technology thus became the flagship, or synonym, for the scientific and rational spirit of the ‘new BJP's’ claim to nationality; like video, it ties the power of political representation to economic and technological development.
The imagined landscape is the most powerful landscape in which we live … (A)ll of us, individually and culturally, live in the mappings of our imagined landscape, with its charged centres and dim peripheries, with its mountain tops and its terrae incognitae, with its powerful sentimental and emotional three-dimensionality, with its bordered terrain and the loyalty it inspires, with its holy places, both private and community shared.
Every single mountain and river, big or small, named or unnamed, covering the body of Bharat Mata (India), has the imprint of divinity and history … of our unifying National Consciousness. While on the one hand they have been the traditional abodes of gods and goddesses, they have also stood as shields of protection and security for our people against the foreign aggressors … these centres have acted as bulwarks for preserving the nation's psyche rich with the spirit of cultural and spiritual oneness…. They also wake us up to the urgent and paramount need for putting our Hindu house in order for ensuring the eradication of all such blots of foreign domination and keeping aloft the flag of national honour ever high hereafter.
Made in 1990, From the Sea to the Saryu (Sagar se saryu tak, Hindi; hereafter From the Sea …) presents the ‘patriotic pilgrimage’ (deshbhakti ki teerth yatra) of BJP president L K Advani from Somnath, a town by the Indian Ocean in Gujarat, to Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh.
In the context of the financial governance of the IMF, what are the equity implications of the manner in which the IMF distributes the cost of running its regular (non-concessionary) lending operations as well as the modalities of funding its concessionary lending and debt relief operations? While the IMF charges borrowers roughly what it pays its creditor members for the resources used in its regular lending operations, its overhead costs (administrative budget plus addition to reserves) are shared between the two groups of members in a less equitable manner. With the overhead costs rising inexorably to meet an increasing number and range of responsibilities being placed upon the institution – largely at the instance of the IMF's principal creditors by virtue of their dominant majority of voting power – the under-representation of the IMF's debtors undermines the legitimacy of its decision-making. With regard to the concessionary lending and debt-relief operations, some of the IMF's funding modalities have involved a substantial contribution by IMF debtors, sometimes under pressure. While this has been accepted as part of an intra-developing country burden-sharing exercise, it has also meant a significant burden shifting away from the developed countries in the cost of meeting their responsibilities to the poorest members of the international community.
1. Introduction
An important aspect of governance at the IMF relates to the cost of running the institution and the sharing of that cost between the industrial countries (the IMF's principal creditors) and low-income countries and emerging market economies (primarily borrowers). Much larger issues of equity are involved with respect to the distribution of quotas (or capital shares) and of voting power in the IMF. This subject has attracted growing attention in recent years. A contribution to the literature by a former Secretary of the IMF from 1977 through 1996 concludes that:
The system of quotas and voting power in the IMF has, over the years, created distortions and lacks equity. A group of 24 industrialized countries controls 60 per cent of the voting power, while more than 85 per cent of the membership – 159 out of 183 IMF members – together hold only 40 per cent of the vote … The existing imbalance is seen as evidence of the lopsidedness of governance of the international monetary system. Thus a more equal distribution of quotas and voting power between the developing world and the industrial countries should enhance the IMF's governance and credibility …
Institutions are not … created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules.
Douglas C NorthNobel Lecture, 1993
Abstract
What is the nature and purpose of IMF conditionality, and is it required to safeguard Fund resources? This chapter reviews these issues and then poses some key questions. For example, can program ownership by a country be made compatible with externally imposed conditionality? To what extent is conditionality of the international financial institutions (IFIs) power without responsibility? What, if any, are the consequences for the IMF of imposing programs that fail more often than not? It looks into the reasons for increased conditionality during the 1980s and 1990s and reviews the recent debate on conditionality. As the number of conditions – in particular structural ones – grew rapidly during the 1980s and the 1990s, the rate of compliance with IMF-supported programs saw a parallel and sharp decline. The chapter also presents an analysis that distinguishes between different types of external crises: short-term imbalances that result from excess demand and expansionary policies; mediumterm structural disequilibria such as those resulting from time lags in production (future supply) from investment spending (current demand); and currency and external crises resulting from sudden reversals of capital flows, noting that different types of underlying causes of imbalances call for different sets of policy conditionality. It critically examines the new guidelines on conditionality approved by the Executive Board in September 2000, concludes that they are not much different in substance from the previous ones, and offers some specific suggestions to make them operationally more effective. It also addresses the optimal mix between adjustment and financing. It discusses how the economic and social costs of adjustment may be minimized and find that Fund resources are highly inadequate to enable it to comply with its mandate. Finally, it offers some specific policy suggestions for streamlining conditionality and enhancing program ownership.
Introduction
Conditionality is perhaps the most controversial of the IMF's policies. Among the traditional criticisms of Fund conditionality are that it is short-run oriented, too focused on demand management, and does not pay adequate attention to its impact on growth and the effects of the programs it supports on social spending and income distribution.
The research program of the Group of 24 is the world's only research effort devoted to evaluating the international economic system from the perspective of developing nations’ needs. Multilateral development banks and other research organizations may put out a larger volume of studies, but their mandate and intended audience are not as clearly defined as the G24’s. This makes the papers produced under the auspices of the G24 very special. Nowhere is the voice of the developing nations expressed as cogently and powerfully as in these papers.
This volume continues a tradition of dissemination that has long been part of the G24 agenda. It includes chapters on some of the most burning issues on the agenda: reform of the IMF and its conditionality, debt workouts and restructuring, management of capital flows, efficacy of self-insurance against crises, debt sustainability in the HIPC countries, poverty-reduction strategy papers (PRSP), international public goods, and the Millennium Development Goals and the ‘global partnership for development’. Readers will find fresh and controversial perspectives in each of these chapters.
Separating hype from fact and promise from reality has always been a hallmark of the G24 research tradition. If you are doubtful that there exist effective mechanisms for improving the governance of the IMF and its conditionality, read the chapters by Buira. If you believe that the HIPC initiative has a solid chance of placing poor countries on the path of debt sustainability, read the chapter by Gunter. If you think the World Bank's PRSP approach is based on solid economic and statistical reasoning, read the chapter by Levinsohn. If you think financial markets have become so integrated that prudential controls on capital flows have become unfeasible, read the chapter by Epstein, Grabel and Jomo. If you are of the view that the IMF's proposal of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) is harmful to ‘emerging’ economies, read the amended version that is offered in the chapter by Herman.
I hope the reader will not stop with individual chapters but take the volume in its entirety. It is a gripping reminder of the long road we need to travel before the governance of the world economy becomes truly hospitable to the aspirations of the developing world.
I present a critical examination of Goal 8 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), namely, to ‘develop a global partnership for development’. As of November 2002, seven targets were listed under this Goal, as well as seventeen indicators. Given the wide-ranging issues covered under Goal 8, I review only some aspects of the global economic system, their effects on development and what needs to be done to reach Goal 8. The main focus is on the international trade system and the implications of the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). I also offer some suggestions on clarifying or adding to the targets and indicators. A key argument of this review is that success in attaining ‘global partnership for development’ underpins or, at a minimum, is linked with efforts in reaching the other seven MDGs, and thus Goal 8 should be given a high priority and efforts to attain it should focus on getting international economic structures, policies and rules right.
1. Introduction
The origins of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) lie in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which was adopted by all 189 UN Member States on 8 September 2000. The Declaration embodies many commitments for improving the lot of humanity in the new century. Subsequently, the UN Secretariat drew up a list of eight MDGs, each accompanied by specific targets and indicators. This paper addresses Goal 8, which is to ‘develop a global partnership for development’. As of November 2002, seven targets were listed under Goal 8, as well as 17 indicators. The selection of indicators is subject to further refinement. Goal 8 covers a wide range of issues but this chapter focuses on only some aspects of the global economic system, and mainly on international trade and multilateral rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Goal 8 is crucial, as it is the only development goal that generally and specifically covers international relations. As is generally accepted, successful development efforts require appropriate policies at both the domestic and international levels. International factors have become increasingly important in recent years as a result of globalization. Developing countries have generally become more integrated in the world economy and their development prospects and performance are thus more dependent on global economic structures and trends.
Institutions are not … created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules.
Douglas C North Nobel Lecture, 1993
Abstract
What is the nature and purpose of IMF conditionality, and is it required to safeguard Fund resources? This chapter reviews these issues and then poses some key questions. For example, can program ownership by a country be made compatible with externally imposed conditionality? To what extent is conditionality of the international financial institutions (IFIs) power without responsibility? What, if any, are the consequences for the IMF of imposing programs that fail more often than not? It looks into the reasons for increased conditionality during the 1980s and 1990s and reviews the recent debate on conditionality. As the number of conditions – in particular structural ones – grew rapidly during the 1980s and the 1990s, the rate of compliance with IMF-supported programs saw a parallel and sharp decline. The chapter also presents an analysis that distinguishes between different types of external crises: short-term imbalances that result from excess demand and expansionary policies; mediumterm structural disequilibria such as those resulting from time lags in production (future supply) from investment spending (current demand); and currency and external crises resulting from sudden reversals of capital flows, noting that different types of underlying causes of imbal-ances call for different sets of policy conditionality.
This chapter builds on the emerging consensus in the development literature that the enhanced HIPC Initiative does not fully remove the debt overhang in many poor and highly indebted countries. It examines the six most crucial problems of the enhanced HIPC initiative: the use of inappropriate eligibility and debt sustainability criteria; the use of overly optimistic growth assumptions; insufficient provision of interim debt relief; the delivery of some HIPC debt relief through debt rescheduling; non-participation and financing shortfalls of creditors; and the use of currency-specific short-term discount rates to calculate the net present value (NPV) of outstanding debt. To address these shortcomings, the chapter suggests: revising the HIPC eligibility and debt sustainability indicators; using lower bounds of growth assumptions; providing deeper and broader interim debt relief; delivering HIPC debt relief only through debt cancellation; adjusting the current equal burden-sharing concept by releasing the HIPC Trust Fund resources immediately to finance-constrained small regional MDBs; exempting minor creditors from the provision of HIPC debt relief; and using a single fixed low discount rate for all NPV calculations. However, even with these changes, the long-term debt sustainability of HIPCs would remain fragile. The chapter argues that more aid coordination is urgently needed for HIPCs that have not yet reached their decision points; that it makes sense to substitute some loans with grants; that HIPC debt relief has thus far been neither frontloaded nor additional and that 100 per cent debt relief would be feasible as well as desirable for the poorest debtors, irrespective of what their debt levels are.
1. Introduction
Achieving long-term debt sustainability is a complex and challenging task that requires a combination of appropriate macroeconomic, structural, investment and debt management policies. In poor countries, long-term debt sustainability is also heavily influenced by such external factors as terms of trade, donor financing, and the provision of debt relief. Debt sustainability, however, can be defined in a variety of ways. As EURODAD, Northover and Sachs et al. illustrate, if debt sustainability is approached from a human and social development perspective, most of the poorest countries have an unsustainable debt regardless of their debt levels. The rationale of such a definition of debt sustainability is that countries with large proportions of their populations living below the poverty line have a more urgent need to spend their resources on poverty reduction than on debt service.
The chapter reviews the elements that constitute the power structure (basic votes, quotas and the qualified majorities) by which the IMF is governed, following the commitment made by all participants in the Monterrey Consensus to increase the voice and participation of the developing countries and transition economies in the Bretton Woods institutions.
It finds that the small economies have been marginalized as a result of the relative erosion of basic votes and that quotas are far from representative of the size of members' economies. As a result, developing economies are under-represented while certain industrial countries, notably those in Europe, are over-represented. It finds that the governance of the IMF does not meet the standards of transparency and accountability needed to ensure the legitimacy of its decisions and the proper use of the resources at its disposal.
Finally, the question is addressed of how the decision-making process can be reformed to attain political legitimacy without weakening the credibility in financial markets.
Introduction
Following the commitment of all participants in the Monterrey Consensus to increase the voice and participation of developing countries and transition economies in the Bretton Woods Institutions, the issue of governance has come to the fore of the IMF and World Bank. The Monterrey commitment was renewed in the IMFC and Development Committee communiqués of 12–13 April 2003, and has been reflected in recent administrative steps to strengthen the capacity of African constituencies.