The new order and its President

The period immediately following the election of 1977 was one of great hope. In the economic sphere certainly this seemed justified. Massive devaluation and a vigorously pursued open economic policy that contrasted sharply with the restrictions of the last seventeen years prompted much aid from the First World and its agencies, and a renewed interest in investment, local as well as foreign. Some of this was in a Free Trade Zone set up just north of Colombo, in emulation of Singapore and other success stories of the seventies. There was however general interest in the country as a whole, and a period of stagnation was succeeded by one of intense activity.

Tea prices too finally took off, while another large source of income developed through remittances from Sri Lankans working in the Middle East. The increase in oil revenues there had contributed to a proliferation of jobs for foreign workers, unskilled as well as skilled. The dearth of satisfactory employment in Sri Lanka in the preceding years had propelled many in that direction. Both these avenues opened up shortly before the elections, but their full impact was felt only afterwards, contributing to the feeling that the millennium had at last arrived.

There was a greater sense of purpose in the air, and several large projects were devised for concentrated action. Most important of these was the Mahaweli Scheme, planned some years earlier, but implemented very slowly, to harness the waters of the largest river in the country for hydroelectric power and irrigation of the Dry Zone.

The assassination of Vijaya Kumaranatunga

In this context of increasing violence, on 16 February 1988 Vijaya Kumaranatunga was assassinated. The JVP, functioning through the DJV, was widely believed responsible. Kumaranatunga was the lynchpin of the alliance between his own SLMP and the old left. They had welcomed the Indo-Lankan Accord and had just the week before been recognized by the Elections Commissioner under the title of the United Socialist Alliance (to be known, ironically, as the USA). The new party had made clear its intention of putting forward candidates for the elections to Provincial Councils that were now thought to be imminent.

Such a stance was bound to weaken the position opposition parties had jointly adopted earlier, of agitating for a general election as a prerequisite for the restoration of normalcy. But the USA could not refrain from contesting the Provincial Council elections since they had welcomed the Accord as a just solution that could, through substantial devolution, satisfy the grievances of Tamils.

Had the USA meant only the parties of the old left it would not have been so significant as they had little public support. The charismatic matinee idol Kumaranatunga however, married to Chandrika Bandaranaike who was held to embody the radical tradition of that family, would clearly provide a source of electoral strength. The following week the USA was due to sign a joint programme which might have been seen as filling the gap caused by the drift of the SLFP to the right.

The writing on the wall

The UNP lost the Southern Provincial Council election very badly. Though on a higher poll it got more votes in two of the three districts than previously, the PA by itself got many more votes, and a higher percentage, than it and the DUNF together had managed ten months previously. After 16 long years it now seemed capable of forming a future government by itself.

Analysis of the result took many forms. The DUNF vote at the previous election had been claimed as, not just the vote of UNP supporters disgruntled with Premadasa, but rather of those waiting to return to the party once his ascendancy had passed. This had been Dissanayake's claim, but the result showed that his participation in the campaign had brought nothing to it.

Another assumption that the results seemed to disprove was that it was desirable for the UNP to repudiate Premadasa's legacy. Research afterwards confirmed what was apparent in reactions to Wijetunge's performance at meetings, namely deep resentment amongst sections of society that had benefited from Premadasa's policies, at how he had been totally forgotten by his successor. This was particularly apparent in the Hambantota district, where the UNP did much worse than in the previous year. Premadasa's son Sajith resided there, and the fact that he had not been invited to participate in any election meeting made the current neglect of Premadasa obvious.

Government relations with other forces

Despite the impetus given to the Tamil cause by the events of July 1983 and the ongoing negotiations, there was no change in the government's attitude to crucial issues. No attempts were made to enhance opportunities in the public sector for education or employment.

With regard to devolution, far from there being any advance, the District Councils in the north and to some extent in the east, were rendered virtually defunct by the enforced dismissal of TULF members, who were unwilling to take the oath of allegiance to a unitary state prescribed under the sixth amendment to the constitution. Since the JVP, the only other party to contest the elections in 1981, had been proscribed, District Councils throughout the country, far from being an alternative repository of authority, became rubber stamps for the government. This situation was exacerbated by the government; using its powers under Emergency Regulations that were renewed without remission month after month, it postponed elections to these Councils when they were due, so that members elected in 1981 held office for over seven years.

The government did not explain why it was necessary to postpone these elections for the entire country. It was not due to the security situation for, continuing with its window-dressing operation, it held by-elections to a few select seats over the next few years. These were selected usually where the UNP's previous majority was large.

Treatment of Tamil grievances

Before looking at the race riots that errupted in August 1981 after the District Council elections, we should look at some factors that had exacerbated tensions over the preceding four years. In its manifesto, the UNP identified four main grievances of the Tamils. First was education. The incoming government therefore abandoned the system of standardization that increased the number of Sinhalese gaining admission to university, while reducing the number of Tamils. There was some agitation about this change, but it was ignored as having been instigated by loyalists of the previous government. For two years then the admissions to university were purely on marks, which were equated with merit.

The number of Tamils gaining admission to university shot up dramatically in some especially sought after subjects. Complaints from the Sinhalese became more intense, culminating in an allegation by Cyril Mathew in parliament that he had evidence of cheating by some Tamil examiners. Instead of inquiring into Mathew's allegations, the government seemed to accept them in that it reintroduced the effects of standardization through a system of district quotas. Though this benefited deprived districts, some of them Tamil, the net result was that Tamil areas, where education was very much an industry, were the hardest hit. In particular this meant Jaffna. This time the response was more bitter. Expectations roused by the 1977 reforms were dashed; whereas in 1970, the ostensible grounds for change had been egalitarian principles, now it was in direct response to an allegation of cheating, and was deeply resented by the majority of Tamils.

The Democratic People's Alliance of Opposition Parties

Mrs. Bandaranaike was Premadasa's chief opponent. Finally nominated by the SLFP under its own symbol, she ran as the common candidate of five parties which had come together under the title of the Democratic People's Alliance (DPA) on a manifesto prepared by them and three others, including the JVP and the SLMC.

The grouping had begun in February through an initiative of the MEP, led now by Dinesh Gunawardena, who had entered parliament in the by-elections of 1983, after an electoral alliance with the SLFP. It was thought he owed his victory to the refusal of his UNP opponent to allow the fraud and thuggery rampant elsewhere; that opponent was now the Secretary of the ELJP, set up by Rukman Senanayake.

Gunawardena had called together leaders of opposition political parties to take a stand on the violations of human rights and the disappearances of persons in the south, following the government's offensive against terrorism there. The same strategy that had led to disaster in the north was being applied, with similar results in terms of increasing militancy. Whereas the Tamil Liberation groups had a well established information network that kept the issue alive internationally, abuses in the south received little publicity, and only roused indignation when they were as gross as in the case of Liyanarachchi. The parties that came together on Gunawardena's initiative could do little except issue statements, but they decided to meet regularly to discuss issues of common interest.

The first UNP years

When the problem of the Indian Tamils was discussed at the time of independence, it was suggested that they be granted citizenship and educated in Sinhalese. A Sinhalese Civil Servant of the period rejected this on the grounds that the Indian Tamils were so industrious that they would soon dominate the Sinhalese from within. The legend had been swallowed wholesale, and the man clearly had no idea of the kind of assimilation that had been going on for a millennium and more. Perhaps he would not have been capable of appreciating that new groups, which exercised influence amongst their peers after they had learned Sinhalese, would do so virtually as Sinhalese themselves. It was in that way that, far from being dominated by immigrant groups with different identities, the Sinhalese had over the centuries absorbed new blood that enabled them to develop, and to preserve traditions that were constantly being renewed and rejuvenated.

But at the time of independence the Sinhalese language was a sort of relic, to be carefully conserved but scarcely ever used. The bureaucrat belonged to the old aristocracy that functioned best in English and never questioned the fact. Interestingly enough it was someone from the same sort of background who initiated the revolution. But, as is usual in such instances, charismatic as the individual was, his influence was immense precisely because he responded to real public need.

Corruption compounded

Apart from personal advantage, it is possible that there were other reasons for Wijetunge to cling to so many portfolios. The bureaucrats who had run these ministries previously could be relied upon to maintain continuity more effectively than the politicians. Certainly the UNP as now constituted suffered from a singular lack of talent. He was also keen to woo the DUNF, and needed to have some ministries available for them if the move succeeded.

It was certainly a possibility, since the DUNF rhetoric had been primarily anti-Premadasa, and there were no essential differences of policy. Dissanayake, who had even contemplated the idea of going back while Premadasa was alive, had indicated that he favoured the idea. If he went over, it was likely that the rest would have to follow since, with Athulathmudali dead, there was likelihood of a paucity of resources, and no one with enough electoral appeal to attract votes.

And there were certainly very good personal reasons for Wijetunge to want the DUNF back. He had got where he was because he had been seen as Premadasa's man, but from the time he took over the Presidency he showed determination to distance himself from his predecessor. He argued that the UNP had lost support to the DUNF, and it made political sense to try to get the DUNF back to revive the earlier majority.

A domestic dispensation

Chandrika Kumaratunga served eleven years as Executive President. For the first five years she had a secure parliamentary majority and was in undisputed control of the country. During this period she kept the economy on a course of steady if limited growth, and continued to open it up, albeit on foundations laid by Premadasa. Thus plantations, handed over previously to private sector management, were privatized during her tenure. Again, the rapid opening up of the telecommunications sector followed the initial enforcement of competition during Premadasa's regime.

The credit she received for this achievement, all the more remarkable in that the more senior ministers of her cabinet still had a predilection for old fashioned socialism, was limited. One reason for this is that, even during her first tenure in office, the ethnic problem became more complex, and the separatist Tigers far more powerful. In addition, her managerial skills were weak, and her dependence on cronies, many of them selected with little regard for ability, increased over the years.

This was a problem endemic to the SLFP. Ever since Bandaranaike was abandoned, shortly before the 1956 election, by the most able of his allies, the SLFP had been lacking in talent at the top, and had generally had to bring in capable administrators from elsewhere. Bandaranaike himself had presided over a coalition which included former Marxists, a situation that led to dissension even before his death.

The UNP under Dissanayake

Almost immediately after the election, Gamini Dissanayake announced that he intended to challenge Wickremesinghe for the post of leader of the opposition. The announcement came as a shock. Though throughout the campaign Dissanayake had suggested that he was the more popular candidate and could restore to the UNP the dominance it had squandered, the results did not quite prove his point. Given his strong showing in Colombo, and also the public acclaim he had received for stepping down, Wickremesinghe had not thought himself open to challenge.

It was true that the only Districts the UNP had won were those in the hills, which Dissanayake suggested constituted his own fiefdom. However the UNP did much better percentage wise in Colombo than it had done in the Provincial Council elections, and Wickremesinghe got nearly 300,000 preference votes, 100,000 more than Dissanayake, and slightly more too in percentage terms.

Despite this it seemed as though Dissanayake's challenge had the blessing of the party hierarchy. One reason for this may have been Wickremesinghe's refusing to cling to power after the election, which could well have damaged him in the eyes of a party unable to conceive of losing office. Wickremesinghe's supporters claimed that even Jayewardene was backing Dissanayake, on the grounds that, whereas Wickremesinghe would be content to spend the next few years in the opposition, Dissanayake would do his utmost to topple the government which had a narrow majority.

The southern problem

Though the SLFP suffered more from the JVP during the 1989 general election, that the long term threat from the JVP was to the UNP became clear in the few weeks immediately after 15 February. There was a rapid escalation in violence and a couple of hartals that proved as successful as those at the height of the agitation for elections.

Premadasa however was slow to react. Before the election he released many suspected JVP detainees and revoked the state of emergency that Jayewardene had maintained. Though violence increased dramatically Premadasa did not shift his stand about opening up negotiations with the JVP.

The JVP did not respond. Since they had so soon brought the country to boiling point again, even though elections had been held and therefore the main reason for public discontent mitigated, they thought complete success just round the corner. The first new hartal they called on 22 March proved remarkably successful. This may have been because of resentment on the part of other political parties at what seemed the stealing of the election by the UNP. In addition fear played a great part in the continuing success of JVP demands over the next few months, a psychosis born of the habit of obedience ingrained when JVP tactics seemed the only way to ensure elections.

The new opposition

Athulathmudali, Dissanayake and the other dissidents who had declared themselves were expelled from the UNP and lost their seats in parliament. The expulsion was challenged in the Supreme Court which ruled it valid in that the rebels had clearly violated party norms. Meanwhile Premadasa made great play of the fact that almost all those who had followed Athulathmudali and Dissanayake had appalling reputations. In fact there were enough unsavoury specimens on the other side for Premadasa to mock the rebels' claim that they had wanted to clean up the party.

With almost all who had signed their motion falling in line behind Premadasa, it was a daunting task that awaited Athulathmudali and Dissanayake as they set about establishing a new party. They called this the Democratic United National Front, and claimed it was the true heir to the UNP which Premadasa had perverted. They had indicated earlier that Jayawardene supported them and, though disappointed that during the crisis he had declared himself a loyal party man, they still kept on good terms with him. They were harsh however in their criticisms of Wickremesinghe, who they had initially hoped would join them. Wickremesinghe was the other prominent representative, apart from Athulathmudali and Dissanayake, of the elite of Colombo, which might have been much more supportive of the new party had Wickremesinghe too joined it. Since however he stayed with Premadasa, the upper classes could, despite their personal distaste for Premadasa, happily stay loyal to the UNP, to the chagrin of the rebels.

The Parliamentary Election of 2000

It was only after the Presidential election that Mrs Kumaratunga and Pieris sought again to pass legislation designed to alleviate the ethnic problem by providing greater self government for the Tamils. A package had been prepared early in her tenure, which was also supposed to solve other problems created by Jayewardene, particularly with regard to the overweening powers of the President. The package however proposed to abolish these only after Mrs Kumaratunga's term; and now in 2000 it was to happen only at the end of her second term.

This enabled Wickremesinghe, as previously, to oppose the package, since it could be argued that it was more concerned with the interests of the incumbent President than with resolving problems. Nevertheless, fresh from her electoral victory, the President was able to attract several crossovers from the UNP. Many of them believed, as she seemed to do, that Wickremesinghe had initially promised to support her proposals regarding devolution, so his later criticism of these seemed cynical. When he sat impassive whilst members of his party burned the proposals on the floor of the house, he seemed to concur with the view that Mrs Kumaratunga was conceding too much to the Tamils. However, with the TULF declaring that the package was inadequate, it became clear that the required two thirds majority would not be obtained, and the attempt lapsed.