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If an outside observer were to look at the development of private international law in Europe during the last decade he or she would certainly be amazed at the amount of new Community legislation that has either already been passed or is currently being prepared. But not only would the sheer number of new rules catch his or her attention but also the speed of such development, which only started ten years ago when the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force and the European Community gained competence to legislate in this area of the law. The landscape of the unification of private international law in Europe has completely changed. Gone are the old days when after lengthy preparation the Hague Conference produced one instrument every four years and this instrument was carefully scrutinized and discussed before it eventually came into force! Instead there is hustle and bustle everywhere!
This is even the case in the area of family and succession law where Community involvement came somewhat as a surprise. The Brussels II bis Regulation on the dissolution of marriage and parental responsibility has been applicable since March 2005 and is already a substitute for Regulation 1347/2000. It contains rules on jurisdiction, cooperation between authorities and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in the areas of divorce, separation and marriage annulment, as well as on parental responsibility. A new Maintenance Regulation was adopted in 2009. When it comes into force it will replace the rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of the Brussels I Regulation, and will also provide a new cooperation regime between the authorities of the different Member States. A Proposal for a new Regulation on Succession is currently being discussed in Brussels. Two new Proposals authorizing and implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation were made public at the end of March 2010. The Council decision authorizing enhanced cooperation in this area was subsequently very quickly adopted on 12th July 2010. On 20th December 2010 Council Regulation 1259/2010 was finally approved. A working party is preparing a proposal for a Regulation on matrimonial property, which should be ready during the second semester of 2010. The European Union can certainly not be blamed for not being productive.
The aim of this chapter is to achieve two complementary goals. The first is to define the most important issues related to the protection of elderly family members through a family law prism. In that regard, special attention is devoted to questions of guardianship, maintenance and family violence. The second goal is to define the role the state has, or, even more so, the role the state should have in relation to the family. It is my intention to prove that the role of the state is not only to provide help and care for elderly family members, but also to influence changes in the family, so that care within the family itself is re-established. I believe that only a strong family, which takes care of all its members, is able to resist all the temptations imposed upon it by modern society. If the process of losing its value continues, the family shall be deprived of its wholeness, which would in turn lead to destruction of basic human values, causing insufficient and inadequate protection of all its members, and elderly family members in particular.
CHANGES IN DEFINITION, THE ROLE AND THE FUNCTION OF A FAMILY
The definition of a family is a constantly changing one, both in its legal and its every-day notion. Hence, the legal definition of family is not often found in national family law sources. The unwillingness of the legislator to define the notion of family is caused by awareness of the dynamics of family relations. Namely, within these relationships, like in all other relationships in society, constant changes occur, which sooner or later deprive the legal definitions of their practical value. If we analyse international documents, a similar definition of family is found in numerous sources, based on the concept that a family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state.
Furthermore, like the legal definition, the every-day notion of family is also vague. Until recently, it was not hard to define a family: a traditional structure made of spouses and their children. Today, the paradigm has changed. Nevertheless, no matter which definition of family we should or should not accept, it is beyond doubt that members of family should be protected as much as possible at all times. This is the very ratio of the existence of family law itself.
Recent years have seen a wide and increasing diffusion of care arrangements for older people. This development has arisen owing to the convergence of multiple factors related to the pan-European problem of an ageing population with increasing demands for care. Although, of course, older people are not necessarily dependent on others for continuous non-medical care, the passing of the years does mean that many will eventually, in various ways, require assistance in performing daily tasks. Not only is the population ageing, but fertility rates across Europe are dropping, leading to the elderly constituting a larger proportion of the overall population and charging the growing costs of elder care to a shrinking number of tax-payers. Moreover, the rise of the nuclear family model, consisting of only two generations, parents and children, living together, and the increasing number of people seeking and finding employment out of their birth town have been weakening the function of the family as primary support structure for older people. The raising of retirement age and the growth of women's work outside the home further contribute to the diminution of informal caregivers available. In addition, the growing level of women's education and income from paid employment increases the economic resources of the family, making it economically more attractive for families to have women working outside their household and to hire caregivers for children and older dependent persons.
Besides, the crisis of the modern Welfare State, worsened by the global economic crisis, has been causing a reduction of quality and quantity in social services. The introduction of the so-called welfare mix model, in which social services are supplied both by the municipalities themselves and by the private sector, has further stimulated the development of private care arrangements. The moving of the hospital health system towards assistance only for severe acute condition increases the demand for palliative treatments and general care of the sort frequently required by older non-dependent persons. Indeed, “care” encompasses not just diagnostic and therapeutic action, but all other aspects of preserving mental and physical well being.
The default rule in English succession law is that ‘an Englishman still remains at liberty at his death to dispose of his own property in whatever way he pleases’. Nevertheless, family provision legislation has made significant incursions into that principle in England and Wales, as well as its equivalent in other common law jurisdictions. Under such family provision statutes, certain family members and dependants may apply for discretionary financial provision out of a deceased person's estate where the deceased's will and/or the default intestacy rules have failed to make suitable provision for the applicant.
This chapter concerns family provision claims made in two European jurisdictions, namely England and Wales and the Republic of Ireland, by adult offspring who have provided care for their now-deceased parents. The ageing population in Europe is highly relevant to this question in two respects. First, it may cast doubt on the purposes of family provision law and succession law in general, since people are less likely to be in financial need by the time their parents die. Secondly, the fact that the population is ageing increases the longterm care needs present among the general population, and raises the question of whether and how the state should encourage informal care provided by family members, including offspring.
The chapter begins by discussing the purposes of succession law and considering the extent to which succession law can and should be used to reward, support or encourage informal care. After summarising succession law in England and Wales and the Republic of Ireland, the chapter then considers the relevance of care to family provision claims made by adult offspring in those jurisdictions. The chapter concludes by assessing the need for and likelihood of reform in those jurisdictions to increase the relevance of care to such claims.
THE PURPOSES OF SUCCESSION LAW
This section explores the purposes of succession law and assesses the extent to which it can and should be used to support, reward or encourage care provided by family members. Peart summarises the accepted purposes of succession law as:
… consider[ing] the wishes of the individual … the preservation and security of the family, and … [protecting] the welfare of society in general by promoting the equalization of fortunes.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES : A DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH BETWEEN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW
Continental European legal systems generally regulate the proprietary consequences of marriage through a specific body of matrimonial property law, rather than leaving them to be governed by general property law rules. While most continental legal systems contain some provisions relating to property in the general law on marriage (régime primaire, allgemeine Ehewirkungen), for example rules governing the family home and household assets, which are binding independently of the matrimonial property regime (régime sécondaire), it is the matrimonial property regime which lies at their core. Spouses enjoy a large degree of autonomy and can choose their preferred matrimonial property regime in a pre-nuptial agreement, the statutory matrimonial property regime serving just as a default rule.
The common law does not have matrimonial property law as understood in the civil law systems, and therefore also does not have a default matrimonial property regime. Since the Married Women's Property Act 1882, marriage has no effect upon the proprietary rights of the parties in England and Wales. As a result, the spouses’ assets remain separate. In contrast to continental law, marital agreements, which in England and Wales could more appropriately be termed separation or divorce agreements, traditionally are not binding. This is comparable to the legal situation in Ireland.
Most continental legal systems draw a clear distinction between matrimonial property and maintenance, whereas common law systems in principle deal with both issues simultaneously.
The function of maintenance will be of lesser importance in systems where the courts have the power to reallocate property. Reallocation of family assets is a particularly important mechanism in common law systems to guarantee the standard of living and equality between the spouses. Maintenance, in the form of financial provision, is mainly granted when property redistribution cannot guarantee the required standard of living. In continental systems reallocation is extremely rare, although a few examples can be found. In some Nordic legal systems the courts have the power of reallocation. The French prestation compensatoire and the Spanish pensión compensatoria are not totally comparable with the common law system of reallocation but combine elements of maintenance and matrimonial property. However, most continental legal systems do not have special provisions regulating the distribution of marital property and where a community system applies, the community is simply divided into equal parts.
Since its establishment in 2001, the Commission on European Family Law (CEFL) has drafted common European Principles which address core issues of family law. In doing so, the CEFL aims to contribute to the harmonization process of private law in Europe. In carrying out comparative research and proposing Principles of European Family Law, the CEFL is independent of any organisation or institution. To date, 26 European jurisdictions are represented by academics, judges and practising lawyers in the work of the CEFL. These experts have been working together pursuant to a self-established method which has proven to be workable. The comparison of solutions which are presented in national reports compiled in response to an extensive list of questions constitutes the fundaments on which the CEFL Principles are built. If a national legislature takes this comparative material into account and – more importantly – finally decides to use the Principles as a source of inspiration when adopting new rules in family law, the ultimate goal of the CEFL has been achieved. It goes without saying that all legislatures are free “to take it or leave it”. Given their lack of any enforceability, the Principles must convince on their own, as they are formulated (imperio rationis instead of rationeimperii). In 2008, the Portuguese legislature for example, in modernizing the law of divorce and parental authority took advantage of the work of the CEFL. As a result, some of the new Portuguese rules are identical to the CEFL Principles. This example is not alone in illustrating that the final results are considered to be in accordance with the scientific standard for reliable and comprehensive comparative research. Moreover, CEFL Principles are not black letter rules, but guidelines to be “filtered” into national – or European – legislation.
After having completed the Principles of European Family Law regarding Divorce and Maintenance between Former Spouses (2004) and the Principles of European Family Law regarding Parental Responsibilities (2007), the CEFL is currently in the process of drafting Principles regarding Property Relations between Spouses. Due to the complexity of this area of law, it is to be expected that the work will be finalized no earlier than 2013.
In my view, the main purpose of succession law legislation is to strike a reasonable balance between the interests of (1) the surviving spouse (or cohabitant), (2) the interests of other family members and (3) the deceased's own preferences for the distribution of his property. The question of how to perform this balancing act has been answered in widely diverse ways throughout history and in different jurisdictions. The purpose of this paper is to identify different ways of balancing these, often conflicting, interests. Within the rules of inheritance law, there are several concepts of legal protection of the surviving spouse or other surviving relatives. I will focus on four main concepts of legal protection within the law of succession and show how – and to what extent – these concepts are applied in Norwegian law.
There are of course alternatives that do not imply any balancing of interests. One unbalanced solution is to provide the lineal descendants with a legitimate portion or indefeasible share of the entire estate. Another solution, unbalanced in favour of the surviving spouse, is to provide her with a legitimate portion which amounts to the entire estate. A third alternative is to provide the deceased with unlimited freedom of testation. My focus is to identify different ways of balancing the interests. Therefore, I will not pay much attention to unbalanced solutions.
When discussing inheritance rights, especially the inheritance rights of the surviving spouse, one should bear in mind that community property is the default family property regime in many civil law jurisdictions. Thus inheritance and legitimate portion is a question of how much the widow or widower is entitled to of the deceased's assets in addition to his or her share of the community property. Upon one spouse's death, community property is usually split into halves. One half constitutes the survivor's share in the community property and thus belongs to him, whereas the estate of the predeceasing spouse consists of the other half of the community property, along with such assets as the predeceasing spouse may have owned in his own right (as separate assets). To some extent the surviving spouse receives double protection.
In this contribution the focus will be placed on rules which determine the law which is applicable to a cross-border succession. Currently, these rules are not unified because of the lack of binding international and European instruments in this area. As a result, every state has its own national rules on the law which is applicable to succession. This situation can result in different outcomes to the question of which law is applicable to a cross-border succession. The following example may serve as an illustration:
A Dutch person lives in the Netherlands and acquires a country house in France which he uses for holiday purposes. When he dies, he leaves movable and immovable property situated in the Netherlands as well as in France. According to Dutch conflict of law rules, the whole succession is governed by Dutch substantive inheritance law while, according to French conflict of law rules, the house situated in France is governed by French substantive inheritance law and the remainder of the estate is governed by Dutch substantive inheritance law.
It goes without saying that the different approaches could have important consequences for the persons involved.
In a cross-border succession, when the deceased has made no choice as to the applicable law in a testamentary disposition, the applicable law is determined objectively at the moment of death. As the moment of one's death is uncertain, it can be difficult to plan one's estate during one's lifetime. A way to remove this uncertainty is to allow a testator to choose which law shall be applied. The chosen law, the subjective applicable law, replaces the objective applicable law including its mandatory provisions. This kind of choice is called a conflict of law designation, a ‘kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung’. A choice of law designation gives a testator the freedom to testate: the testator knows which law shall apply to his succession and, therefore, he can plan his estate during his lifetime.
Not only does the principle of freedom of testation play a role in private international law, the principle of family protection also gives rise to several important questions in this context. What if substantive inheritance rules which protect the family of a deceased are considered by a State to be overriding mandatory rules?
In the common law world England & Wales is the powerful jurisdiction. What we do in London is followed in a number of other jurisdictions, both legislatively and by precedent.
We apply only the lex fori in family proceedings, we do not apply the law of another jurisdiction. Under our law there are no property consequences of marriage. However, there are profound property consequences of divorce. In that event the parties submit all relevant assets to a process of redistribution in the discretion of the trial judge, conducted now under Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Parliament has put few bounds on the exercise of that judicial discretion. There is only a checklist specifying first child welfare and then all the circumstances having particular regard to assets, needs, age, duration of marriage, health, contribution and conduct. Rather more the exercise of the discretion is guided by precedent, that is to say previous reported decisions, particularly of the appellate courts.
HISTORY
It is worth sketching the background to see how statutory provisions not fundamentally reformed since their introduction in 1971 have been construed and to trace the steps by which we have walked from where we were then to where we are now.
The first powers to order capital payments had been introduced in 1963 but the judges had chosen to exercise them with great caution. At the outset the extensive powers introduced by the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1970 were also hardly applied innovatively but as a component in a financial scheme at the heart of which lay periodical payment orders.
Economic growth, prosperity, the erosion of hallowed distinctions between capital and income, the decline of the aristocratic and landed classes, the emergence of huge fortunes very rapidly amassed: all contributed to a fresh approach. The clean break and the capitalisation of future liabilities in a single present payment became the norm when affluent people divorced. For this there was statutory foundation in the reforms introduced by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. However, there remained a distaste in the senior judiciary, still exclusively male, for the megabucks publicised in Los Angeles settlements and a determination not to introduce standards that might encourage the gold-digger or spread cynical disregard for the marriage vows. This judicial attitude is well illustrated in the judgments in the appeal in Preston v Preston.
Research shows that an ever-increasing number of child maintenance payments involve transnational elements. The European Union has no right to ignore these trends in order to provide minimum guarantees for European citizens. In this regard Article 65 of the EC Treaty, which speaks of measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, is of crucial importance. It provides a basis for two types of initiatives. First, the official efforts to establish simplified rules of procedure in relation to child maintenance obligations have been made. Second, attempts to lay theoretical as well as practical foundations for harmonizing and unifying substantive family law are evident.
Although child maintenance is still behind other fields of family law where practical harmonisation steps have already taken place, it is rather a question of time when this will happen as the recent research in this field reveals great differences in EU Member States` legal systems. Bearing in mind the substantial amount of scepticism towards the possibility of family law harmonisation, a comparative look at the child maintenance laws of three EU countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – which were once already unified could be important. An overview and comparison of family legislation developed in each country after the re-establishment of independence might contribute to the search for an answer to the following question: are child maintenance laws suitable for harmonization at all?
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Often described as the ‘Baltic states’ and considered to be one region, in the 1940s Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were included in the territory of the Soviet Union. During the period of Soviet rule all three countries experienced the impact of the unification of all legal spheres, including family law.
THE PERIOD OF SOVIET OCCUPATION
The developments in the three countries` family laws during the period of occupation encompass three main periods:
1. The period of Russian family law. The Soviet occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940 suspended the family legislation of the former independent states. A decree issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on November 26, 1940 applied the civil legislation of the Russian Federation to the Baltic countries; in particular, the Russian Federation's Code on Matrimony, Family and Wardship adopted on November 19, 1926 came into force.
Honore de Balzac proclaimed that to enter into a marriage contract was one of the holiest duties of a couple about to get married. In his novel Le contrat de mariage he describes the long and intricate negotiations that traditionally took place in France before marriage, not only in aristocratic but also in bourgeois families. Contracts with regard to matrimonial property are to date an integral part of most Continental European legal systems, as is the ensuing freedom of contract. In English common law, on the contrary, pre- or post-nuptial contracts were for a long time considered to violate public policy, and only recently have courts begun to accord them a role in the granting of financial relief upon divorce.
This controversy about party autonomy and its boundaries goes to the heart of marriage and family law: in family law, contracting can affect either the parentchild relationship, as do agreements on the exercise of parental responsibility, or affect affiliation or surrogacy agreements. Such contracts involve children as third parties, who are in particular need of the state's protection. Different questions generally arise when adults enter into agreements concerning their relationship: why and to what extent should they be free to determine the rights and obligations during the existence or upon the dissolution of their relationship? The degree to which couples may regulate their partnership by contract raises fundamental questions as to the role of marriage law in pluralistic societies. What is the state's role vis-a-vis increasingly diverse forms of partnerships and in view of a growing acceptance of different life styles and religious or ideological views? The answers to these questions vary: on the one hand, according to a postmodern view, we can dispense with marriage law completely and the regulation of intimate relationships should be left to private ordering. On the other hand, there is a marked tendency to create new types of partnerships in response to the increasing diversity of family life. In many Western countries, registered partnerships or civil unions provide new options for couples. In some parts of the US, state-sponsored alternative forms of marital agreement such as covenant marriages have been introduced. State regulation of de facto relationships or cohabitation has also increased, especially with regard to the provision of certain financial adjustments upon the dissolution of the partnership.
European legislators have come up with different legal regimes to provide for situations in which a person – due to old age and/or disease – is unable to make decisions for him- or herself. One of these instruments is the living will, also known as an “advance decision” or an “advance directive” concerning medical care. This legal instrument has been constructed to ensure that a person's will concerning medical treatment is adhered to even at a time when the patient is unable to make the required decisions. This does not apply to elderly people only, but also to people with terminal illnesses and people who, for religious reasons, object to special medical treatments.
Providing health care directions for a future incapacity is a legal undertaking which stands at the threshold between many legal disciplines. The link to health law and the law dealing with incapacity is obvious. However, health care directions are also linked to criminal law when it comes to the question of differing between rightful medical treatment, to which the patient consented, and penalized treatment causing bodily harm or even homicide, where the patient did not consent. Here physicians need clear guidelines on the existence of a valid consent. Public law is also involved when it comes to the questions of how far the duty of a state with respect to the protection of life goes, and how far the selfdetermination of a patient reaches respectively.
This article will focus on the private law aspects of living wills as part of the law on incapacity. Before I go into the details of the German law on living wills, I would like to provide a short overview of the legal rights and interests concerned; followed by a detailed analysis of the preconditions and legal consequences of a living will as set out in the German Civil Code. I conclude with a short analysis of whether the German law succeeds in striking a balance between the rights and interests involved.
THE PROTECTION OF ELDERLY PERSONS ESP. CONCERNING MEDICAL CARE
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
Low birth rates and a slow but steady increase in life expectancy characterise the age structure in the European Union.
Criminal courts stand at the heart of the field of criminal justice, endorsing actions taken at earlier and later stages of the criminal justice process. Police and prosecution seek approval of the courts for particular investigative techniques and bring completed investigations before the court. Prisons draw a degree of legitimacy from the fact that their work represents the realisation of decisions made in the courts. Bourdieu (2002: 824) describes a ‘chain of legitimation’ removing individual acts from the category of arbitrary violence and the courts provide a vital link in this chain. The judicial system has been said to hold the ‘center of ideals’ of Western governments (Arnold 1965: 128); in the criminal trial itself the dignity of the state and individual are juxtaposed (Arnold 1965: 128). As well as this symbolic significance, the trial can have an important functional element in prompting and informing public debate. The criminal case, like other less formal responses to ‘trouble’ serves as an empirical example against which norms and values are tried and tested (Arnold 1965: 42; Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941: 23 ff). The criminal courts are thus central to the legitimacy of the coercive elements of state activity and to the criminal justice agencies in which such coercive power is invested. In spite of this central position it has been observed that, with some exceptions, criminological research has tended to focus on policing and corrections; the black box of courts linking the two is left as the remit of legal scholars (Brodeur and Shearing 2005: 382). Yet to analyse international interventions in policing and prison services without also engaging with criminal courts would leave a significant gap in understanding international intervention in criminal justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
This chapter starts by discussing the role that courts play in society, before examining their particular role in societies undergoing transition from periods of conflict or authoritarian government. The importance of particular procedural techniques is examined through a brief discussion of plea-bargaining, underpinning a more detailed discussion in relation to BiH in chapter 6. The subject of plea bargaining is also put into the context of policy transfer and legal transplant literature, first introduced in chapter 1.