Executive Summary

As the first directly elected Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) served at a crucial juncture in Indonesia's history. Succeeding the three short presidencies of BJ Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, his presidency had a lot to prove. The initial stage of transition to democracy under these preceding administrations was extremely challenging as state institutions underwent changes, while the elite grappled with the demands from the polity for better governance. The fact that the first three post-reform presidents only served a portion of their terms signifies the uncertainties of a post-authoritarian state and the intense politicking among the political elites. Indeed, succeeding these leaders with a two-term presidency is a testament to SBY's popularity and political flair. With a popularity that was remarkably broad across political parties and demographic groups (Liddle and Mujani 2004, p. 121), much was riding on his first victory in 2004 as voter dissatisfaction towards his predecessor Megawati Sukarnoputri transformed into great hope for his presidency.

Among SBY's many achievements, top of the list is the strengthening of democratic institutions. SBY did so by maintaining overall political stability, while ensuring certain important milestones such as setting up direct elections for local heads (at the province, district and municipal levels) and strengthening the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Overall, he maintained peace and stability, two important conditions for keeping democracy intact and consolidating it. These milestones were particularly important, given that his two-term administration coincided with the country's democratic transition, one of the most crucial periods in Indonesia's history.

Alongside praise, SBY's government has also attracted criticism over his failure to further Indonesia's progress. Specifically, he was responsible for a period of democratic stagnation in Indonesia (see, for example, Tomsa 2010 and Mietzner 2012). As identified by scholars, some important signals of the push against and pull towards democratic institutionalization were the attempts by the elites to roll back the progress of democracy, on the one hand, and civil society's efforts to maintain the process of democratic institutionalization, on the other. Political freedom also started to deteriorate in his second term, with Freedom House downgrading the country's status from “Free” in 2013 to “Partly Free” in 2014, owing mainly to increasing government control over civil organizations.

I served as foreign minister of the Republic of Indonesia in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Second United Cabinet between 2009 and 2014. It has been a humbling experience — following in the footsteps of those who have ably served the nation and capping nearly three decades of diplomatic service — one that has indelibly shaped my world view and Indonesia's place within it.

That world view is one of an Indonesia whose conduct has the capacity to mould the region's affairs, earning it a position of leadership. It is one of an Indonesia that has a proud tradition of constructive activism in global affairs beyond its immediate shores and direct interests. It is of an Indonesia that pursues an independent and active policy — a capacity for independent decision-making in a complex and ever-changing world. It is of an Indonesia that presents itself as a regional power with global interests, a country that can be entrusted to be part of the solution, a bridge-builder for the varied challenges confronting the community of nations. It is of an Indonesia secure in a world of change, pursuing a million friends and zero enemies on the basis of the principles of mutual respect and benefit. And it is an Indonesia confident in the strength of its democracy.

Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World

My years implementing and formulating Indonesia's foreign policy rested on the firm belief that, ultimately, Indonesia's foreign policy cannot be divorced from its internal, national setting. We use the term intermestic to describe the inseparability of the international and domestic environments. To successfully navigate the world of the twenty-first century, the choice, indeed, is not between domestic or external priorities; instead, the two must be made to work seamlessly. Strenuous efforts must be made to ensure that there is a mutually reinforcing synergy between the internal and external dynamics. While this has been true throughout Indonesia's history, the linkage between the national and international milieus has become even more pronounced in the contemporary globalized era. The distinctions between the local, national, regional and global levels have become ever more blurred. Indeed, the distinctions between political, economic and social issues have become ever more tenuous.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) had to confront a series of terrorist attacks while in office. He built on his experience as coordinating minister for political, legal, and security affairs in the Megawati government (2001–4), when he had to deal with the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. In his ten years as president (2004–14), Indonesia continued to be plagued by a network of terrorist cells, but the risk of high-casualty attacks receded over time. The SBY government succeeded in managing but not eradicating the terrorism threat, and the decline of terrorist capacity was due to many factors other than government policy. In general, his government did better at rounding up perpetrators once they had committed violence than in preventing radicalization or “immunizing” communities against extremist ideology. This was in part because the police became skilled in crime scene investigation and using sophisticated equipment to track down known suspects. This reactive “hard approach” is almost by definition easier than a proactive “soft approach” of trying to tackle the problem at its roots. But it was also because once an attack had taken place, there was near universal political support for arresting those responsible. Prevention strategies aimed at extremist discussion groups or social media were much more sensitive, and SBY had little appetite for political confrontation. The result was that over his two terms in office, while several hundred suspected terrorists were arrested and over ninety killed in police operations, almost no progress was made on prevention and deradicalization. One consequence was that as a new threat appeared late in SBY's second term in the form of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terror group, the government had few good tools or people in place to address it.

The 2002 Bali Bombings: How Counterterrorism Efforts Began

On Saturday night, 12 October 2002, a one-tonne bomb exploded in two clubs, Sari Club and Paddy's Café. The two clubs, the most popular in the area of Legian, Bali, were totally destroyed. Cars and other vehicles in the area were turned into charred ruins. Windows throughout Legian were shattered and the roofs of cafes and homes flew off. In all, 202 people lost their lives and more than 300 were wounded.

During the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the Indonesia–Malaysia relationship was regarded as one of the most important bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia. This was for two interconnected reasons. First, Indonesia was, and still is, the most populous and powerful nation in the region. Second, given this fact, the bilateral relationship with Indonesia's closest neighbour assumed greater significance than it otherwise would.

In the SBY era, both states constantly reaffirmed their commitment to the relationship, albeit framed in a slightly different way from past eras. Under previous leaders, much was made of the “sibling” identity shared between Indonesia and Malaysia. This notion was based on geographic proximity and a similar colonial and post-colonial history, underpinned by a shared language, a shared culture and a shared religion. The intimacy of the historical ties, which have been conceptualized in various pan-Malay imaginaries, led to numerous leaders from both countries to refer to the bilateral relationship as one premised on “Malay blood brotherhood” or, more commonly, Malay serumpun, which can be glossed as a shared Malay racial or ethnic stock. Under SBY, however, a more prosaic or pragmatic approach was taken, and thus notions of serumpun were deliberately avoided. Nevertheless, underneath SBY's “realpolitik” style was a deep current of genuine and mutual warmth, stretching back to the colonial era, when the independence activists of both countries worked closely together, teaching and inspiring each other.

The Indonesia–Malaysia relationship under SBY's watch was built on a firm foundation of years of interaction at all levels of state and society. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, which was marked by SBY's presidency, several issues seriously strained bilateral relations. Among these was the strong public reaction in Indonesia to maritime boundary disputes, claims over each country's cultural heritage, the cross-border impact of haze from Indonesian forest fires, and the poor treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia. Indonesia's liberal mass media, a capstone of its democratic consolidation progress under SBY, played a key role in inflaming the tensions. In addition to numerous anti-Malaysia columns, editorials and blogs, several semi-journalistic books discussing the bilateral relationship, often in highly inflammatory language, were published.