Introduction

This chapter intends to raise the question as to whether the socio-religious movement we now call “Tantrism” may represent a wider Monsoon Asian areal phenomenon, with roots in a past that predates the earliest available textual data. It has been directly inspired by, and it engages with, three thought-provoking essays by anthropologist Robert Dentan on a common religious base in South and Southeast Asia (2002a, 2002b, this volume). As a scholar trained in Sanskrit and Classical Indology focusing on the adoption of Indic religions across Southeast Asia, I intend to take up the challenge cast by Dentan, namely that “speculative reconstruction of Semai theological history… suggests that serious students of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Daoism, need to pay attention to the indigenous religions of Peninsular Malaysia” (2002b, p. 207).

I begin the discussion by surveying the historiographical parameters concerning the complex process of cultural and religious transfer between premodern South and Southeast Asia, and the origin of Tantrism. Next, I revisit the idea, advanced by early twentieth-century French scholarship, of a shared cultural matrix in Monsoon Asia, within which framework Dentan's hypothesis may be situated. I then move to review Dentan's main argument that a comparison of similar religious tropes found in the late Vedic tradition and in the oral lore of the Austroasiatic languagespeaking ethnic group of the Semai in Peninsular Malaysia would suggest a common ancestry. By taking into account additional evidence from premodern and modern South Asian, Javano-Balinese, and Malay contexts, I suggest that many of the similarities detected by Dentan extend to the post-Vedic period, i.e. to Tantric Śaivism and Tantric Buddhism in the mediaeval or post-Gupta period (ca. 500–1300 CE).

Indonesia's decentralization — with which some authority has been passed to the regions — has produced popular leaders such as the current president Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), Bandung mayor Ridwan Kamil, and Surabaya mayor Tri Rismaharini (Risma). This new breed of Indonesian leaders are popularly elected in direct elections, unlike their appointed predecessors under Suharto's New Order. These appointed local leaders were essentially individuals chosen by the Ministry of Home Affairs with the approval of local legislatures. Often, they were retired military generals or former bureaucrats who were appointed as extensions of the central administration. Now held regularly, direct elections often see the rise of ambitious rich individuals with questionable leadership skills, but they have also elected self-made leaders with a strong track record in either the government bureaucracy or as professionals.

Among those who rose from bureaucratic circles is Surabaya's mayor Tri Rismaharini (fondly known as Bu Risma). This article investigates her popularity by looking at how her policies have been perceived by the Surabayan voters. Risma's popularity is fascinating and important to investigate, particularly as Jokowi himself launched his presidency based on his credentials first as mayor of Solo and then as governor of Jakarta. Such a trajectory has amplified the positions of local leaders and meant that they are closely watched as possible upcoming national leaders.

This paper selects specific policies in certain areas under Risma's administration, and investigates how they have been perceived by voters. By doing so, it aims to formulate an informed answer on what voters want, and the extent to which a leader's popularity would translate to votes. It is argued here that the case of Risma in Surabaya points to the positive outcome of direct local elections when voters are presented with candidates with a good track record. Cases such as in Surakarta where Jokowi was re-elected with more than 90 per cent of votes in 2010, and Ridwan Kamil who won the Bandung mayorship in 2013 by more than 27 per cent of the votes, show that voters do scrutinize their potential leaders. The success of Risma demonstrates that beyond the aspects of popularity and celebrity status, many more voters inspect the track records of candidates closely. This development may lessen the influence of money politics and vote-buying in elections, and in turn lessen the preponderance of personality cults.

The year 2016 will be remembered for its extraordinary events. It started on a promising note with the signing of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in February 2016, after prolonged years of negotiations. This was followed by the unexpected United Kingdom vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) in June and Donald Trump's stunning victory in the U.S. presidential election in November. The latter event has now cast doubt over whether the TPP will be ratified. In Southeast Asia the death of Thailand's revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the world's longest-reigning monarch, in October, also marked another historical moment. China's launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in January 2016 signalled a new era in global finance, as the new international bank is perceived to rival the U.S.-led World Bank. All ten economies in Southeast Asia have signed on to be members, although the ratification of Malaysia and the Philippines had not been completed at the time of writing.

Within the region there have been several changes that may affect its internal cohesiveness, as well as the region's economic and political relations with external powers. These include changes in political leadership in Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam, while rising tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea have strained relations between China and some countries in the region. The signing of the TPP has also been perceived by some members of ASEAN as disruptive to ASEAN integration.

Amidst such changes, how did the Southeast Asian economies fare in 2016? The main objective of this chapter is to examine the growth of the ten Southeast Asian economies over the year and the main factors that have contributed to this growth. It also discusses the issues that have the potential to affect economic growth of these countries in 2017 and beyond.

Economic Performance in 2016

Overall Growth Performance

Global growth is projected to fall from 2015 to 2016 due to the uncertainties associated with Brexit and the global impact of the U.S. election results of November 2016. Even in the Asia Pacific, the growth rate for the region is forecast to stagnate from 2015 to 2016. Five of the Southeast Asian economies are expected to have slower growth in 2016 compared to 2015 (Table 1).

The Rising ISIS Threat: Physical and Ideological Dimensions

The counterterrorism front proved a busy one for Singapore in 2016. By far the biggest story of the year involved the so-called Batam rocket plot. In August, media reports emerged of a plan by a cell of Indonesian militants associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to fire a rocket from Batam island — south of Singapore — at the iconic Marina Bay Sands (MBS) complex on Singapore island itself. The five-man cell was colourfully called Katibah Gonggong Rebus (KGR), meaning “Boiled Snails Cell” in Bahasa Indonesia. It appeared to be influenced by the incarcerated extremist cleric Aman Abdurrahman, but operationally directed by a Syria-based Indonesian ISIS militant called Bahrun Naim, also an associate of Aman's, and had intended to launch the projectile from a point on Batam island called Habibie Hill, about seventeen kilometres from Singapore's shoreline and eighteen kilometres from MBS. Investigations revealed that the Batam cell leader, Gigih Rahmat Dewa, had coordinated the planned strike with Bahrun Naim via social media. Planning for the attack reportedly began in October 2015, and in addition to Singapore the cell had intended to attack Indonesian targets such as an international seaport in Batam, shopping malls, and other places in the archipelago using suicide bombers. A month later, Indonesian police reported the arrest of one Leonardus Hutajulu, also linked to the KGR cell, who had apparently planned to seek employment on Sentosa Island, a tourist attraction in Singapore, though it was unclear whether this was linked to the MBS plot. It further emerged that Nur Rohman, a suicide attacker who had targeted a police station in July in Solo, Central Java, was also linked to the KGR cell. Some reports suggested that the KGR cell members did possess some technical skills that could have enabled them to build a rocket capable of striking Singapore's MBS from Batam; in any case, the cell may also have relied on expertise brought in from outside Batam by Bahrun Naim. One of Bahrun Naim's protégés, Dodi Suridi, had been able — based on information gleaned from YouTube — to build and successfully test-fire a makeshift rocket launcher employing a plastic tube, potassium nitrate extracted from fertilizer, and other substances.

The year 2016 was arguably one of shock and unpredictability for Thailand. No other major event in 2016 was as historically significant as the passing away of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej (1927–2016) on 13 October 2016 at the age of eighty-nine. He was the beloved King of all Thai people, and the world's longest-serving monarch, reigning for seventy years. His frail health since 2014 had been closely monitored by Thailand's leading medical professionals. The Royal Household Bureau's various announcements on the condition of his health time and again caused concern nationwide and led to many religious ceremonies to wish him a speedy recovery. Once the official announcement of his passing became public knowledge, the whole nation seemed to come to a standstill. Most commuters travelling home that evening shed tears publically without embarrassment while checking the news on social media. Every sector of Thai society agreed that the King's passing was a major historical transition. Once they overcame this sense of great loss, the other prevailing question was what would happen in terms of the royal succession.

Aside from the King's passing, the political landscape in Thailand in 2016 was more pessimistic. Thai society continued to be characterized by polarized contention and other negative political features. The full blossom of democratization was still far from reality, though the draft charter was completed and approved by a nationwide referendum in August 2016. Some argued that Thailand was still in an indefinite transition, while others labelled it a great leap backward. For those with a pessimistic view, the acronym COSTUP would describe the state of affairs in the country in 2016, standing for Corruption, Oppression, Social injustice, Tyranny, Unequal rights or unemployment, and Poverty — representing the rise in political, economic, and social costs confronting the military-led regime, and Thailand in general, in 2016.

The King's Passing: His Enduring Legacy and a Historical Transition

To most Thai people the passing of the revered monarch in October 2016 was so overwhelming that nationwide bereavement and grief ran very high. The “allin-black” practice was adopted nationwide, governed by different timeframes according to the sector of the country; i.e., the general public, regardless of gender or age, donned black outfits as a sign of mourning for at least thirty days, while the government has decreed that its officials will wear black for a full year.

Introduction

This chapter presents a novel contribution to the study of language contact between India and Southeast Asia, in particular the oft-neglected “Prakrit” or—more accurately—Middle Indo-Aryan (henceforth MIA) loanwords in Malay, Old Javanese and other languages of Maritime Southeast Asia. To this end, I will call attention to 101 tentative instances of lexical borrowing and present new perspectives on the pre-modern dispersal of Indic culture and thought to Southeast Asia during the first millennium CE. As scholarship on the exchange of vocabulary between South and Southeast Asia has traditionally prioritized the role of Sanskrit and the associated “high culture”— including religion, state organization, art, architecture, literature and philosophy (cf. Gonda 1973; De Casparis 1997)—a focus on (North) India's historical spoken languages may reveal more vernacular dimensions of interethnic contact, challenging scholars to reconsider the structure and nature of the maritime networks that have shaped Asia's pre-colonial past.

Without wanting to delve too deep here into the history of scholarship on cultural contact across the Bay of Bengal, it is worth pointing out that historians and archaeologists frequently present linguistic arguments in support of one or the other macrohistorical scenario. In an attempt to understand the mechanism through which cultural influence from India gained foothold in early Southeast Asia, Van Leur (1934, p. 126) contended that if the region had been frequented predominantly by warriors (kṣatriya) or merchants (vaiśya), more vernacular elements would have been adopted—including the fully developed caste system (i.e. the jātis, not just the varṇas), craft industry, political organization, and Indian languages other than Sanskrit. He thus rejected the then prevailing notion of a “Hindu colonization”, as advocated by Mookerji (1912) and other scholars of the Calcutta-based Greater India movement, and suggested that the literary and magico-ritual “high civilization” of classical Southeast Asia had been introduced by a relatively small number of Brahmins who had ingratiated themselves at the local courts. The notion—first advanced by Krom (1931, p. 90) and thenceforth commonplace in the field of early Southeast Asian history—that indigenous elites were actively and deliberately importing Indian traditions and adapting them to local preferences is essential to this idea.

Introduction

The focus on globalization has encouraged researchers in the humanities to rethink cultural processes on wide spatial and temporal scales, i.e. those of the world and the long-term (Assayag 1998), and to emphasize processes of social, economic and cultural integration. When understood as an approach to history, researchers looked for processual continuities from prehistory to the modern era that could explain contemporary globalization (Beaujard 2005, 2012a, 2012b; Beaujard, Berger and Norel 2009). Researchers hold that human history, when understood as a global process, has already experienced several sociocultural translocal processes of “globalizations”, such as Hellenization and Romanization in Europe, and Indianization and Islamization in Southeast Asia (Amselle 2000; Assayag 1998). While those translocal processes have been made the subject of abundant research over an extended period of time, the hypothesis of a maritime Southeast Asian globalization, possibly dominated by Austronesian speakers, is a relatively new field of research. The notion of an integrated maritime Southeast Asian space has long been advocated by Braudel-inspired historians such as Anthony Reid, for whom long-established interconnections within the South China Sea accounted for the strong spatial and human integration he observed in Southeast Asia in modern times. However, recent advances in the field of prehistory led a few archaeologists to argue for an interaction sphere that existed already in the prehistoric period (Bulbeck 2008; Hung et al. in press; Solheim 2006). Indeed, it is now demonstrated that in the second millennium BC populations actively interacted and exchanged technologies, human experiences and valuable goods thanks to an advanced sailing technology within the South China Sea. From then on some networks were established, as indicated by shared ceramic traditions and the circulation of characteristic nephrite ornaments. For these archaeologists, these interactions could well have laid the ground for common practices and cultural affinities accounting for the ease with which populations have been circulating and exchanging goods and ideas from the Metal Age, by 500 BC. From this period onward, exchanges increased and transethnic networks began to generate significant quantity of characteristic stone and glass ornaments, distinctive decorated ceramics related to the “Sa Huynh-Kalanay complex”—an expression forged by Solheim (1961)—whose distribution spans from the shores of the Thai–Malay Peninsula to those of the Philippines and of the Indonesian archipelago.

Introduction

Earliest sea crossings and offshore fishing in various parts of the world—including Taiwan, the supposed homeland of Austronesian languages—are dated in the period of rising seas, from the outgoing Pleistocene (c. 14,000 BP) until Mid Holocene, or later. But archaeological data to be cited below show that sea crossings and high-sea fishing in Insular Southeast Asia (henceforth ISEA) must have begun at least three times earlier (c. 45,000 BP). When people elsewhere just began developing seaworthy watercraft, equatorial populations retreating before the rising seas in ISEA were likely to have already accumulated tens of millennia of experience, so it is only natural to expect that innovations in the construction of such watercraft originated from there.

In this process of constructional innovation, the raft—the primeval watercraft—was likely to have been replaced by a multiple dugout—a “raft” with dugouts instead of logs—and then a double canoe, when improved construction of dugouts, and perhaps also smaller loads, made more than two hulls superfluous. I cite evidence elsewhere (Mahdi 2016) indicating that Chinese as well as Malayo-Polynesian (henceforth MP) shipping had developed from a double canoe. However, as this latter was not a primeval watercraft construction, it was likely to have been acquired from the very equatorial populations—apparently ancestors of present-day Negritos—who, retreating before the rising seas, also brought it northwards from ISEA to Fujian, and subsequently to Taiwan.

I will cite biogenetic data which place populations of Taiwan and ISEA closer to one another than either of them to that of the Chinese mainland. These data have even led to theories, to be cited below, of an equatorial origin of the Austronesians. Nevertheless, linguistic studies will also be cited, which indicate that the reconstructable corpus of Proto-Austronesian shares a significant number of elements with language phyla of the mainland. At the same time, one can distinguish two distinct protoforms for “person”, depending on whether of Australoid or Mongoloid appearance. The first migration wave of Malayo-Polynesians apparently referred to themselves as the former (Mahdi 1994; 2016).

Available archaeological and other data to be discussed below suggest development of a maritime mercantile tradition in the South China Sea, connecting Mainland Southeast Asia (henceforth MSEA) with the Philippines, and Southeast China and Taiwan with ISEA.

Demographic Composition of Respondents (N=410)

Introduction

The MSEA Convergence Zone

There has been considerable investment in the concept of Mainland Southeast Asia (MSEA) as a linguistic area (Enfield 2003, 2005; Enfield and Comrie 2014). Despite great phyletic diversity, its languages show a remarkable homogeneity in terms of structure. Such patterns are often described as Sprachbunds, geographical areas characterized by linguistic convergence (Trubetzkoy 1928; Becker 1948). Sprachbunds have been identified in many regions of the world, with the Balkan Sprachbund the most well-known. Regions of convergence are typically cited in Africa, notably Ethiopia (Ferguson 1976; see also papers in Heine and Nurse 2008) in India, and the Caucasus. However, those characteristics of language which converge are by no means the same in different regions. In some cases, a high incidence of lexical borrowing can coexist with great variations in grammar and morphology, as in Ethiopia. Papua, especially the Sepik, and Arnhem Land languages show strong typological similarities in grammar and morphology in conjunction with high lexical and thus phyletic diversity. A Sprachbund may thus be a less useful term than “convergence zone” which leaves open the parameters of similarity.

MSEA is undoubtedly a convergence zone, characterized by five major language phyla: Austroasiatic, Austronesian, Daic, Sino-Tibetan, and Hmong-Mien. Apart from the Andamanese peoples there are no language isolates. Phonology, tones, morphology (or more precisely the lack of it), word and syntactic structures all show remarkable similarities despite the evident lexical diversity (Blench 2014, in press a). No clear consensus in the linguistic literature has emerged to explain this pattern, but we have good evidence for the rapidity with which this type of analogical restructuring occurs. Utsat, the Austronesian language spoken in Hainan island, is a good example of this (Thurgood and Li 2012). Utsat is Chamic, and would have resembled Malay when its ancestral speakers settled on the mainland of modern-day Vietnam some 2,000 years ago. Its syntax and phonology were restructured so that it more closely resembled the neighbouring Austroasiatic languages. However, in 969 AD, part of its speakers fled to Hainan island in Southeast China and there came into contact with both Hlaic and Sinitic languages. Utsat then converged with these languages, losing all its morphology and adopting a complex tonal system.

Malaysia entered 2016 with the baggage of many unresolved political, economic, social, and foreign policy issues from 2015. Especially notable has been the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) political saga that spilled over to economic, social, and foreign policy domains. In response, Malaysian civil society continues to build momentum and confidence, despite various crackdown efforts. All this amidst continued economic slowdown and a sustained currency slide, made worse by the post-U.S. General Election “Trump Tantrum”. Quite drastic foreign policy adjustments were employed, especially towards the end of the year, to attempt to counter these negative developments. Despite the sustained challenges, Malaysia has displayed surprising resilience through it all.

Political Distractions and Divisions

The 1MDB debacle that consumed much of Malaysia's political attention and energies in the previous year continued to do so well into 2016. 1MDB is a strategic development company owned by the government of Malaysia which aims to promote foreign direct investment and establish strategic global partnerships to drive the country's long-term economic development. The company was thrust into the limelight in 2015 when Sarawak Report, an investigative news portal, started releasing information on the misappropriation of 1MDB funds by prominent members of the ruling government.

Early in the year, Malaysia's new Attorney General (AG), Mohamed Apandi Ali, who abruptly took over from the previous AG in mid-2015, announced that $681 million of funds transferred into Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's personal account was a donation from the Saudi royal family, and was not linked to 1MDB. It was further announced that $620 million of that sum was returned to the royal family because it was unutilized. With this, the AG closed Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) investigations into 1MDB and cleared Najib of corruption, as “no crime was committed”. Najib also set about removing members of his party — the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) — who had expressed dissent over official explanations on 1MDB. This included former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin (who was dropped from the DPM position during a surprise cabinet reshuffle in 2015) and Mukhriz Mahathir, the son of Malaysia's former Prime Minister and Najib's adversary Mahathir Mohamed. This strategy of removing dissenting individuals seemed to have successfully stemmed much of the criticism over the issue from within the party.

Following the global drop in oil prices for three consecutive years, economic developments during 2016 demonstrated the fact that Brunei was adjusting well to the challenging economic environment. Oil and gas exports traditionally account for 65 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and for more than 90 per cent of government revenue. Due to the prolonged period of low oil prices, the country's trade deficit was about B$2 billion in 2015, and by October 2016 total national exports stood at B$545.5 million, a decrease of 12.1 per cent from the figure in the same month in 2015.

However, Brunei was fortunate that the pace of contraction was moderated as production output generated a 3.6 per cent rebound in GDP, mainly contributed by liquefied natural gas exports, which increased by 13.6 per cent in October 2016. However, as the non-oil and gas industrial sector's contribution to GDP decreased, Brunei's projected GDP growth for 2016 is only at 1 per cent, one of the slowest growing economies in Southeast Asia.

Better Economic Climate

The government has long acknowledged the country's dependency on the energy industry, simultaneously recognizing the urgent need for fiscal and structural policy reforms to strengthen and diversify the economy. In His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah's New Year Titah, the monarch announced the formation of a Foreign Direct Investment and Downstream Industry Committee, which is tasked essentially to carry out reforms to create a competitive business environment conducive for foreign investment. The monarch also approved the establishment of a Small and Medium Enterprise Centre to support the development of local businesses and nurture entrepreneurs.

The monarch further made it clear that policy reforms should deliver measurable results, and for this reason he authorized the adoption of the Brunei Vision 2035 Framework to monitor and evaluate the country's progress in achieving Vision 2035's main objectives of producing an educated and highly skilled population with a good quality of life as well as a dynamic and sustainable economy. This in many ways makes economic diversification efforts imperative.

Since the cabinet reshuffle in October 2015 there have been remarkable changes in government delivery and in the country's focus on the diversification of the economy.