In normally placid Singapore, 2023 witnessed the political succession entering a critical phase with a more definitive timeline announced amid political controversies and scandals involving the ruling and leading opposition party capturing the attention of Singaporeans. The government's plans for a revitalized social compact were also unveiled after more than a year of consultations and engagements with Singaporeans under the auspices of the Forward Singapore exercise. The economy still awaits the strong post-pandemic recovery—it grew by 1.1 per cent, against the GDP growth forecast of 0.5 to 2.5 per cent. Coming on the back of the pandemic, making sense of the continuing uncertainty was not only challenging but also demanded a steely resolve from everyone to keep spirits up.

Watchful Waiting for Post-pandemic Economic Recovery

The International Monetary Fund had forecasted that a third of the world economy would be in recession in 2023, with the United States, European Union and China all slowing down simultaneously. Multiple global crises have confronted the world simultaneously on an almost unprecedented scale since 2022, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, intense geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States, cross–Taiwan Straits tension, nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and the lingering effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Domestically, the economy was a key concern, with inflation and the cost of living being top of the mind and creating uncertainty and anxiety for workers, consumers and businesses alike, especially when the inflation rate surpasses wage growth. With reduced real purchasing power, consumers tend to spend less, affecting business outlook, spending and investments. In turn, job insecurity and uncertainty among workers regarding whether salaries would remain stagnant or even be cut are generated. It's a vicious cycle that economic uncertainty drives, and which necessitated the government to provide ongoing assurance.

In 2023, the government rolled out a slew of measures such as various rebates, vouchers, subsidies, Medisave top-ups, and even cash payouts throughout the year, with low-income families receiving subsidies almost every month. The bulk of these came under the SG$8 billion Assurance Package to cover food and groceries, utilities and healthcare to partly manage the Goods and Services Tax (GST) increase, from 7 to 8 per cent effective 1 January 2023, with another 1 percentage point increase in 2024. As an economy dependent on export and investment, Singapore is bound to be affected by global economic storms. But the GST hike bore the brunt of the blame for the inflationary prices even as the rationale for the two-phased GST increase had been regularly explained. In part, it may indicate that Singaporeans still lack a competent understanding that being plugged into the international economic grid means Singapore is not spared from the vicissitudes of its external environment.

Singapore's Presidency: An Ever-Evolving Institution

Singapore's state institutions were modelled originally on their British counterparts but have undergone transformations to meet local needs and challenges. Further— partly because of modern Singapore's youth, partly because of new challenges, and partly because Singapore's political order allows institutional arrangements to be adjusted swiftly—this process of transformation is an ongoing one.

Singapore's presidency is no exception. When Singapore became a sovereign independent state in 1965, the president was like the monarch in the United Kingdom: he was the head of state and a symbol of the nation, and official functions were performed in his name, but he was not involved in the formulation and execution of law or policy.

Things changed in 1991, following fears that a future rogue government could effect irreversible change to Singapore—say, by squandering Singapore's reserves on poorly thought out or outright populist measures, with the aid of state institutions packed with cronies. The solution was this: in addition to his existing ceremonial duties and “soft” role as a unifying figure, the president would now have the power to veto proposed key public appointments or any attempts by the government of the day to draw down on reserves built up by previous governments.

In many cases, the veto could be overridden, but only if the president's veto was contrary to the views of the appointed Council of Presidential Advisers and if the government introduced a motion in Parliament to overrule the president that Parliament agreed to by a supermajority—which would certainly come at a political cost. So the president took on what were known as “custodial” functions: while he could not stop what he saw as unwise spending or a bad appointment, he was to serve as an important safeguard.

To perform the new custodial functions, the president would have to be independent of the incumbent government. So the presidency was transformed into a popularly elected office, with elections taking place every six years. Since the first popularly elected president, Ong Teng Cheong, took office in 1993, the office of the presidency has continued to evolve: early assumptions were clarified, points of friction between the presidency and the government were smoothed over, and rules on who can be president were reformed.

Like many other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has been increasingly worried about the state of great power relations and the direction it may take in the region. The country's leaders have raised the issue more frequently in recent years. They are concerned that the intensification of great power rivalry would inevitably threaten the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia. For example, in his speech at the opening of the 43rd ASEAN Summit in September 2023 in Jakarta, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) warned great powers “not to turn our ASEAN ship into an arena for rivalry that is destructive”. A year earlier, as Indonesia started its presidency of the G-20, President Jokowi also warned that “it is not the time for rivalry, it is not the time to create a new tension”. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi often expresses similar messages of concern about the intensification of US-China rivalry and warns the two great powers that “we don't want to get trapped by this rivalry”.

The focus of concern is clearly on the state of the relationship between the United States and China. For Indonesia, the preferred default position has always been described as tidak memihak (not taking sides). That position is seen as the natural manifestation of the principle of bebas (free/independent) in the twin principles of bebas-aktif (free and active) of Indonesia's foreign policy. Indonesia is still committed to the vision of a Southeast Asia that is free from great power rivalry. But as the rivalry has intensified over the last few years, Indonesia finds itself in a more challenging strategic environment. Indeed, navigating the US-China rivalry whilst maintaining a close and equidistant relationship with each of them has now become a difficult task for Indonesia's foreign policy. As Southeast Asia becomes the arena for the competition for influence between the two great powers, Jakarta sees it as crucial to ensure that Indonesia and the region remain bebas. President Jokowi, on more than one occasion, warned ASEAN “not to be a proxy for any great power”.

In order to stay bebas, Indonesia must be aktif. In order to pursue the twin imperatives of bebas and aktif, Indonesia cannot just sit on the fence and hope the challenge will simply go away. It must formulate an active and creative response to that challenge. This essay examines Indonesia's strategic concerns and predicaments emanating from the great power rivalry, explains Indonesia's response to the challenge and discusses some changes that Indonesia needs to consider if it wants to cope with the intensification of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia in an active way. It is imperative, however, to also understand that the expression of Indonesia's foreign policy towards great powers will continue to be affected and tempered by its domestic politics and national economic interests.

Upon winning re-election in 2019, Indonesian president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was preoccupied with one pressing question: how to avoid becoming a lame-duck president in his second term, as his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had been. Jokowi is an ambitious, impatient politician fired with a determination to transform Indonesia into an advanced and economically powerful nation. In his first term, he had committed himself to a significant programme of infrastructure, welfare, health and educational reforms, achieving success in many of these or making considerable progress. But he has far bigger plans for his second term, including a proposed new capital city, high-technology industrialization, and raising the quality of Indonesia's workforce and innovation capacity. As Eve Warburton has observed, Jokowi sees himself as a latter-day Soeharto, the authoritarian president who ruled Indonesia from 1966 till 1998. Just as Soeharto had a profound impact on the nation through his developmental policies and restoration of its international reputation, so too does Jokowi wish to be remembered as bringing a dramatic improvement to the lives of Indonesians and presiding over Indonesia's ascent to becoming a major global power.

With four years of his second five-year term now elapsed, Jokowi has banished any threat of political diminution. Indeed, as he prepares for his final year in office, he has become the commanding figure within the nation's politics, enjoying greater power and public approbation than any president of the post-1998 Reformasi period. He is widely regarded as having managed the Covid-19 pandemic capably, the economy is healthy, Indonesia's international profile has never been higher, and the country has been largely peaceful and stable. A measure of how highly he is regarded can be found in public opinion surveys, which for most of 2023 have shown his approval ratings in the seventy to eighty per cent range—an unprecedented level for the past twenty-five years. He has a firm grip on political processes and an ability to bend parliament and political parties to his will. His governing coalition contains seven of the nine parliamentary parties, or eighty-three per cent of seats, providing the president with a compliant legislature. His authority is such that his coalition and parliament readily endorse his legislative agenda and his appointment of loyalists to a wide range of key positions within the cabinet, the bureaucracy and the military, thereby ensuring that his wishes and interests are safeguarded by trusted figures. Most media magnates are also close to coalition parties or Jokowi, resulting in largely positive reporting of his and his government's actions.

In recent years, China has embarked on an ambitious path to not only consolidate its own development model but also to project its norms and values across the global stage. This projection is embedded in a series of initiatives that collectively aim to reorient the axes of global governance, potentially forging an alternative architecture replete with “Chinese characteristics”. Central to this architecture are the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which are complemented by the expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China's growing economic clout.

These initiatives do not operate in isolation but interlock to promote a comprehensive suite of norms and values that China deems conducive to its vision of a harmonious global order. While the BRI lays the physical groundwork for connectivity, the GDI, launched by Chinese president Xi Jinping in September 2021, seeks to catalyse a more equitable, balanced and inclusive development paradigm. Meanwhile, the GSI, introduced in 2022, offers a Chinese formula to counter what it perceives as a security dilemma exacerbated by zero-sum alliances. The GCI, though less concrete in its early form, proposes a dialogue-of-civilizations approach that appears to challenge the Western-centric narrative of global governance.

Southeast Asia, with its dynamic economies and complex security landscape, serves as an influential testing ground for the reception and integration of these initiatives. The diverse responses from the region, ranging from receptive collaboration to cautious hedging, provides a nuanced canvas to evaluate the traction these initiatives might gain and the potential reshaping of Southeast Asia's political, economic and strategic domains. As China continues to promote its narratives and approaches with vigour and an assertive diplomatic posture, the fabric of Southeast Asian governance structures, development models and geopolitical alignments could be subject to significant influence, if not transformation.

This chapter will dissect the layers of this influence, contemplating the extent to which Southeast Asian states might align with, adapt or counterbalance the outreach of Chinese initiatives. It aims to unravel these norms and values and critically examine their implications for Southeast Asia, a region that is both geographically proximate and strategically pivotal to China's global aspirations. The interplay of these developments is not merely regional but bears the weight of global significance, posing fundamental questions about the future trajectory of international order. This analysis will, therefore, not only spotlight the Southeast Asian perspective but also reflect on the broader implications of a global governance structure that continues to evolve and to be contested under the shadow of a rising China.

On 17 November 2022, visiting Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida and Thai prime minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to reflect the deepening as well as broadening of bilateral ties over the last decade. While Japan and Thailand also signed a first bilateral defence agreement in May 2022, the partnership remains, first of all, an economic one, as the Joint Statement of both prime ministers made clear. Prime Minister Kishida had already stressed the economic importance of the relationship in an article published in a Thai newspaper during his inaugural visit to Thailand in May 2022. In it, he pointed out that six thousand Japanese companies had invested in the country, which eighty thousand Japanese are calling home, and also mentioned the substantial Japanese investments in infrastructure. This view is shared by the Thai public according to a survey by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2021. Thais perceive Japan as an economic power and technological leader but also a country with beautiful nature and appealing traditional and popular culture.

This mutually beneficial economic partnership is faced with challenges, as acknowledged in the Joint Statement, because of demographic and technological change, and the pressure to make both economies and the supply chains connecting them more sustainable. Clearly, China's influence has also increased in Thailand. According to the 2021 survey and ISEAS's State of Southeast Asia survey 2023, Japan remains the most trusted international partner of Thailand, but China is already seen today as the most important one.

The trajectory of Thailand-Japan relations in their multiple dimensions makes clear that while Japan will not be Thailand's single-most important partner anymore, the relationship will remain an important and beneficial one for both countries in the foreseeable future.

The year 2023 ended with a mixed bag of hopes and frustrations for Southeast Asian countries. The region had left the Covid-19 pandemic behind, but geopolitical tensions such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas war, as well as the subdued performance of the Chinese economy, cast a long shadow over the region's aspirations for a robust post-pandemic recovery. Many countries in the region are currently undergoing leadership transitions, ranging from post-election political consolidation to active campaigning for upcoming elections. Geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, along with the pressure to take sides, are significant sources of concern for many Southeast Asian governments. But foremost among the priorities of Southeast Asian policymakers are efforts to curb inflation, transition towards a more sustainable economic growth model—including by diversifying away from the oil and gas sector and embracing EV industries—and enhance national competitiveness to capitalize on the next wave of FDI diversification from China.

Political Developments

After and Before the Votes: Political Transitions in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Singapore and Indonesia

A number of Southeast Asian states—Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia and Timor-Leste—were in the process of political consolidation after leadership transitions resulting from elections in 2022 and 2023.

In Malaysia, there was relative political stability after five years of frequent changes of government. National politics was dominated by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and partisan skirmishes over race and religion, as noted by Ariel Tan in her Malaysia overview chapter. The main challenges facing the prime minister were to deliver on his reform agenda, win more Malay support while retaining non-Malay support, and improve the economy. In the six state elections in August, the ruling coalition successfully defended the states under its rule as well as three parliamentary seats but saw an erosion of Malay support. As such, the government enjoyed a strong majority in parliament. However, approval ratings for Anwar and the government declined significantly in 2023 stemming from public concerns about the economy, especially the higher cost of living.

In Thailand, the political divide between the Thaksin-led Pheu Thai Party and the conservative establishment centred on the military and the monarchy, which has been the major source of political instability since 2006, was bridged surprisingly by an alliance between the two. This new alignment, as described by Napon Jatusripitak, reflects a return to old politics driven by the shared interests and common adversaries of the elites, particularly vis-à-vis the Move Forward Party (MFP) and the broader pro-democracy movements. Long-term stability is by no means guaranteed as this delicate balance will face tests. The electoral victory of the MFP—and the denial of its premiership position following Pheu Thai's decision to collaborate with the conservative establishment—underscored the ideological differences in the country over the role of the monarchy and the military. This structural tension in Thai politics will continue to simmer below the surface. These changes have occurred at a time when the economy is vulnerable because of external economic and geopolitical factors, which adds to the uncertainties facing the country going forward.

The year 2023 was arguably one of the most challenging for Filipinos, particularly as the country continued to struggle to recover from the impact of a global pandemic. This is the first full year of the administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who was elected president in a landslide victory in the May 2022 national elections. By the middle of 2023, an end to the pandemic was announced in the country through a presidential proclamation lifting the state of public health emergency resulting from Covid-19. It was expected, therefore, that the Philippines would bounce back from the gruelling effects of the pandemic on the economy. In 2022, a survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) reported that 45 per cent of the adult population of the country were optimistic that the quality of their lives would improve in the next twelve months, while 39 per cent believed there would be no change. A year later, the optimism remains at the same level of 46 per cent. This is despite the high prices of basic commodities—including rice—a soaring inflation rate, and more than two million Filipinos being unemployed.

In the political realm, observations of a crack within the ruling political alliance that enabled the electoral victory of President Marcos and Vice-President Sara Duterte, the daughter of the former president, became more pronounced. Talk of the disintegration of President Marcos and Vice-President Duterte's UniTeam alliance abounded as conflicts among personalities associated with both leaders began to emerge. This was accompanied by the emergence of controversial proposals such as the establishment of the Maharlika Investment Fund and the huge allocation of confidential funds for the use of the Office of the Vice-President and the Department of Education headed by the current vice-president.

Interestingly, the trust and approval ratings of the two highest officials of the country remained relatively high. Although there was a double-digit drop in the approval ratings of both leaders by the third quarter of 2023, such ratings still indicate a majority approval of their leadership. According to a Pulse Asia survey conducted in September 2023, the approval rating of Marcos dropped to 65 per cent from 80 per cent in June 2023, while Sara Duterte's approval rating moved downwards from 84 per cent to 73 per cent. The Pulse Asia survey was conducted from 10 to 14 September 2023, when deliberations for the 2024 budget were ongoing in the Philippine Congress and when rice price caps were imposed through the issuance of Executive Order No. 39.

In 2023, Thailand continued to grapple with the challenges posed by growing economic vulnerability and geopolitical uncertainty. These challenges have been amplified by a crisis of confidence in the country's political trajectory emanating from the outcomes of the 14 May general election. While the election marked a definitive end to General Prayut Chan-o-cha's military-dominated regime, it paradoxically resulted in the formation of a government that appears to diverge from the clear mandate expressed by Thai voters.

Although the Move Forward Party (MFP) emerged as the winner in the election, securing 151 seats in the 500-member House of Representatives, it was unable to form the government. The party's leader and prime ministerial candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat, was rejected twice in parliament despite having the support of an eight-party coalition that held a comfortable majority in the House. Their exclusion from power appeared to be sealed from the outset by a complex interplay between the institutional legacies of the May 2014 coup d’état—specifically, the existence of a military junta-appointed 250-member Senate with the power to jointly select the prime minister alongside the House—and a deal brokered behind the scenes between former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the conservative establishment.

On 22 August, coinciding with Thaksin's return to Thailand from a fifteen-year self-imposed exile, Srettha Thavisin of the Pheu Thai Party was elected as prime minister. He was supported by eleven parties, including the military-backed United Thai Nation Party (UTN) and Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), as well as senators aligned with Prayut. Just ten days later, Thaksin's sentences were reduced from eight years to one via a royal pardon. Although the exact relationship between Thaksin's return, his pardon and the government formation process remains elusive, the timing and significance of these events strongly hint at the emergence of an alliance between Thaksin and the conservative establishment. This alliance appears to have facilitated both Thaksin's return to Thailand and Pheu Thai's rise to power, on the understanding that the new Pheu Thai–led government would act as a safeguard for the conservative establishment, shielding it from the reformist demands of the MFP and broader pro-democracy movements. Ultimately, it required an extraordinary realignment among the Thai elite, the most significant since the coup that ousted Thaksin in 2006, to stifle the growing calls for change in Thai society.

As the year 2023 arrived, the mood in Brunei, as around the world, turned from one of doom and gloom to cautious optimism and hope. The reason for this was the steady downward trend in the number of Covid-19 cases and the eventual return to normalcy in February 2023. This air of cautious optimism and hope was reflected in Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah's New Year speech to the nation on 1 January, in which he called on all Bruneians to express their utmost gratitude to Allah for being able to successfully weather the storm of the Covid-19 pandemic. He also highlighted the silver lining behind the pandemic, which provided the country with the opportunity to build its resilience in sectors such as food security, education, finance and health. He expressed hope that this would in turn encourage Bruneians to work harder towards achieving the national agenda of economic diversification, especially in realizing Wawasan Brunei 2035 (Brunei Vision 2035).

Two major events in early 2023 that perhaps signalled the return to normalcy in Brunei were a royal wedding in January and the country's national day celebrations in February. It is often said that whatever happens in Brunei centres mainly on the royal family. As such, the year started with a gala royal wedding when Sultan Hassanal's fifth daughter from his second wife, Princess Azemah Ni’matul Bolkiah, married her first cousin, Prince Bahar, a son of the sultan's brother, Prince Jefri Bolkiah, on 25 January. The opulent and grand ceremony, held at the sultan's official residence, the Istana Darul Iman, was marked by much pomp and pageantry. Lasting a week, it was attended by foreign dignitaries, including members of Brunei's foreign diplomatic community.

The other event was Brunei's 39th National Day celebrations on 23 February. The theme for the event was “Menjayakan Wawasan Negara” (Achieving the National Vision), which emphasized that every Bruneian had a role in realizing the country's national vision. The theme for 2023 was the same as in 2022, which underscored the importance of Wawasan Brunei 2035. The event was marked by a massive parade and performances by seven thousand participants.

In mid-March 2024, the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), the nation's supreme political institution in the one-party state, convened an extraordinary plenum, during which it accepted President Vo Van Thuong's resignation and dismissed Hoang Thi Thuy Lan, the party secretary of Vinh Phuc province. Originally comprising 200 elected members, the committee saw the loss of 20 members just three years into its current term. For perspective, from 1986 to 2021, only 9 committee members lost their positions.

Vo Van Thuong and Hoang Thi Thuy Lan became the latest casualties of the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, known in Vietnam as the “Blazing Furnace”, initiated by VCP general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in 2013. Over a decade, this campaign has targeted nearly 200,000 party members, including almost 100 Central Committee-level officials who previously enjoyed immunity because of their positions. Since the 13th VCP Congress in 2021, the campaign has intensified. Within less than two years, two presidents—Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong—and two vice prime ministers—Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam—were compelled to resign as General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong declared the campaign to have “no no-go zones or exceptions”.

The persistence of the anti-corruption campaign post-2021 has taken many Vietnam observers by surprise. After all, the 13th Congress was seen as the “final victory” for Trong, who broke the VCP constitution to secure his third consecutive term without any objections. He spent the entirety of his twelfth term dismantling the remnants of support for his political rival, former prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, and he was instrumental in key personnel decisions within the VCP leadership. If the anti-corruption effort were merely a veil for power struggles among political elites, it should have decelerated post-2021, as Nguyen Phu Trong has already been the nation's most powerful politician for decades.

The acceleration of the “blazing furnace” suggests that other determinants have influenced the dynamics of anti-corruption in Vietnam.

Approaching from a political economy perspective, this chapter aims to examine the logic of Vietnam's ongoing anti-corruption campaign, its key determinants, and the consequences for different stakeholders in both the economic and political realms. It begins by exploring recent trends in the country's anti-corruption efforts, then delves into the economic and social consequences. Subsequently, a stakeholder analysis will identify the winners and losers of the “blazing furnace” in the country's “new normal”. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the future of the campaign, considering Nguyen Phu Trong's personal drive, and the necessary structural and institutional reforms required to address this deep-rooted systemic issue in Vietnam.

Fuelled by the scalding heat of Vietnam's “blazing furnace” (đốt lò) anti-corruption campaign, the year 2023 roared both in and out. In January, an investigation into bribery and overcharging for Covid-19 test kits and evacuation flights led to the dismissal of three prominent Vietnamese technocrats, including then president Nguyen Xuan Phuc. In December, an ongoing investigation into Truong My Lan—chairwoman of the Van Thinh Phat (VTP) group and one of Vietnam's highest-profile and richest tycoons—revealed a staggering graft scheme, estimated to encompass over US$44 billion and involving dozens of accomplices in the business sector, bureaucracy and government. The implications of the “blazing furnace”, however, are far greater than the counting of punished officials and vast sums of corruption money. The effort to root out corruption at the core of the Vietnamese regime is fundamentally altering the country's political economy. The changes that are unfolding have the potential to dramatically influence Vietnam's economic and political development trajectory in both positive and negative ways.

At the elite level, political analysts have observed that the Vietnamese leadership is more consolidated under the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), Nguyen Phu Trong, than at any time since the dawn of the Renovation (Đổi mới) era in 1986. A key feature of Vietnam's renovation-era polity has been the implicit division of powers between the country's top leaders (general secretary, prime minister, president and national assembly speaker). The distribution of authority among these “four pillars” enabled greater diversity of opinions in the collective leadership. This structure generated veto points that facilitated thoughtful deliberation and slowed policy change. It also incentivized the redistribution of resources from regions benefitting from globalization to the more disadvantaged ones.

The downstream effects of elite consolidation are also tangible, as the press, social media and civil society, especially environmental NGOs, have come under greater scrutiny and constraints, leading to what some analysts have called a “chilling effect” on public discourse. This effect was amplified on 15 November when Lưu Binh Nhuong, deputy head of the National Assembly Commission for Public Petitions, a high-profile commentator on public affairs, was arrested on confusing charges of embezzlement. At the bureaucratic level, fears about being targeted by the “blazing furnace” have slowed government procurement as both officials and businesses remain uncertain of the new rules of engagement. Numerous provinces were slow to spend public money on official projects, including the country's economic capital, Ho Chi Minh City, which had only spent twenty-three per cent of its planned budget by the year's midpoint.

The difficulties are likely to remain until new systems are put in place that give local officials confidence that procurement can take place in a lawful and transparent manner. In terms of foreign policy, the campaign provided an important backdrop in shaping the terms of Vietnam's major foreign policy achievements, including joining the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) and establishing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the United States.

After seizing state power on 1 February 2021, coup leader and commander-in-chief of the Myanmar military, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, assumed the position of chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime the next day. He made his first public statement only a week later, on 8 February 2021, stating that the SAC would not change the country's foreign and economic policies, and offering assurances that Myanmar's economy would remain open to foreign investment. This was echoed by the SAC's minister for investment, U Aung Naing Oo, who highlighted on 16 February that the SAC would prioritize economic recovery from the pandemic. These pronouncements were indicative of the SAC's aspiration to legitimize its seizure of power by presiding over an economic performance better than that achieved under the National League for Democracy (NLD) during its first term in office over 2016–21.

The statements by Min Aung Hlaing and Aung Naing Oo were elaborations on the commitment to “recover the businesses caused [sic] by [the] Covid-19 pandemic as quickly as possible” that formed part of the six-point statement announcing the military's reasons for the coup. Despite these stated commitments, Myanmar's economic performance has steadily declined, as have domestic and external trust in the SAC's capacity to achieve the recovery—and attendant stability—it had promised when taking over state power in 2021. Interestingly, the SAC adapted the NLD's Myanmar Economic Recovery and Reform Plan (MERRP) as its Covid-19 response. The MERRP had been developed by the NLD as an update to and an extension of the longer-term Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP), with a specific aim to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic had presented the NLD government with an opportunity to push through “radical” liberalization reforms with the MERRP, such as public finance reforms and liberalization of interest rates and the export sector. The SAC, however, dropped the “reform” element of the MERRP, and unveiled it instead as the Myanmar Economic Recovery Plan, or MERP, in August 2021.