INTRODUCTION

The Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) Growth Triangle was first proposed on 20 December 1989 as an agreement between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands to exploit their geographical proximity and resource complementarity as a combined region. The idea behind the Growth Triangle was that Singapore's strengths in higher value manufacturing, world class infrastructure, financial resources and strong relationships with multinational companies (MNCs) would profitably complement Johor's and Riau's endowments in cheaper and more abundant land and labour. The development of SIJORI was to be led primarily by the private sector, with governments facilitating the flow of goods, services, investment and people. On 17 December 1994, this subregion was renamed the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) and formalized with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding.

In the SIJORI agreement, Singapore's dominance in the triangular partnership has been obvious and outsized — it has been the principal investor and major destination of trade flows. As costs in Singapore rise, the benefits of the agreement have become more telling. Yet, political issues remain a bugbear in further advancing this cooperation. Hence, as we discuss the merits of the SIJORI agreement, the main questions that must be answered are: Can Singapore become a global city like London or New York without having the immediate hinterland that those cities have? Can the three countries put aside their political differences for mutually beneficial growth? Can the Riau Island-Johor side of the triangle develop?

Currently, the factor endowments in the three regions differ. Singapore's strengths include its highly skilled labour force, well-developed infrastructure, and security and stability. However, it lacks land and other natural resources and its focus has thus been on high-value manufacturing and services. On the other hand, Johor and the Riau Islands both have an abundance of land and labour. Production is much cheaper than in Singapore but these two regions lack technology and capital inputs. Therefore, there may be potential synergies that could be unlocked in the agreement that would result in the region becoming competitive, productive and vibrant enough to compete with China. The advantages that we envision are: the re-allocation of land and labour for higher-value uses; increased scale and diversity; leveraging off each region's competitive advantage; and the benefits of increased competition.

INTRODUCTION

Singapore's air-traffic has grown at an astounding rate: the number of passengers has quintupled since Changi Airport opened in 1981 and tonnes of airfreight movements have risen by a factor of ten. In great part, the increase of flows articulated by Changi has been central not only for the development of Singapore but also — as this chapter argues — to the growth of its related larger territory: the Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) Cross-Border Region (CBR). Through fieldwork conducted in Singapore, the State of Johor in Malaysia and the island of Batam in Indonesia, this chapter outlines an ongoing investigation into the impact and potential that “aeromobilities” have on processes of urbanization and regional integration within this wider region.

Specifically, the chapter explores the air-cargo networks articulated by Changi throughout this larger territory. It analyses the spatial manifestations and implications for cross-border regulatory regimes shown in two case studies: (1) the trade of taxfree “perishable” goods, such as fresh cut flowers and ornamental fish organized by local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) across SIJORI's rural hinterlands; and (2) the offshore production of “high-value” electronics by multinational corporations (MNCs) and their transhipment between Changi and the industrial free-trade zones of the SIJORI region. In doing so the research uncovers how, in playing both active and reactionary roles in urban development beyond Singapore's national borders, Changi Airport has enabled companies to expand their commercial activities across the SIJORI Cross-Border Region.

Finally the chapter investigates the development of “low-cost” hybrid trans-border air-and-bus and air-and-ferries combinations put in place by SIJORI's secondary airports — namely Hang Nadim in Batam and Senai in Johor. While Changi remains the international hub, overshadowing by its capacity and connections the smaller airports on the fringe, these are starting to develop inventive solutions to compete with Changi. In doing so, the chapter argues that coming changes in Singapore's airspace control, coupled with the rapid development of aviation in the region, calls for Changi's hub to expand its catchment area even further across national borders by collaborating with these smaller regional airports.

In conclusion, the paper posits that Changi Airport, along with its related transport links, is a critical lens for re-examining and broadening Singapore's cross-border perspective and questioning how this larger territory is being redesigned to facilitate the production as well as global circulation of goods and passengers.

INTRODUCTION

The state of Johor is in transition. On the political front, one of the striking trends of Malaysia's 2013 General Elections was that over 81 per cent of the Chinese vote went to the opposition. This loss of Chinese votes was quickly dubbed the “Chinese tsunami” by the ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN). This label proved erroneous because the BN actually received a lower share of the vote from Malay and Indian voters as well (Izwan 2013). According to studies elsewhere, the Chinese vote in the state of Johor dipped from 52.7 per cent in 2008 for the BN to 21.3 per cent in 2013 while the Malay vote for the BN in the state saw a slight increase from 81.1 per cent in 2008 to 81.9 per cent in 2013 (Merdeka Center 2013). Among the host of electoral issues were rising property prices (Hong 2012), corruption and transparency in government (Low and Green 2013), as well as a clean-up of the electoral roll (Merdeka Center 2012). Meanwhile the BN's loss of support from urban voters was attributed to the three “Cs”, namely, “corruption, cost of living, and crime” (Jayasankaran 2013).

Johor also has economic aspirations. Iskandar Malaysia was established on 30 July 2006 as an economic development zone in the state with longer term plans for it to be a hub for finance and business, medicine and education, as well as a site for luxury private housing, and electronic and industrial facilities. In total, Iskandar Malaysia covers an area of over 2,000 square kilometres. Some eight years after its establishment, Iskandar Malaysia has attracted a total of S$51 billion in investments (Channel NewsAsia 2014). According to official Malaysian statistics, Singapore is by far the lead investor to date with RM9.1 billion, followed by Spain at RM4.1 billion, and in third place Japan at RM3.7 billion. It has, however, not always been smooth sailing. The Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA) has admitted that it needs to win over the “hearts and minds” of Johor residents, as well as “be more attuned to the needs of local residents” and to “counter the perception that Iskandar Malaysia only served the interests of foreign investors” (New Straits Times 2009). More recently, IRDA has had to refute claims that the inflow of foreign investments into Iskandar Malaysia has “marginalized Malays in Johor” (Teo 2013).

INTRODUCTION

A closer Johor-Singapore economic integration via the Iskandar Malaysia (IM) project has been of high concern to policymakers on both sides of the Causeway. The economic ties between Johor and Singapore date back to the Sultanate of Johor and the colonial era when the former was a key hinterland region with its Singapore-controlled pepper, gambier, rubber and then oil palm plantations (Luraschi and Wruck 2013). Singapore was, along with Johor, part of a group of entities colonized by the British in the Malayan Peninsula. In 1946, while still under colonial rule, Singapore and Malaya — which included Johor — were separated. They were briefly united in the independent Malaysian Federation from 1963 to 1965. In 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia, thus ending its directly shared history with Johor. An international border plus a twenty-year frosty relationship of the Mahathir-Lee Kuan Yew core period slowed cross-border supply-chain developments and other investments between the two countries. However, during Malaysia's industrialization phase in the 1970s, Singaporean FDI was an important source of funds, with Johor hosting a series of infrastructure works and industrial clusters (Yeung 1998). Thus, economic linkages between Johor and Singapore continued but until recently, there has been a lack of high-key, big transboundary investments by large Malaysia and Singapore private sector companies, including their market-dominating government-linked corporations.

Up until the recent 2007–08 Global Financial Crisis, Malaysia implemented somewhat competitive policies in relation to Singapore. In Johor, projects aiming to steal traffic from Singapore's port include: Tanjung Pelepas, competing over container terminals with the Port of Singapore Authority; and long-hoped-for competition over oil storage and petrochemicals. This includes the on-hold Asian Petroleum Hub which is now on firmer footing via the new Petronas Refinery and Petrochemical Integrated Development (RAPID) project inclusive of the Dialog oil storage terminals and deep-water berthing in Pengerang at the southeastern tip of Johor. However, after nearly twenty years of stop-start projects, punctuated by two major financial crises, the latest Johor policies take on a new cooperative stance with Singapore. This seems to be taking root, engendering confidence among private sector investors from the two countries and beyond. The Iskandar economic corridor story has caught their attention, and the region is abuzz with big property projects and investments in the healthcare, education and tourism sectors.

This collection is the first in a book series emanating from a broad research venture titled “Floating Frontiers”, supported by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute Director Tan Chin Tiong in 2012.

The attitude this project adopts is to consider Southeast Asia as a maritime phenomenon in the crucial period when regionalism has become a necessary strategy used by governments in the region to counteract and negotiate strong global forces bearing upon them. Applying a cross-border and generally sub-national approach allows our researchers to gather facts that are not immediately shaped by national borders and budgets, and to analyse their findings in ways that do not deny the sub-regional and extra-national nature of present-day economics and culture.

Three areas for research were identified by ISEAS in 2012. All of them involve parts of Indonesia and Malaysia, while Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines are respectively included in each of these sub-projects. The first — and the handsome book you hold in your hand is the product of this focus — is on Singapore-Johor- Riau. This so-called SIJORI Cross-Border Region studies interactions between Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor, and the new Indonesian Province of the Riau Islands. Second is the Sulu/Celebes Seas region where the coastlines of Sabah, the Southern Philippines and Sulawesi are the object of study and analysis. Third is the Andaman Sea and its coastlines. Other studies of maritime Southeast Asia are being planned.

We proudly present this first volume for your reading pleasure. Much dedicated work was put into it by all involved, especially the editors, Francis Hutchinson and Terence Chong, and important trends and patterns are captured here within, in text and in maps.

Since the 1980s, a key segment in Singapore's economic development strategy has been to promote the relocation of land- and labour-intensive activities to offshore locations. The two nearby territories of Johor and the Riau Islands have been the recipients of much of this investment. But that is only a small part of the story.

Facilitated by common cultural references, a distant shared history, and intricate cross-border business networks, the interactions between the three have multiplied and grown deeper. On the economic front, localized production chains link firms based in Singapore with these neighbouring territories and people move across the borders frequently to consume or provide goods and services.

INTRODUCTION

According to Cooke (2001, p. 953), Cross-Border Regions (CBRs) are economic-cumpolitical units that may exhibit cultural or historical similarities. They span across various political jurisdictions, such as the nation-state, and federal or local levels of government. This chapter focuses on the Singapore Malay nuclear family as an entity that operates within one particular CBR: that linking Singapore to the neighbouring southern Malaysian state of Johor, which has ties to other parts of Malaysia. It is argued that in the era of transnational flows, citizenship and the accompanying national identities are not always as state leaders envision them to be, especially within CBRs. The stretching of the nuclear family across borders can position the family as a serious competitor to nation-states over the matters of first, citizenship, and second, national identity, exemplifying the idea that state borders are social constructs (van Houtum 2000, p. 67) that can be challenged and transcended.

This chapter offers two case studies of Malay families straddling borders. In the first, members of the family business illustrate that Singapore citizenship is not necessarily a stable political identity. These Singaporeans veer between retaining their Singapore citizenship and adopting a new citizenship status, that is, a Malaysian one. Thus, where the Singapore Malay family acts as a corporate entity, family members can exercise what anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1999, p. 112) calls “flexible citizenship” — professionals choosing from among different nation-state sites for working and anchoring family based on economic and political advantages that can be gained. These Malays mirror similar processes involving other ethnic groups (see Ong 1999 for an exposition on overseas Chinese) and in other cross-border zones, such as that linking Dubai and neighbouring states (see Kanna 2010). Amongst the Malays considered here, possibilities for such veering arise primarily because of a genealogically anchored shared Malayness spanning Singapore and Johor, discussed below.

A clarification of key concepts employed in this chapter is useful here. “Nationstate” refers to the convergence of the political unit of “state” — a form of organizing political power (Poggi 2006, p. 607) characterized by the presence of physical territory, sources of revenue and bureaucracies (Weber [1921] 1958) — with the cohesive cultural unit of the nation that carries shared identities.

In September 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the building of the New Silk Road Economic Belt during his visit to Kazakhstan, and in the same year in Indonesia, he proposed the building of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road — now they are collectively called One Belt One Road (OBOR for short). After further discussion and planning, Chinese domestic bodies of various levels gradually reached consensus on this initiative. At the Boao Forum on 28 March 2015, China released the “Vision and Action on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (Vision and Actions for short) which was jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce with State Council authorization, indicating that the OBOR initiative has officially become one of China's national strategies.

OBOR has evoked widespread discussion within China as well as a range of interpretations internationally. Some observers view it as a grand strategy for extending China's economic and geopolitical influence into Eurasia and beyond, while others are concerned that OBOR might reshape global economic governance and lead to the rebirth of a China-dominant Asia.

Details are still scarce, however, and a concrete top-level design is still lacking. This has led scholars and the mass media to inject more information than can be found in officially published sources. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of the issues from the point of view of scholars in China.

OBOR AS A CONCEPT, A NATIONAL STRATEGY

OBOR as communicated by the Chinese government aims to increase connectivity between the Asian, European and African continents. The intention is to enhance trade flows and spur long-term economic growth and development, benefiting all countries involved.

Be that as it may, OBOR is very much a national strategy for China, and is expected to be a critical driver for the country's long-term ambitions and a key pillar of its “going out” strategy. This overarching strategy is reflected in Vision and Actions, which sets out a vision in which China-led infrastructure construction, reduced tariffs, and simplified customs administration would allow trade to flow seamlessly between China and countries along OBOR by both rail and ship.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY