Appendix 2 List of Dongzong's Members

Although the Japanese surrender in Malaya came into effect on 19 August, it was not until 4 September that the main Allied landings were made in Singapore. On 9 September, Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, South East Asian Command (SEAC), accepted the final surrender of 70,000 Japanese troops. The Japanese used the intervening period to burn archives, to murder witnesses to their atrocities, and to falsify documents.

THE MPAJA AND SINO–MALAY RACIAL CLASHES

In Chapter 10 we noted that Japanese policies on ethnicity served to solidify incipient “racial” identities and exacerbated Sino-Malay rivalry and distrust. Japanese propaganda had highlighted Chinese “exploitation” of impoverished Malays and Japanese championship of Malay interests. Post-war violence was to deepen and indeed entrench inter-ethnic cleavage.

The unexpected swiftness of the Japanese capitulation left an interregnum of several weeks — months in some districts — in which there was a complete absence of government control. In many areas law and order collapsed, and diverse groups throughout the country took matters into their own hands. Mobs exacted revenge against those who had collaborated, or were rumoured to have collaborated, with the Japanese, and there was a spate of lynching, murder, torture and other acts of violence.

Under the agreement signed at Blantan in December 1943, the MPAJA had allied with the British and agreed to accept SEAC direction. With the Japanese surrender, the MPAJA, hailed as heroes among the squatter population (and generally admired by many urban Chinese as well), and numbering between 5,000 and 7,000 armed members, now emerged from the jungle and signalled their intention of maintaining order within Malaya until the arrival of British and Allied forces. Ultimately approximately seventy per cent of small towns and villages throughout Malaya came under MPAJA control.

The MPAJA instigated a regime of savage and arbitrary reprisals against known as well as putative collaborators. Many of those dealt with by MPAJA tribunals were arraigned as a result of unfounded and trumpedup charges (often provoked by the personal grievances of informers and agents), and were convicted on the basis of uncorroborated and even contrived evidence. Most of the accused were Malays, who, as noted in Chapter 10, had been actively recruited by the Japanese.

The central puzzle in the study of Japanese foreign policy has been why Japan has continued to play a passive role in international affairs, despite its impressive economic and political power. Challenging this central puzzle, the core argument of this study is to present an alternative path for the study of Japanese foreign policy. In fact, in recent years Japanese foreign policy has become less dependent on the United States, more strategic towards Asia, and more energetic towards international and regional institutions. One of the main features is multilateralism in Japanese foreign policy, as shown by Japan's active participation in the regional institutions. In pursuing multilateralism, Japan cooperated closely with the only durable regional body in Southeast Asia, to wit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Given the fact that East Asian regionalism has been driven by ASEAN, it is of utmost urgency to investigate the emerging partnership between Japan and ASEAN. My central thesis in this study is thus to put Japan's ASEAN policy into a proper perspective by asserting that Japan's new policy initiatives towards ASEAN are not reactive, nor are they exceptions in a broader framework of merely reactive foreign policy.

In writing this book, I have fortunately received enormous support and assistance from individuals and institutions. To begin with, I have received financial support from two institutions to carry out my book project. They are a three-year research subsidy by the Japanese government and Pache Research Subsidy of Nanzan University. Without these sources of financial assistance, it would not have been possible to undertake extensive field research in Japan and Southeast Asia. In undertaking my field research, I am especially indebted to the following institutions. In Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Asian Studies gave me a special opportunity to conduct my field research based in Bangkok. For this, I am grateful to Dr Khien Theeravit and Ms Saikew Thipakorn. In Singapore, I am indebted to the staff of the ASEAN Studies Centre for their time and assistance: Mr Rodolfo Severino, Dr Termsak Chalermpalanupap, and Ms Moe Thuzar. Also at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, I owe a great deal of thanks to the following staff who were kind enough to answer my questions: Alexander Lim, Bala Palaniappan, and Kris Sandhi Soekartawi.

Our journey that has taken us to Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is coming to an end. As is usually the case, the journey has had its ups and downs, with some pleasant surprises in coming to an understanding of the reality of Japan-ASEAN relations. The most profound change in post-war Japan's regional policy we have witnessed, is the fact that due to its proactive multilateralism, Japan could outgrow its low-profile posture or reactivity necessitated by the legacy of Japanese colonialism. Given the inherent limitation of Japanese foreign policy, Japan's ASEAN policy has traversed much further than expected. It is now safe to conclude that with the exception of China and South Korea, Japan has come to be accepted as a trustworthy and constructive partner in East Asia today.

In fact, ever since the Fukuda Doctrine laid the foundations in 1977, Japan's ASEAN policy has shown distinct features at critical junctures of Japan-ASEAN relations. The Takeshita Doctrine in 1987 consolidated the relationship during the late 1980s and mid-1990s and the Hashimoto Doctrine in 1997 began to expand the relations beyond Southeast Asia. Finally, the new Fukuda Doctrine in 2008 has attempted to nurture a new regionalism in East Asia, while at the same time retaining the essence of the Japan-ASEAN partnership. How has this unique relationship come about? Why has this relationship been sustained and developed? And most of all, whither the Japan-ASEAN partnership? By way of summary, first of all, let us put Japan's ASEAN policy into proper perspective.

JAPAN's ASEAN POLICY AS AN ALTERNATIVE STREAM

As discussed at the outset of this study, Japanese foreign policy contains three major streams (see Figure 7.1). The mainstream, premised on dependence on the United States and the pursuit of economic diplomacy, has proven effective as shown by the very fact that a defeated Japan became an economic great power in the middle of the 1960s. Even after the Cold War, Japan's alliance with the United States continues to constitute a cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy, although around the turn of the century the quest for grand strategy has become a post–Yoshida Doctrine national agenda.

The second is the alternative stream, which emerged when anti- Yoshida group leader Nobusuke Kishi attempted to implement his autonomous foreign policy, particularly exemplified by his proposal for the Southeast Asian Development Fund in 1957.

Until the period immediately preceding the Japanese invasion of December 1941, the Indian population of Malaya showed no real awareness of a common identity; the cleavages of class, caste and ethnicity militated against the development of any expressive communal solidarity. The greatest of these divisions was class. By 1939 there were approximately 700,000 Indians resident in Malaya comprising fifteen per cent of the total population. Of these, only four per cent were occupied in trade, business, or the professions, while approximately ten per cent were employed in skilled and semi-skilled occupations. The remainder were absorbed in unskilled or menial work.

The large working class existed in a continuous state of abject poverty. As we have seen, plantation employers viewed the Indian labourer as a simple being, who had been conditioned by his experiences in India to a desperately low standard of living. By emigrating to Malaya, he had supposedly been rescued from a life of semi-starvation and chronic indigence, and introduced to an environment where his minimal wants and basic needs were more than adequately met by the low wages the industry was prepared to pay.

The contempt felt by European administrators and planters for Indian labourers was echoed by the Indian professional and middle classes. In general, members of these classes spared no attempt to distance themselves from the Indian workforce, and to demonstrate to other Malayan communities their inherent difference from the “illiterate” Indian labouring classes. In asserting their putative superiority, middle-class Indians were just as prepared as Europeans to categorize all Indian labourers with the pejorative label “coolie”; lowly beings unworthy of consideration. These strata of Indian society could not be expected to understand, let alone empathize with the problems faced by Indian labour.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, on plantations and in urban workplaces, workers were directly managed by administrative and field staff consisting mainly of Malayalees and Jaffna Tamils. “Coolie” labour and administrators were thus unable to forge bonds based on common identity, and indeed relations were often riven by mutual distrust and suspicion.

The debasement of “coolie” labour, by both the European community and their own middle class and professional compatriots, effectively isolated the Indian labouring classes and emphasized their social and political impotence.

In the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, Southeast Asian international relations were preoccupied by the Cambodian conflict and the restructuring of regional order in the post–Cold War period. Having successfully resolved the much-prolonged Cambodian conflict in 1991, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged as a united actor to be reckoned with. Encouraged by its diplomatic success, ASEAN seized the moment to play a leading role in activating closer regional interaction, as exemplified by the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and other supportive organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Council for Security in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

Against this background, Japan also responded positively to stability in Southeast Asia. As with Fukuda's overtures, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita attended the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila and never failed to recognize the importance of ASEAN as a partner. Seizing the opportunity to officially proclaim another doctrine in 1987, Japan's ASEAN policy entered a new phase. In particular, the dawn of the post–Cold War period necessitated new initiatives from Japan. Japan's political role was required to resolve the Cambodian conflict and to offer reconstruction assistance. Japan's economic role was also needed to boost the ASEAN economies in the wake of the conflict. It was also important for Japan to further strengthen mutual understanding by promoting cultural exchanges. Following the effects of the Fukuda Doctrine, this chapter observes closely how Japan reinforced political, economic and cultural relations with ASEAN in the post–Cold War period.

ASEAN IN 1987: 20TH ANNIVERSARY

When ASEAN's third decade began on 8 August 1987, much attention was given to how ASEAN could kick off a new decade. There was a sense of déjà vu as ASEAN needed to reiterate the way it started ten years ago. The year 1987 was significant in that ASEAN deliberated on two critical issues, namely, the need to enhance tangible forms of intra-ASEAN cooperation and the need to reassess the ASEAN dialogue-partner relationships. Enhancing intra-ASEAN cooperation needed greater economic cooperation and was where ASEAN was at its weakest. The ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), for instance, included a list of more than 18,000 items, but this had not made much impact because ASEAN members continued to limit its scope with substantial exclusion limits.

The end of the Cold War renewed interest in regional approaches to development and security. Apart from the obvious case of Europe with its economically integrated European Union, East Asia appears to be one of the most dynamic regions among developing countries. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a particular leading role in initiating closer regional interaction, as exemplified by the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT). It is thus quite remarkable that these multilateral efforts are being carried out by ASEAN, whose very survival had initially seemed questionable. Even after the unprecedented financial crisis that occurred in Thailand in July 1997 and soon engulfed Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN's regional role has been strengthened by the institutionalization of the EAS in 2005.

Beginning in 1997, Japan has also shown some notable initiatives in its foreign policy. It is notable because for the first time Japan has identified itself as part of East Asia. In particular, it was unprecedented that the Japanese government proposed the formation of an East Asian version of the International Monetary Fund in order to deal with the contagious financial crisis, despite American objections. To follow up, Japan offered the so-called Miyazawa plan and initiated the Japan-ASEAN Summit meeting, which led to the formation of a regularized APT forum. The high point was the adoption of the ASEAN community and the commemorative Tokyo summit in 2003.

When a populist premier instituted his domestic and foreign policy, Japan's East Asian policy was turned around, thus adversely affecting Japan-ASEAN relations. In particular, worsening Japan-China relations caused mainly by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, could serve as a testing ground for closer Japan- ASEAN relations in the twenty-first century. While closely following the footsteps of the Takeshita Doctrine, this chapter focuses on how Japan managed to cope with the transitional period of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

ASEAN AT THIRTY

The year 1997 was critically important for ASEAN as it celebrated its thirtieth anniversary and convened a historical meeting with China, Japan and South Korea, later known as the APT.

INTRODUCTION

This study has identified two institutions, namely, structural and relational institutions, that have been crucial to the mobilization capacity and persistency of the Chinese education movement in Malaysia. As democratic institutions within non-liberal democracies are often constrained and easily manipulated by the ruling regime, social movements in these states rely instead on relational institutions to channel their needs and demands for change. The flexibility of relational institutions based on informal interpersonal networks compliment the rigidity of their structured counterparts, thus enabling social movements in non-liberal democracies to persist in pushing its agenda despite facing ongoing constraints imposed by the state.

Dynamic state-movement interactions result in movement mobilization mechanisms and repertoires that are adapted to the local political environment, indigenous norms and cultural influences. Although these mechanisms and repertoires may differ from those practised in liberal democratic societies, they have proven to be enduring in sustaining movements in suppressive states. Using the Chinese education movement in Malaysia as a case study, this study has demonstrated that despite rapid industralization and urbanization, primordial-based social movements — of which the Chinese education movement is a type — remain a significant social force in Malaysia.

This concluding chapter is divided into three sections. It first summarizes each of the previous chapters and details their significance to the main argument of the study. The second section explores three significant trends on social mobilization identified from studying the Chinese education movement: (1) the strategies and sustainence of resource mobilization efforts of the Chinese education movement activists; (2) the role of brokers and interpersonal networks in sustaining movement-regime interactions within a non-liberal democratic setting; and (3) the challenges faced by the movement in sustaining unification.

In the final section, the role of institutions, in particular the non-formal relational institutions, is evaluated in terms of the institutions’ impact on the endurance of social mobilization within a suppressive regime. This section emphasizes the importance of adapting movement repertoires and mobilization mechanisms, especially those that have evolved through interactions with the regime over the years, as the key drivers of the movement. As one of the oldest nationwide social movements in Asia, the Chinese education movement is an instructive example from which important lessons may be drawn and shared with activists of similar movements within non-liberal democratic settings.

British rule in Malaya inaugurated a period of rapid economic and political change. The colonial authorities set about the process of providing the physical structure and administrative apparatus necessary to support a colonial economy and to encourage commercial enterprise. Both government and commercial sectors required the support of a trained English-speaking workforce which possessed a range of specialist skills and expertise. This was not immediately available in Malaya, among either the indigenous Malays or the immigrant labouring communities, and thus had to be imported from abroad. India was a fertile recruiting ground for the required skilled manpower. The expansion of the Malayan economy also attracted other groups — merchants, financiers, and skilled labour — which saw personal and professional advantages in working in colonial Malaya. By 1927 the Agent of the Government of India could report that Indians “other than labourers” resident in Malaya included the following diverse groups: professional and clerical classes of “Madrassi” Tamils and Malayalees; Sikhs and North Indian “Muhammadans” who had, in the main, been recruited to serve in the military and police; Chettiar merchants; South Indian “Muhammadans” who were largely engaged in small to medium business enterprises; and an entrepreneurial/business class from the Bombay Presidency which established an array of medium to large merchant houses. The Agent did not list Ceylonese Tamils who were at that point not officially recognized as Indians by the colonial authorities.

CHITTY MELAKA

We noted in Chapter 1 that Indian Hindu and Muslim merchants had a lengthy history of trade and cultural interaction with Malayan polities and that they comprised established communities within the cosmopolitan Melaka Sultanate. In 1510, on the eve of the Portuguese conquest of Melaka, there were an estimated 1,000 Gujaratis and approximately 3,000 other Indians (mainly Tamils, Bengalis, Parsis, and Malayalees) resident in the city. The Indian communities lived in enclaves known as vira pattanas and collectively comprised a prosperous and respected mercantile class. The Portuguese administrator, Tome Pires, observed that the South Indian Hindu merchants, known as klings, were active as traders and controlled the bulk of commerce conducted between Melaka and South India.

Hindu communities based in Melaka intermarried with local communities, including Malays, Batak, Javanese, as well as Nonya (acculturated) Chinese.

The end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 brought about many changes in the international relations of Southeast Asia: rapidly declining American commitments, a growing Soviet influence, and the polarization of Indochina and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that was induced by the antagonism between communist countries. It is thus no wonder that Soviet-supported Vietnam invaded and ousted the pro-China Pol Pot regime in Cambodia in December 1978. During the height of a new Cold War, it was ASEAN that seized the opportunity to become a viable regional body by resolving the most critical regional conflict. As a matter of fact, ASEAN has come to develop its political base while pursuing economic cooperation policies with the assistance from outside powers.

Many studies have been undertaken to account for these changes, yet the growing Japanese role in the region has not generated any substantial analysis.One of the reasons for the limited scrutiny of Japan's Southeast Asian policy is the view that Tokyo has never changed its traditional economic policy and that its reactions to the changing regional environment are being induced by external pressures. Also, the consistency of Japan's low-profile economic diplomacy has led many scholars to believe that Japan, without adequate military power, does not stand a chance of playing a significant role in Southeast Asia.

This chapter looks closely at new developments in Japanese foreign policy from a different perspective, focusing on how Japanese policymakers came to define Japan's new role in a turbulent region, while pursuing multilateral policies towards ASEAN instead of traditional bilateral economic policies. Japan's new role can be seen in the process of forging the very first foreign policy doctrine in 1977. In fact, designating ASEAN as a pillar of Japanese foreign policy, Japan went through a significant experiment in playing a proactive political role in Southeast Asia between 1977 and 1986.

ASEAN IN 1977: 10TH ANNIVERSARY AND JAPAN

The year 1977 could be regarded as a turning point in ASEAN regionalism for two reasons. The first is the fact that ASEAN held another summit in a row. The second is that ASEAN incorporated dialogue partners into the framework of the regional cooperation scheme.

Appendix 3 List of Independent Chinese Secondary Schools in Malaysia