Economics and maritime power constitute the core of a state's role and stake in the current global order driven by globalization. The emergence of maritime power as the vanguard of globalization has reinforced the criticality of maritime infrastructure to countries that are increasingly reliant on the medium of sea for economic interdependence, growth and prosperity. Significantly, maritime power is the keel of economic globalization as it facilitates economic growth and investments in the maritime domain.

The economic dimension of maritime power pivots on the state's ability to sustain a vast merchant marine built around civilian shipping assets, port infrastructure to transact large volume of trade, ability to build ships to conduct maritime trade and the availability of a quality human resource that shapes and conducts maritime business. Economics and maritime power also provide for technology development and inflow of investments since these are primary determinants that ensure a sustained and continuous growth of maritime commerce. In its economic topography, maritime power has interlinked the littoral and the hinterland through various ports and industrial centres such as the Special Economic Zones. The transportation network built around roads, rail and inland waterways facilitate long-haul bulk and containerized cargo traffic thus creating a seamless supply chain connecting the hinterland to the littoral.

Economics and maritime power is also built on the maritime-technological-industrial capacity that pivots on technological sophistication, infrastructure based on information technology, and modern systems and processes for conduct of maritime commerce. In the contemporary global maritime-based trading, these capabilities gain greater credence, particularly when the system is built around “just in time” cargo that provides for sustained manufacturing of goods. Information technology is vital to the efficient functioning of maritime enterprises and its operations depend heavily on the integrity of information infrastructure in a highly competitive globalized trading system.

Economics and maritime power deal with marine resources, both living and non-living, that abound in the EEZ of the state. The marine domain is a very important source of food security to the state and needs to be guarded against exploitation by other states that tend to overfish and encroach into others’ EEZ. Preservation of the marine resources is also critical for the continued replenishment of the fishing economy of the state that constitutes a substantial slice of resources. Similarly, hydrocarbon constitutes a critical marine resource for the state's economic power.

Diplomacy is fundamental to states and critical for the conduct of international relations. It is exercised to further national interests, consolidate existing relationships, or to avert a crisis/conflict and can be invoked at any time across the spectrum of cordial-adverse relationship. There is a symbiotic relationship between the state and its navy since both operate in a partnership for furtherance of national interests. States have integrated diplomacy with their navies and have found this instrument of military power a useful means to exhibit goodwill, provide humanitarian assistance, showcase technological prowess, build alliances, and for the demonstration of coercive power. In that context, navies plan and train for the entire spectrum of diplomatic activities from coercion, presence, friendship missions and disaster relief operations.

Historically, seas and oceans have facilitated movement of people, cultures, ideas, religion, and trade resulting in growth of maritime enterprise. States have also transported state power, both coercive and benign, beyond national shores through the medium of the sea. Naval diplomacy has been in vogue and practice since ancient times and was exercised by the Greeks and Romans in the Mediterranean and Cholas in India, Srivijaya in Southeast Asia and by several dynasties in China in furtherance of national interests, be it to appease powerful kingdoms, enhance trade, safeguard sea lanes, and also in its coercive format of “gunboat” diplomacy. For instance, the Chola king Rajendra Choladeva I dispatched a powerful naval fleet to Southeast Asia targeted against Srivijaya kings ostensibly to protect own trade and maritime interests. As part of diplomacy, the Srivijaya kings had sent embassies to India and China with precious gifts for the rulers and also built Buddhist vihara (temples) in these kingdoms as goodwill gestures and also to seek protection against attack by powerful neighbours. In China, the Ming rulers dispatched naval fleets to establish trade links and in its coercive construct established influence in some countries in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean. In the 21st century navies continue to be the vanguard of various political roles and missions that militaries perform during peacetime.

The political milieu of maritime power serves the state in several noteworthy dimensions. The navies possess a unique profile of being instruments that are most suitable for projecting power and influence in special dimensions over distant lands.

There is a strong belief among Asian nations that it was the neglect of ocean frontier security that led to their domination by colonial powers during the 15th to the 19th centuries. For China, its preoccupation with internal wars led to the neglect of the littorals that came to be dominated by the imperialist powers and was the springboard to the domination of the hinterland. Similarly, for India, the littoral dominance by the European powers, first by the Portuguese and then by the British and French resulted in their ascendancy of the Indian heartland. Significantly, for both China and India the colonial-imperial supremacy came from the sea, to the littorals and into the heartland. The foremost strategic objective of China and India therefore is to build autonomous maritime military capability to preclude intrusive dominance of the littorals by any external power.

Soon after independence, China and India were engaged in wars across their land frontiers and military developments were shaped by the strong continental mindset among the ruling elite. It was in this context that the trajectory of the military structures and organization of the two powers was largely built around the army. Naturally the army was the vanguard of the national security structure and entrusted the important role of guarding national frontiers and providing external security. Operationally, the navy and the air force of the two countries were subsumed within the primary role of the army and were adjunct to the land forces. In the Chinese context, its navy was addressed as People's Liberation Army Navy, i.e. PLA Navy and in India it came to be termed as “Cinderella” service. In terms of strategic priorities in decision-making, resource allocation and the formulation of security strategy, the army dominated the national security structure.

However, weakness at sea soon came to haunt the two Asian powers; for China the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–55 and 1958 witnessed U.S. intervention in support of its ally Taiwan. Significantly, both crises witnessed U.S. aircraft carrier task force deployed in the area and precluded any attempt by the PLA to undertake amphibious landing on Quemoy.

This book attempts to give an account of how Chinese schools in Peninsular Malaysia struggled to survive and develop between 1786 and 2003, a period spanning more than two hundred years. The overriding consideration is to see how the various governments of the country over these years posed challenges to them and how they responded to these challenges.

In the years before the Pacific War, the British colonial government left the Chinese schools alone. However, when they caused harm to the country's economy by their political activities, the colonial government adopted legislation to control them.

During the years of the Pacific War, when the Japanese who ruled the country closed all the Chinese schools, they had no means of responding.

After the Pacific War, the British were back in the country. Because of the China orientation of the Chinese schools, they sought to transform them into English schools between 1945 and 1955. The Chinese schools responded by reorientating themselves to Malaya and escaped transformation.

From 1955, the country came under the rule — at first partially, but then fully from 1957 — of a Malay government. The new government sought to achieve their “ultimate objective” in education, which was to have all schools use the Malay language as their main medium of instruction. From then until now, this was the challenge posed to Chinese schools, which put in their best effort to meet this challenge.

Our story is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 covers the years from 1786 to 1941, from the first arrival of the British in Malaya to when the British lost it to the Japanese in the Pacific War. The focus of this chapter will be on the founding of modern Chinese schools in Malaya in the twentieth century. Like those in China, these schools were instruments for the modernization of China. As such, they were highly politicized. Soon their political activities became injurious to the economy of the country. As a consequence, the British colonial government adopted legislation to curb their activities. The challenge of the British action, however, did not affect their growth.

After the general election and the racial riots of 1969, with Abdul Razak replacing Tunku Abdul Rahman as the leader of the nation, things took a radical turn in the country as observed. The Malays found Tunku Abdul Rahman to be too compromising with the Chinese, and his successor adopted a more pro-Malay attitude than him. Yet, at the same time, Abdul Razak did not seek to squeeze out the non-Malay communities altogether. In fact, he sought and worked out a better understanding with them.

On the pro-Malay side, Abdul Razak took measures to ensure the political dominance of the Malays in the country could and would not be challenged again. He had a national ideology, called the “Rukun Negara” or “Articles of Faith of the State”, promulgated which defined the political orientation of the country for years to come. Next he made parliament, when it was reconvened, to pass legislation to bar all sensitive issues, that is, issues pertaining mainly to the special position of the Malays, from public discussion. He also initiated a New Economic Policy which sought to improve the economic lot of the Malays vis-à-vis the other communities radically.

As for forging a more workable modus vivendi especially with the non- Malay races, he enlarged the Alliance Party into a Barisan Nasional to include some of the opposition parties, which eroded the voter support of the MCA in the general election. He also extended a friendly hand to the PAS, which ate into the base of UMNO itself.

In line with the grim determination to put beyond the pale any questioning of the political dominance and intensified efforts to better the economic position of the Malays, an even more decisive thrust was made in the education field to realize the ultimate objective of a one-medium schooling. On this occasion, English-medium schools were to bear the brunt of the offensive.

Since ancient times, states have depended on sea-based commerce for growth and affluence. Seafarers travelled distant lands in search of raw material, critical resources, luxury goods and markets for their products and these activities resulted in several trading systems that emerged in the Mediterranean of Greece and Rome; Egypt, Persia in Southwest Asia; India, Southeast Asia and China in the Asian littoral. The maritime trading systems featured intense competitive rivalries as contending states outdid one another, and at times states contested to limit and control trade as a means of containing the rising power with the consequences of trade-related wars. The struggle for the maritime commercial power induced several maritime developments that featured the build-up of navies to protect trade as well as to fight piracy.

Sea-based commerce necessitated the development of naval and civilian maritime shipping. It resulted in the technological innovation of vessels for commerce and warfare. Naval supremacy assured the tranquillity of the seas and the securing of uncharted waters as well as guaranteed access to ports, thus sustaining the economy. At another level, human resources deployed at sea were dichotomous for naval and civilian maritime roles. States enacted land battles at sea and also embarked armies on board ships as marines to fight naval battles to achieve maritime dominance and supremacy. Naval power was the critical offshore leveraging power that shaped and influenced the strategic and tactical outcomes of battles on land.

Ancient maritime history informs us that the Mediterranean Sea located at the junction of Africa, Asia, and Europe was the first centre of maritime-power. The Minoans based in Crete were perhaps the first civilization (3000 BC to 1500 BC) that developed extensive maritime trading relations as well as significant naval power without being significantly threatened by external forces. The Minoan maritime empire and enterprise was the epitome of ancient maritime trade and maritime supremacy. The nemesis of the Minoan civilization was however due to a catastrophic natural disaster owing to a volcanic eruption around 1500 BC.

The Phoenicians succeeded Minoans and emerged as a dominant maritime power. Their seafaring skills encouraged them to expand their trade well beyond the Mediterranean to the west coast of Africa and their shipbuilding capability enabled them to build warships to project power and emerge as a formidable navy. The Phoenicians sustained their maritime trading hegemony in the Mediterranean until the Greeks neutralized them.

The self-government granted by the British to the Alliance Party in 1955 was returning partial power to the local people of the country. This was followed two years later by the British relinquishing power altogether and Malaya becoming independent.

As to be expected, the political changes, like in previous times, had ramifications in the educational field. The Alliance Party was led by UMNO, a Malay organization. With power in its hands, UMNO aspired and took steps to pursue an “ultimate objective” in education, which was to use the Malay language as the main medium of instruction in all schools. This objective still holds today. The objective was called ultimate because UMNO realized, for various reasons, that this could not be achieved overnight. It was ready to accommodate these various reasons and aimed to reach the objective only ultimately.

This chapter will attempt to chart the course which UMNO pursued to achieve its goal, as this impacted on Chinese education from the year 1955, when self-government was realized, to 1969, which was a turning point in the history of the country after which there were momentous changes again in the field of education. The Alliance Party was able to wrest self-government at first, and finally, even independence from the British because its component parties, UMNO, the MCA, and MIC, could reach a compromise amongst themselves on what should be the respective status of the Malay, Chinese, and Indian races in a new country. The understanding worked well for many years, but by 1969 each community had become dissatisfied with what the others were enjoying and an explosion occurred. Racial riots broke out.

TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

Between 1955 and 1957, the Alliance Party led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, negotiated with the British for independence. The talks were successful and the country became independent on 31 August 1957, with the Tunku as the prime minister.