INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's attitude to the relationship with the United States in the post- Cold War period could reasonably be characterized as ambivalent and full of contradictions. Jakarta's view of America in the 1990s became more and more unfavourable. As the post-Cold War era progressed, Suharto's New Order regime was increasingly annoyed by the U.S. criticism of Jakarta's human right abuses and of its heavy-handed treatment of East Timor. The emerging distrust of America's intentions was further accentuated by the perception that Washington exploited Indonesia's weakness during the 1997 financial meltdown by making Indonesia dependent on the IMF and putting immense pressure on Jakarta to accept a multinational peacemaking force in East Timor. The United States, along with Australia and other Western powers was also alleged to be using NGOs as part of a conspiracy to separate the provinces of West Papua and Aceh from Indonesia.

The U.S.-launched War on Terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, further exacerbated the upsurge of negative attitudes towards America as a series of anti-American demonstrations swept Indonesia in the period of 2001–05. In particular, the military campaign to overthrow the Iraqi regime gave rise to a wave of anti-Americanism that swept through Indonesia and widened the rift between the two former Cold War anti-communist allies. Some Islamic groups in Indonesia demanded that the government cut the country's diplomatic relations with the U.S. As public opinion polls indicate, Indonesian view of the United States underwent a major shift in the first five years of the new millennium. While 75 per cent of them had a favourable opinion of the U.S. in 2000, three years later, 83 per cent of the Indonesian population held an unfavourable view of that country. Commenting on the poll's results, a report noted that “anti-Americanism has [not only] deepened, but it has also widened. … People see America as a real threat. They think we [America] are going to invade them.” Moreover, the 2004–06 research demonstrated that 51 per cent of Indonesian leaders considered the United States, in contrast to 33 per cent Australia and 27 per cent China, as the principal malign factor affecting Indonesia's national interest and security.

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will look closely at the current Indonesian foreign policy elite's perceptions of China. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the elite have a deeply ambivalent, love-hate attitude towards the United States. In the light of the Indonesian leadership's concern about U.S. predominance and notably the George W. Bush Administration's assertive and unilateralist policies, the following discussion shows that the rise of China is welcomed insofar as it provides Indonesia with a greater space for manoeuvring vis-à-vis the United States and other major powers. Yet, in contrast with the United States that is ultimately viewed as ramah, a friendly power and the main guarantee for peace and stability in the region, this chapter highlights the Indonesian elite's deep-rooted sentiments held towards China, and its perceptions of the former “Middle Kingdom” that have been shaped by the long history of mutual interaction as well as China's geographic proximity.

The increasingly close economic, political and cultural ties between Indonesia and China stand in contrast to Jakarta's rather problematic and volatile relationship with Washington after 2002. We can question here whether the marked upswing in the Indonesia-China bilateral relations can be interpreted as a departure from the New Order's cautious approach to the long-standing “China threat” phenomenon. While pointing to some positive effects of China's rise for Indonesia, the leaders are simultaneously very much concerned about the prospect of facing a giant with hegemonic intentions at Indonesia's doorstep. Here, this chapter draws on the preceding one, and within the framework of balance-of-threat theory, it provides a comparative account of the elite perceptions of China and the United States in the context of the “mendayung antara dua karang” thesis.

POST-SUHARTO PERIOD: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY OF THE “CHINA THREAT” PERCEPTION

The preceding chapter drew attention to the recent rise of anti-American sentiments among Indonesia's population and growing suspicion about Washington's global actions among the country's elite. In contrast to Jakarta's rather volatile and problematic relationship with Washington, especially from 2002 onwards, Indonesia's relations with China have displayed an overall upward tendency.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with the Indonesian elite's perceptions of other important regional and extraterritorial state actors, namely Australia, Japan, India and the ASEAN countries. The preceding two chapters both analysed separately, and also juxtaposed, the elite perceptions of the United States and China in the context of the “mendayung antara dua karang” thesis — this signifies the Indonesian elite's belief that, in the future, the island nation will increasingly have to “row between two reefs”. In other words, much like in the bipolar Cold War era, Indonesia will have to manoeuvre between two rival superpowers — the United States and China, both of whom have proven to be of the highest concern to the interviewed members of the Indonesian foreign policy elite.

However, we will argue in this chapter that, when compared with the Cold War era, the elite is more confident in Indonesia's ability to successfully “navigate” between the “two reefs”. The confidence arises from the leaders’ belief that the future state and nature of international relations will allow Indonesia to decrease its perceived excessive political and economic dependence on the West in general and the United States in particular. Because, as a former President asserted,

As we have found, the current process of China's ascendancy is welcome in Jakarta insofar as it helps Indonesia to eliminate negative implications of the perceived assertive and unilateralist policies of the United States. Yet, the discussion on China also highlighted the elite's continuing deep-rooted suspicions and uneasiness about Beijing's perceived expansionist aspirations. These perceptions, it was argued, will in the future induce the Indonesian leaders to implement a hedging strategy to eliminate any potential threat by China to their country's national interests and security.

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will focus on the concept of the Indonesian foreign policy elite whose perceptions are the focal point of this study. There are two terms in the Indonesian language that describe the country's elite. Pejabat is a broad term that refers to officials occupying all levels — the lower ranks up to the top ranks — of the government bureaucracy. The term elit has similar meaning as the same term in the English language — in Indonesia it is used to describe the most prominent businessmen, military leaders and policy-makers in the bureaucratic hierarchy along with the most influential journalists and intellectuals who maintain close ties with the political establishment.

The existing studies that deal with the “foreign policy elite” look particularly at the issues of elite identity, sources of diversity in the power elite, and the correlation between the elite worldview and the concept of national interests and security. The following discussion will highlight the inherently ambiguous nature of the concept of Indonesia's national interests and security. We will see that the Indonesian elite encompass a variety of diverging views over what actually constitutes and how to defend Indonesia's national interests. The Indonesian elite have been subject to a diversity of ideational influences, which in turn gave rise to a plurality of disparate views and attitudes among the leadership. In contrast to the earlier Sukarno and Suharto regimes, the contemporary Indonesian foreign policy-making is determined by democratic political processes with the direct and indirect participation of a sheer variety of stakeholders who are involved in constant mixed-motive bargaining.

ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND THE CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY

In general, “national interest” as a concept essentially refers to a goal or set of goals of foreign policy that are universal and static, yet, in the case of any particular state, the actual national interest is both specific and dynamic. It is imperative for a state's elite involved in foreign policy-making and implementation to agree on and formulate a broad end or goal — “national interest” — that will provide a long-term sense of purpose and direction to foreign policy.

ABSTRACT

Energy supplies are the Achilles heel of the rising Asian economies in ASEAN, India, and China. Without assured supplies at affordable prices, the Asian economic boom would soon fizzle. Energy supplies are clearly and directly linked to geopolitics. Energy issues figure prominently in key relations among the Great Powers, and between India and Pakistan; they are important in Middle East-South Asia relations, and in Iran-India relations, as well as in maritime security issues involving sea lines of communications, such as the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Hormuz. Finally pipeline issues — such as those planned in Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan- India, Iran-Pakistan-India, the trans-peninsular across northern Malaya, from Central Asia outwards, and from Siberia to China and Japan — have loomed large in interstate relations. Much of the competition on energy access is based on a zero-sum game approach. An interesting question is whether we can turn such an approach into a win-win approach; but how would we achieve this?

INTRODUCTION

First, we can define energy security in terms of the following parameters:

1. • Physical: the availability and accessibility of energy supply sources

2. • Economic: the affordability of resource acquisition — mainly oil and gas — and energy infrastructure development

3. • Environmental: Sustainable development and use of energy resources in ways that do not harm the environment or cause adverse climate change, and that satisfies the needs of the present and future generations

4. • Geopolitical: since energy is highly politicized, as shown by the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 over natural gas in transit to the European Union.

When ASEAN countries survey the region in search of science and technology to assist their economic development, they may assess that Japan, China, Australia, and India are possible sources. Each of them have the needed expertise, as shown in their space, nuclear, industrial, and defence sectors. This applies equally to their energy sectors. Both India and China are similar to the ASEAN countries in terms of having large rural sectors, with many people living in villages, and in being developing countries.

ABSTRACT

India is already the world's fifth-largest energy consumer and is likely to move up to third place by 2030. Its energy needs will grow sharply over the next twenty-five years. Currently, India's primary energy mix is dominated by coal (51 per cent), followed by oil (36 per cent), natural gas (10 per cent), hydropower (2 per cent), and nuclear (1 per cent). India's incremental energy demand for the next decade will be among the highest in the world. The overall energy mix will continue to be dominated by coal, oil, and gas for the next twenty-five years. Other renewable sources of energy such as hydropower, wind, solar, biofuels, and hydrogen remain important, but not critical, for India's energy security. Even if a twenty-fold increase took place in India's nuclear power capacity by 2031–32, the contribution of nuclear energy to India's energy mix would also, at best, be about 4.0–6.4 per cent. Coal will remain India's principal source of commercial energy (estimated at about 45–50 per cent but under no circumstances less than 40 per cent) for the next few decades. India's continued and significant dependence on imported oil and gas is inescapable. Various pipeline issues are being discussed. India must get involved in Eurasian oil and gas projects, not only for its energy security, but also for political and strategic considerations. India must have a strategic understanding on energy with China too, since both are major energy consumers seeking energy from the same sources.

INTRODUCTION

India is today the world's fifth-largest consumer of energy, even though its current per capita consumption of energy is very low (490 kg of oil equivalent per capita, compared to a world average of 1,780 kg). If its economic growth remains at the recent high levels of 8–9 per cent per annum, it is likely to move up to third place by 2030. It is axiomatic that efficient and reliable energy supplies are a precondition for sustaining India's economic growth.

ABSTRACT

In the decade after World War II, the main energy source in Japan was coal, which was replaced gradually by oil in the 1970s. After the two oil shocks of the 1970s, awareness of the need for energy conservation grew. Active efforts were made to shift to a post-oil economy, with reduced reliance on oil and a shift to coal, natural gas, and nuclear power. However, the question of how to secure a stable oil supply remains a major challenge for Japan, as the country still depends on oil for much of its energy supply. The manufacturing industries have curbed their final energy consumption despite the subsequent economic recovery, thanks to an industrial structure that shifted emphasis from materials to IT and other industries, and to the introduction of energy conservation technology in response to a rise in energy prices. The income elasticity of energy (GDP elasticity) is a useful yardstick for directly examining the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption. The energy demand of a country is essentially determined not only by the size of its economy but also by a variety of factors such as its industrial structure, the lifestyle of its people, the level of its technology, and the condition of its climate. As a result of the two oil crises, change in Japan's industrial structure was undertaken and energy efficiency improved during this period. The two oil crises of the 1970s raised awareness of the importance of energy conservation and led to the implementation of energy conservation measures, including the establishment of legislation, various subsidies, and tax measures. In recent years, Japan's energy security has remained fragile not only because of a rise in the crude oil price but also because of the growing energy demand of Asian countries such as China and India and increasing oil dependence on the Middle East.

ABSTRACT

Energy facilitates all human endeavours. It is used for heating and cooling, illumination, health, food, education, industrial production, and transportation. Energy is essential to life. The development of human society and civilization has been shaped by energy. Countries across the world have considered the sufficient production and consumption of energy to be two of their main challenges. Modern economies are energy-dependent. Energy availability and consumption are such important considerations to economies worldwide that the energy consumed per capita has become one of the key indicators of modernization and progress in any given country. The security of energy supplies has been a geostrategic issue throughout this century. At the same time, the sheer intensity of energy production and its use has begun to result in negative impacts on the environment.

INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking, the final form of energy can be found in three types, namely, electricity, fuel, and heat. These are normally found in applications such as cooking, heating, cooling, lighting, the safe storage of food, clean water and sanitation, and in other services required by society, such as transportation, power for industry and agriculture, energy for commerce, communication, and other economic activities. The appetite for energy has often exceeded the capacity of local resources. During the twentieth century, the energy supplies of many countries were imported from distant sources. Efforts to establish influence and control over oil wells, gas fields, or oil shipping routes have generated persistent tensions and political problems. This situation has often influenced national policies in foreign affairs, economics, and science and technology. It has been a factor in influencing the political map of the world.

Since the discovery of massive, subterranean oil resources in the early 1900s, the world has consumed petroleum-based products as its main source of energy. As the engine of growth, energy has played a key role in achieving real improvements to human welfare.

ABSTRACT

Cambodia's power sector has been severely damaged by years of war and neglect. Since 1993, the government has started to restore the electricity infrastructure with support from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Japan, France, and other donor countries. The 2007 statistics show that per capita consumption is about 100 kWh per year. Only 16.4 per cent of households have access to electricity, the lowest electrification rate in Asia. Electricity costs in Cambodia remain one of the highest in the world due to the reliance on imported fuels and the lack of a grid system.

INTRODUCTION

Cambodia's public electricity supply at present comprises twenty-six small, isolated power systems that serve Phnom Penh and the capitals of the provinces. The largest system is in Phnom Penh, which has a population of around 1.4 million. In 2007, the system in Phnom Penh had a maximum output capacity of 243 MW with an actual installed capacity of 270 MW, out of which 224.4 MW was provided by Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and 45.6 MW was supplied by the state-owned power stations. The total output capacity for provincial capitals is estimated at 50 MW, with sizes ranging from 1MW to 10MW. Cambodia imports 95 MW of electricity from Thailand for the three northwestern provinces and 9.25 MW from Vietnam for the northeastern provinces.

ELECTRICITY DEMAND GROWS

According to the 2007 Power Development Plan of Cambodia, electricity demand is expected to increase significantly in the next fourteen years. Electricity generation is projected to grow from 808 MW and 1,550 GWh in 2009 to 3,867 MW and 8,300 GWh in 2020. The Government of Cambodia has intensified its efforts in enhancing energy resources and infrastructure development in order, firstly, to provide stable and affordable supplies of energy; secondly, to meet the rise in energy demand as the key element of fuelling national economic growth; thirdly, to provide adequate supplies of electricity to the rural areas and to improve the electrification ratio; fourthly, to tap sustainable sources of clean energy in order to offset the great increases in oil and gas prices in recent years.

ABSTRACT

Jatropha is a plant that has yet to be domesticated but that has great potential to be a sustainable source of energy. Its productivity however, is highly unpredictable and variable. Better knowledge of its biodiversity, the continuous breeding for better varieties, and the production and distribution of uniform and superior planting materials would all greatly increase the productivity of Jatropha in plantation. Addressing the issue of toxicity and ecological concerns would also lead to better acceptance of Jatropha.

INTRODUCTION

Commonly named the physic nut, Barbados nut, or purging nut, and as a member of the Euphorbiaceae family, Jatropha curcas is a shrub with a smooth, grey bark that grows up to six metres tall. It has large, pale green and shallow-lobed leaves that are arranged alternately. Its bark exudes copious amounts of watery sap when cut. Native to tropical America, it is cultivated widely in tropical countries throughout the world, mainly as a living fence and hedge plant (Jongschaap et al. 2007).

Jatropha grows in well drained and aerated soils and is well adapted to marginal soils with low nutrient content. Its water requirement is low and it withstands long periods of drought by shedding most of its leaves to reduce transpiration loss. It can also grow in lower temperatures and withstand light frosts. Jatropha has yellow-green flowers, generally with many more male than female flowers on the same plant. These flowers are pollinated by insects, especially honey bees. Seeds mature in about three months after flowering. Jatropha can produce seeds from the first year of planting onwards, for as long as fifty years in humid conditions (Heller 1996). Each fruit contains two to four large, black, oily seeds. The seeds contain up to 37 per cent of non-edible oil with the following four most abundant fatty acid components: palmitic (C16:0), stearic (C18:0), oleic (C18:1), and linoleic acids (C18:2). Jatropha seeds contain considerably more unsaturated fatty acids (oleic acid and linoleic acid) than saturated fatty acids (palmitic acid and stearic acid).

ABSTRACT

Automotive technology, transportation-related infrastructure, and liquid transport fuels are experiencing the largest transformation since the development of the internal combustion engine. Singapore, as a clean-tech hub and garden city, is well positioned for this change in transportation and the move towards sustainable mobility. Singapore's limited geography naturally encourages the use of Electric Vehicles (EVs), as their limitations with regard to range and speed are less of an issue. As Singapore aims to increase its population to about six million over the next two decades, traffic-related problems such as congestion and health issues due to poor air quality are likely to worsen as a result. Zeco, an Eonlux project, resulted in the Singapore- based Zero Emissions Company which provides solutions for sustainable mobility. It is dedicated to changing the mindset of consumers towards sustainable mobility by providing the necessary infrastructure and vehicles.

INTRODUCTION: THE GREEN LEAP FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR

Automotive technology, transportation-related infrastructure, and liquid transport fuels are experiencing the largest transformation since the development of the internal combustion engine in the late nineteenth century.

Singapore, as a clean-tech hub and garden city, is well positioned for this change in transportation and move towards sustainable mobility. Singapore has a unique opportunity to serve as a global example of sustainable transportation. Due to the limited land area of Singapore, long-distance travel is not feasible. Overpowered vehicles such as sports cars and SUVs cannot be suitably utilized in Singapore. Singapore's geography naturally encourages the use of Electric Vehicles (EVs), as their limitations in regards to range and speed are less of an issue.

Densely populated Singapore has strong incentives to reduce congestion, pollution, and high vehicle numbers. This is mainly done through the Certificate of Entitlement, Additional Registration Fee (ARF) and Electronic Road Pricing systems. As Singapore aims to increase its human population to about six million over the next two decades, traffic-related problems such as congestion and health issues due to poor air quality are likely to worsen as a result.

ABSTRACT

Economic growth is a goal and an aspiration of developing countries such as the Philippines. The challenges to economic growth presented by the escalating prices of petroleum product imports have motivated governments to consider localized and renewable sources of energy as a major aspect of the countries’ energy supply. For the Philippines, an essentially agricultural economy, one option is to develop renewable energy resources, particularly biomass-based feedstock. As a result, localizing energy supply by exploring and developing renewable energy has always been a part of the country's priorities since energy planning was institutionalized there in the 1970s.

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Energy (DOE) is the primary agency of the Philippine Government mandated to develop and implement the overall agenda for the energy sector. The agenda is embodied in the Philippine Energy Plan. Developing the alternative/renewable energy sector through the Alternative Fuels Program is among the components of the Philippine Energy Plan. The DOE emphasis on the harnessing and utilization of renewable energy comprises a critical component of the government's strategy to provide energy supply for the country. This is evident in the power sector, where increased generation from geothermal and hydro resources has lessened the country's dependence on imported and polluting fuels. In the government's rural electrification efforts, on the other hand, renewable energy sources such as solar, micro- hydro, wind, and biomass resources are now used on a wide scale. Based on current projections of the DOE, renewable energy is foreseen to provide up to 40 per cent of the country's primary energy requirements over the ten-year period beginning in 2003. Although its share will decline in relation to the total figure, renewable energy is estimated to grow at an average annual rate of 2.4 per cent in absolute terms. Biomass, micro-hydro, solar, and wind will remain the largest contributors to the total share of renewable energy in the energy mix, with an average share of 27.5 per cent. Meanwhile, hydro and geothermal will contribute the balance and continue to be significant sources of electric power.

ABSTRACT

Despite China's claim that it wants close and cordial relations with the ASEAN states, the steady increase in its military capabilities and its capacity to enforce its claims in the South China Sea have raised concerns among the ASEAN countries and other powers. The South China Sea is of strategic maritime importance and has potential oil and gas resources. The Spratlys are claimed by six countries and have been the source of disputes. China's nine- dotted line designing its claimed boundary in the South China Sea raises a number of problems. In short, the South China Sea could prove to be a cockpit for disputes over energy resources.

THE SETTING

China has declared that it wants close, cordial, and cooperative relations with the ten ASEAN states. Such cooperation has gained impressive momentum since the end, simultaneously, of the Cold War and of Chinese support for communist-led insurgencies in the region. However, China's military power is growing steadily; at the same time, it claims ownership of the Spratlys and Paracel Islands, together with their surrounding waters and resources in the South China Sea, one of the world's largest semi-enclosed seas (see Figure 8.1). These claims overlap in a substantial way with those of four ASEAN countries — Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia, as well as Taiwan.

China is expected to gain the military capability to enforce its claims in the South China Sea in the next few years. This creates uncertainty over the future of China's relations, not only with ASEAN members but also with ASEAN's main dialogue partners, including the United States, Japan, India, South Korea, and Australia. These countries have important links with China. They also have significant strategic and commercial interests in the South China Sea and in ASEAN.

At three million square kilometres, the South China Sea is the maritime heart of Southeast Asia. It is two-thirds the size of the combined ASEAN land territory. Most Southeast Asian countries have coastlines overlooking or close to the South China Sea.